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FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1976
MERLIN G. BRINER*
INTRODUCTION
F EDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1976 is the fourth of an annual
series of articles to be published in the Winter Issue of the AKRON LAW
REVIEW. The scope of this survey is limited to the substantive developments
in the field of income taxation. The thrust of this article is not only to identify
the new developments, but also to trace these concepts through their formula-
tive changes. This article covers not only the new developments in the case
law but also the TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976.
Given the volatile nature of taxation, it is crucial for the practitioner
in this field to remain current with the changes which have occurred during
the year. Research of this article includes cases decided through December 1,
1976.
In an attempt to minimize the lead time between research and publica-
tion, this author has engaged the most able assistance of several members
of the AKRON LAW REVIEW. Without their substantial contributions and
complete dedication, this article would not have been possible. The author,
therefore, wishes to recognize and thank the following members of the AKRON
LAW REVIEW, for their efforts in researching, writing and compiling this
article: John T. Bender, Larry K. Carnahan, Donald C. Hanzel, Andrew M.
Jaffe, R. Marshall Jones, Kevin C. Krull, William F. Stamm, and Donald
Russell Teffner. Special appreciation is extended to Kevin C. Krull and
William F. Stamm for their dedicated efforts.
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1.00 Income
1.01 Assignment of Income
Under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, the Internal Revenue
Service can shift income, deductions, credits, or allowances among organi-
zations, trades or businesses owned or controlled directly or indirectly
"by the same interest."' The Tax Court has just held that two corporations
owned by different members of one family are not necessarily owned by
"the same interests."'
Two brothers, Robert and Juan, and their immediate families each
owned 37 percent of the stock of a domestic corporation. The remaining
shares were owned by uncles, an aunt and cousins. A foreign corporation
was owned by Juan, his wife and daughter, except for a few qualifying shares.
The Service claimed that the domestic corporation's purchases of tile from
I INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §482. All subsequent references to Code Sections are to the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.
2 Robert W. Brittingham, 66 T.C. No. 41 (1976).
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the foreign corporation were at an excessive price. Since the same "family
unit" owned both corporations, the Service ruled that overpayments could
be corrected by reallocating the deduction under Section 482. The Tax Court
disagreed, stating ". .. There must be a common design for the shifting of
income in order for different individuals to constitute the 'same interests' .",
Here, there was no clear intent to shift income between corporations. The
court opined, "To believe that Robert would be a part of a plan to divert
$1.5 million from a corporation in which he and his children owned a 37
percent interest to a corporation in which his immediate family had no
interest strains all credulity."'
The purpose of Section 482 is to allocate income and deductions be-
tween controlled groups which will give a fair representation of how the
income and deductions would be reflected between parties dealing at arms
length. Generally, allocation is required between members of a controlled
group when the transactions between them are not for a business purpose
but merely to avoid taxes.5 Consistent with this idea is Palo Alto Town &
Country Village, Inc.,' where one member of a controlled group purchased
timber from another member of the group for $17,818.85 and then resold
the timber back to that member for $47,767.84. The possession of the timber
never shifted from the original vendor. Thus, the Tax Court felt that the
purely paper transaction here was not of the type one would see between
uncontrolled parties, and as such it would not set aside the Commissioner's
allocation of income as arbitrary. In addition to tax avoidance, an application
of Section 482 requires that the transaction be between members of a group
controlled by the same interests.7 In some cases, control by the same interests
is obvious. In U.S. Gypsum Co. v. United States,8 U.S. Gypsum had two
wholly-owned subsidiaries, U.S. Gypsum Export Company and Panama
Gypsum Company, Inc. When U.S. Gypsum contracted with Panama Gypsum
for freight rates, the rates were figured by using ships that were smaller and
slower than Panama Gypsum used. Furthermore, U.S. Gypsum sold its
products to U.S. Gypsum Export at a three and one half percent markup;
Export resold at a 77 percent markup in 1957 and a 72 percent markup
in 1958, but in sales to uncontrolled purchasers the markup was 47 percent
in 1957 and 56 percent in 1958. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Com-
missioner's allocation between Export and U.S. Gypsum by noting that all
the parties were owned by the same interests, and as such their dealings
s Id. at 220.
Id.
5 Pacific Northwest Food Club, Inc., 33 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 64,008 (1964).
6 42 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 73,223 (1973).
7 33 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 64,008, at 36.
8 452 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1971).
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were structured so as to shift income and loss to where it would be most
advantageous for tax purposes. Thus, Section 482 required allocation.
Revenue Ruling 76-88' states that if the dealing between the members
of a controlled group are as they would be between unrelated parties, then
there would be no income distortion and no need to allocate. Along this
vein, Delhar, Inc. v. United States" provides some insight into this arm's
length type transaction test. In Delhar, an attempted allocation of income
between the operating corporations and the service corporations was denied
because the companies maintained a separate existence and conducted their
separate affairs pursuant to normal corporate formality. This dealing with
each other as if they did not belong to the same controlled group convinced
the court that no income distortion would occur without allocation.
2.00 Exclusions From Income
2.01 Meals and Lodging
In Kowalski v. Commissioner" the Third Circuit has aligned itself with
the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits" in permitting state highway patrol-
men to exclude cash allowances for meals from gross income. Kowalski, a
New Jersey State Trooper, received a cash meal allowance separately stated
and included in his biweekly salary check. Like all troopers, he was on call
at all times, including meal time, expected to eat at public restaurants within
his assigned patrol area, and not permitted to accept any free meals. He was
not required to account for his expenditures.
The Tax Court in Kowalski had refused to include the cash allowances
within the Section 119 exclusion for meals and lodging because the meals
were not furnished "in kind"." In its per curiam opinion the Third Circuit
reversed, adopting the reasoning of Judge Sterret's dissenting opinion in the
Tax Court.' Judge Sterret accepted the taxpayer's reliance upon Saunders v.
Commissioner," decided under the 1939 Code. In refusing to be strictly
9 Rev. Rul. 76-88, 1976 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 11 at 7.
10 71-1 U.S. TAx CAS. 9107 (1970).
11 38 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 76-6125 (3d Cir. 1976). rev'g 65 T.C. 44 (1975).
12 United States v. Keeton, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Morelan, 356
F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963).
13 65 T.C. at 58. Treas. Reg. §1.119-1(c)(2) states:
"The exclusion provided by Section 119 applies only to meals and lodging furnished in
kind by an employer to his employee." However, there is nothing in the statute which
requires meals to be "in kind" in order to be excludible. The Tax Court did provide
some relief to the taxpayer by allowing him to conduct 2/3 of his meal allowance under
Section 162(a) (2), as expenses incurred while away from home.
14 38 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 76-6126.
"5 215 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954).
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bound by the form of payment, the Third Circuit felt Jacob v. United States'6
reaffirmed the doctrine of Saunders that the "convenience of the employer"
test should permit a broad construction of the term "meals" to properly
reflect the intent of Section 119.1'
Apparently, the court did not consider the "business premises test",
relied upon by the First Circuit in finding against the taxpayer, to be worthy
of discussion. 8 The resolution of this question will remain in doubt until
the Supreme Court resolves this conflict between the circuits and the tax
court.
3.00 Exemptions
4.00 Deductions
4.01 Medical Expenses - Special Education
Section 213 of the Code permits deductions of medical care expenses.
Many taxpayers have been permitted to deduct the cost of sending their
children to a "special" school for the mentally or physically handicapped.
However, the definition of a "special" school found in the regulations is
confined to a school where the student is enrolled for the principal reason
of the alleviation of the student's physical or mental handicap.' 9
Jack Kaufman v. United States" points out an important distinction
in qualifying for the deduction. Mr. Kaufman's son was enrolled in a private
school on the advice of the son's treating psychiatrist. The school did not
have any special facilities for students with emotional problems, no psychi-
atrist or psychologist was listed on the staff, and no special facilities were
available for psychological therapy. Even though the psychiatrist believed
this school would benefit the Kaufman child, the lack of any "special" pro-
grams or facilities at the school disqualified the deduction claimed by
Mr. Kaufman.
It seems clear that to qualify for a deduction the school must provide
some special services. In James R. Martin," the court denied a deduction
16 493 F.2d 1294 (3d Cir. 1974).
17 38 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 76-6126.
isWilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969), interpreting Section 119, which
provides, in part:
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of any meals...
furnished to him by his employer for the convenience of the employer, but only if...
the meals are furnished on the business premises of the employer....
Other courts have found the "business premises" test to be met, e.g., United States v. Morelan,
356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963);
Koerner v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.W. Va. 1975).
19 Treas. Reg. §1.213-1(e)(1)(v)(g).
20 37 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 76-562 (Dec. 1, 1975).
2144 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 175-362 (1975).
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where the school had a philosophy that a child with a handicap should be
treated to life as he would find it with or without such a handicap. The
parents regarded the school's philosophy as unique and thus "special". How-
ever, the court disagreed because the alleviation of their son's hearing loss
was not the principal reason for his attendance at the school.
In C. Fink Fischer," the taxpayer deducted as a medical expense the
cost of enrolling his son in a private school for the dual purpose of remedial
education and the treatment of mental and emotional problems. The court
held that only the portion of school tuition attributable to the additional
cost of psychotherapy and related services was properly deductible. The
measure of that additional cost was determined to be the difference between
the tuition paid and the approximate cost of tuition at a similar private
school not offering the special services.
Unless the school can be classified as a "special" school or a school
serving a dual purpose, the tuition will not be deductible under Section 213.
4.02 Medical Expense - Recommended Trips
In general, the cost of a medically recommended trip may be deducted
if the amount is for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention
of disease.23 Essential transportation expenses are also deductible.2 ' However,
if the expenditure is merely beneficial to the general health of the taxpayer,
it is not a deductible expense.
Revenue Ruling 76-7921 describes an innovative attempt to deduct
transportation expenses incurred in a physician-recommended cruise. A
group of physicians were aboard the cruise ship and provided the following
medical services: reviewed the patient's medical records, performed tests
on the patient, and reported the results of the patient's medical progress to
the patient's personal physician. Seminars on the patient's medical condition
and a supervised dietary program were also provided. The Service concluded:
"The cruise ship was not a hospital or other medical institution, and the
medical services rendered aboard the ship were available in the taxpayer's
home town." 6
The only expenses permitted to be deducted under Section 213 would
be the cost of "... reviewing the patient's medical records, performing
medical tests, and reporting results to the patient's personal physician...
22 50 T.C. 164 (1968).
23 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §213(e)(1)(A).
24d. §213(e)(1)(B).
25 Rev. Rul. 76-79, INT. REv. BuLL. No. 10 at 7.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 8.
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However, the taxpayer must establish what portion of the amount paid for
the cruise was attributable to the aforementioned items. The food and
lodging expenses of the cruise would not be deductible as the ship was not
considered an inpatient hospital. 8
The desirability of such a cruise to a taxpayer is apparent. However,
the strict interpretation of the regulations should dissuade the use of such
a cruise if it is hoped that a majority of the cost would be deductible as a
medical expense under Section 213.
4.03 Medical Reimbursement Plans
Section 105(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for an exclusion
from gross income amounts that an employee receives directly or indirectly
under an accident or health plan as reimbursement for medical expenses"
incurred by himself, his spouse, or his dependants" to the extent, however,
that the benefits are attributable to employer contributions. But, if the medical
reimbursement plan is, in fact, not a plan for employees, and is set up to
benefit shareholders by distributing nontaxable funds to them, the medical
expense payments will be considered to be constructive dividends."' In such
a case of disguised dividends, the medical expense reimbursements are in-
cludible as income to the recipient and are not deductible by the employer.
In Estate of John J. Leidy," the Tax Court decided that medical ex-
pense reimbursement payments to a shareholder-employee were includible
in his income and not deductible by the corporation. From 1956 until 1960,
John Leidy, the taxpayer, and his mother each owned 50 percent of the out-
standing common stock of Leidy Chemicals Corp. In 1956, Leidy discovered
that he had a heart condition, which, while not immediately dangerous, would
gradually worsen. Within a week thereafter, the corporation adopted a medical
reimbursement plan covering all medical and hospital expenses of Leidy and
his mother for 1957. The following year the corporation expanded the plan
to cover all employees of the company who had a minimum of five years
of service. However, coverage was limited to an amount not in excess of one
percent of the employee's base annual salary, but the limitation of reimburse-
ment provision did not apply to the president or vice president of the corpor-
ation, those positions being held by Leidy and his mother, respectively.
During the period of 1961 to 1970 Leidy received $60,693.99, which repre-
2 8 Treas. Reg. §1.213-1(e) (1) (v).
29 Cf. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §213(e).
30 See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §152.
31 Compare Alan B. Larkin, 48 T.C. 629 (1967), affd, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968), with
John L. Ashby, 50 T.C. 409 (1968).
32 45 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 75,340 (1975).
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sented approximately 71 percent of the medical expense payments during the
period.
The Tax Court found that the payment received by the taxpayer did not
come within the exclusion provision of Section 105 (b). For payments received
by the employee to be excludible from his gross income under that provision,
two requirements must be met: (1) there must be a "plan"; (2) the plan
must be for the benefit of "employees" as opposed to shareholders."3 In
Leidy, while a plan for health insurance was found to exist, it was found to
be deficient since the taxpayer did not show any rational basis for the dis-
parity in coverage of Leidy and his mother from the rest of the covered
employees."4 While plans "may discriminate among employees in awarding
benefits, there must be some other rational basis for the discrimination than
ownership of the business.""5
In American Foundry v. Commissioner36 the Ninth Circuit upheld a
medical reimbursement plan which only covered the corporation's majority
stockholder, Dominic Meaglia, who was also the corporation's founder and
ex-president. The American Foundry Company in 1957, by corporate resolu-
tion, established a medical reimbursement plan. The plan covered officers of
the company to the extent that they were not covered by an existing group
medical insurance policy. At the time of the adoption of the resolution the
group policy covered all officers except Dominic Meaglia.
While the Tax Court recognized that a medical reimbursement plan may
be limited to some identifiable class of employees such as corporate officers,"'
and that a plan can be for as few as one employee," it decided in American
Foundry that the plan did not qualify under Section 105(b). Since the Tax
Court found that ".. . Dominic did not fall within a distinct class or category
of employees as would indicate that the 'plan' was one for 'employees,'" it
held the payments were, therefore, includable in Dominic's gross income. 9
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision that the plan was not
one for employees, stating:
33 Samuel Levine, 50 T.C. 422 (1968); Alan B. Larkin, 48 T.C. 629 (1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d
494 (1st Cir. 1968). See also Nathan Epstein, 41 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 228 (1972); E. B.
Smith, 39 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 11164 (1970) (upholding plan even though it was limited only
to corporate officers).
34 45 P-H TAX Cr. MEM. 75,340, at 1443.
35 Id., citing Samuel Levine, 50 T.C. 422, 427 (1968). See Treas. Reg. §1.105-5, which per-
mits a plan to be for as few as one employee.
36 37 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 76-1373 (9th Cir. 1976), ajf'g and rev'g 59 T.C. 231 (1972).
37 See e.g., E. B. Smith, 39 P-H TAX Cr. MEM. 1164 (1970). See also Rev. Rul 71-588,
1971-2 CuM. BULL. 91.
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5.
39 59 T.C. at 242-43. See INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, §61(a).
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The appropriate key to deciding whether a plan is "for employees"
and/or "shareholders" is whether the expected benefits of the plan are
to be paid with respect to the individual's capacity as an employee of
the corporation and whether there is any rational basis other than owner-
ship to differentiate that individual from other employees.'"
The Ninth Circuit found a rational basis for distinguishing Dominic
from the other employees on the basis that (1) at the time of resolution,
Dominic was the "key" employee, and (2) by the terms of the resolution,
any officer who dropped his group medical insurance would have been
covered by the corporate resolution."
4.04 Illegal Discounts
The Internal Revenue Service has recently withdrawn its acquiescence' 2
in two Tax Court decisions'" involving illegal discounts. Both cases involved
violations of similar state laws which fixed minimum milk sale prices. The
milk companies illegally sold below the minimum price level and the sales
were entered on the books at the authorized prices. The difference between
the authorized price and the actual price was deducted through an allowance
account. The Service asserted that the allowance account was not deductible
based on the rationale that to allow the deduction would serve to frustrate
public policy. The Tax Court found for the taxpayers stating that the net
selling price should be given recognition for income tax purposes.
Although the Service gave no reason for withdrawal of its acquiescence,
Section 162(c) (2), which was added in 1969, specifically addresses itself to
illegal payments:
No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any payment(other than a payment described in paragraph (1) ) made, directly
or indirectly, to any person, if the payment constitutes an illegal bribe,illegal kickback, or other illegal payment under any law of the United
States, or under any law of a State (but only if such State law is gen-
erally enforced), which subjects the payer to a criminal penalty or the
loss of license or privilege to engage in a trade or business."
The Service's change of position in the two illegal discount Tax Court
cases appears to be an effort by the Service to conform to the statutory
change effected through Section 162 (c) (2).
40 37 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 76-1376.
"4 Id. Cf. 59 T.C. at 242-43.
42 1976 INT. REV. BULL. No. 33, at 6.
43 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 5 acquiescing in Pittsburgh Milk Co., 26 T.C. 707 (1956); 1961-2CUM. BuLL. 3 acquiescing in Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., 36 T.C. 173 (1961).
44 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §162(c)(2).
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4.05 Travel Expenses
Transportation and incidental expenses incurred by a stockholder in
attending stockholders' meetings of companies in which he owns stock are
personal expenditures and therefore not deductible. 5 The Service reasons
that the expenses of attending these meetings are not sufficiently related to
the taxpayer's investment activities to warrant inclusion under Section 212.
The fact that the shareholder has no other interest in the company other
than the ownership of stock appears to be material to his ability to manage
and control income producing aspects of his investments.
The taxpayer may, however, receive a deduction for travel expenses
incurred in visiting his income producing property. In R. C. Coffey," the
Tax Court permitted a travel expense deduction incurred by the taxpayer
in visiting certain mining interests he controlled. The taxpayer therein realized
income from these interests of approximately $160,000 for the tax year in
question. The Tax Court, without specifying its reasoning, simply found that
these expenses came within the purview of Section 121 (a) (2) of the Revenue
Act of 1942. (Section 121 (a) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1942 was the prede-
cessor of Section 212 and was not materially altered by the enactment of the
current Code.) The Tax Court, however, denied the taxpayer's claimed
deductions for automobile maintenance since there was no substantial evidence
that these additional expenses were proximately related to any of his business
trips.
What criteria then must be satisfied for a taxpayer to receive a deduction
under Section 212? Generally, there must be an immediate type of relation
between the expenses incurred and the managment of the taxpayer's invest-
ment activities. In Stanley S. Walters," the taxpayer was denied a claimed
deduction for automobile and parking expenses incurred from regular trips
to his brokerage house during his lunch hour to observe the "ticker tape".
The court found that these trips were not directly related to any particular
stock transaction. Further, such trips to a brokerage house cannot be deemed
necessary in the sense that they were appropriate and helpful to the taxpayer
in his production of income. In short, some reasonable nexus or proximate
relationship between the claimed transportation expenses and the production
of income is an essential prerequisite to satisfying the ordinary and necessary
tests of Section 212.8
Perhaps the most satisfying explanation of what qualifies as a deduction
45 Rev. Rul. 56-511, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 170.
46 1 T.C. 579 (1943), aff'd, 141 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1944).
,6 38 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 69,005 (1969).
48 See John C. Kingsbury, 44 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 75,204 (1975).
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for investigative travel is found in William R. Kinney." The taxpayer therein
was a substantial investor and made approximately fifteen investigative trips
throughout the United States in the tax year in question. The Tax Court dis-
allowed his claimed deductions since the expenses incurred had not been
proven to bear a "reasonable and proximate relationship to his investment
activities." However, the court went on to say that it may have decided in
favor of the taxpayer if
. . . proof had been adduced that such a trip was part of a rationally
planned, systematic investigation of the business operations of such a
company, if the level of costs involved had been reasonable viewed in
relation to the magnitude of the investment and the value of the informa-
tion reasonably expected to be derived from the trip, if circumstances
had negated a disguised personal motive for the travel, and if there had
been some showing of practical application through investment decisions
of the kind of information gained from such trips, .... 50
The court pointed out that the locations visited were not crucial in
production or in other respects having a direct effect on stock market value.
The investigation sites were randomly selected in conjunction with visits to
relatives in the area and, therefore, could not be deemed customary or normal
(ordinary) for an investor in stocks and commodities.
Although the Tax Court denied the taxpayer's claimed expense deduc-
tion, it recognized that there are circumstances in which such travel by
a substantial investor could be deemed ordinary and necessary. Obviously,
the circumstances in which investigative travel deductions will be allowed
are rare. However, the guidelines offered by the Tax Court in William R.
Kinney, above, should prove to be a helpful planning aid to the investor
desiring such a deduction. The taxpayer will be constrained to follow the
Tax Court's interpretation of Section 212 as the Tax Reform Act of 1976
does not encompass any changes in this particular area.
4.06 Education Expense
The deductibility of educational expenses hinge on whether the incurred
costs can be classified as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Treasury
Regulation 1.1 6 2-5 (a) allows the taxpayer to deduct the educational expense
if the education:
(1) Maintains or improves skills required by the individual in his em-
ployment or other trade or business, or"'
(2) Meets the express requirements of the individual's employer, or the
49 66 T.C. No. 17 (Apr. 21, 1976).
5 0 d. at 70.
GI Treas. Res . §1.162-5(a)(1).
AKRON LAW REvmW [Vol. 10:3
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss3/6
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1976
requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a con-
dition to the retention by the individual of an established employ-
ment relationship, status, or rate of compensation.52
These two areas of deductibility are not as broad as they first seem. Treasury
Regulation 1.162-5 (b) disqualifies otherwises complying educational expenses
if they either are incurred in order to meet the minimum educational require-
ments for qualification in taxpayer's trade or business,5" or those educational
expenses incurred that qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business. 5'
In applying these regulations one of the most litigated questions is
whether the taxpayer is improving currently facilitated employment skills
or actually qualifying himself for a new trade or business. The resolution
of this question often turns on the taxpayer's primary purpose for incurring
the educational expense. However, what begins as a rather straightforward
means of determination becomes muddied when the holdings in non-law school
cases are contrasted with those where the taxpayer attempts to deduct law
school expenses.
In Greenberg v. Commissioner,5 5 the taxpayer had completed his training
in the field of psychiatry and began to practice, on a part-time basis, in a
Veteran's Hospital. In addition to practicing part-time, the taxpayer engaged
in an institute-sponsored training program in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis
is a recognized specialty in the field of mental health, and thus the expenses
incurred in receiving this training would seem to be nondeductible under
Treasury Regulation 1.162-5(b) (3). The court, instead of viewing this as
training to meet the minimum qualifications for a new trade or business,
looked to the taxpayer's primary purpose for pursuing the training. The court
held in favor of deductibility, stating that even though the taxpayer could
have become a psychoanalyst on the conclusion of his training, the taxpayer's
sole purpose was to add the techniques of psychoanalysis to those skills he
already exercised in his practice of psychiatry.
The primary purpose test has been much less successful when applied
to law school expenses. In Condit v. Commissioner,5 the taxpayer was a
full-time accountant who attended law school in the evenings. The Commis-
sioner contended that the taxpayer had actually incurred an educational
expense which would qualify him for a new trade or business. In the face of
this attack the taxpayer contended that he studied law to improve his arsenal
5 2 Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(a)(2).
5 5 Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2).
54 Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(3).
15 367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1966).
56 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964).
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of skills used on his current job, and that this ought to be viewed as his
primary purpose, for subsequent to his graduation from law school he was
still employed as an accountant. The court disagreed and denied deductibility
for the reasoning proposed by the Commissioner.
Not all legal training expenses have their deductibility disallowed.
Revenue Ruling 76-6211 has opened some doors. This Ruling allows law school
training expenses to be deductible if the law courses are job related and
are taken to maintain or improve the skills required for the taxpayer's job,
and the courses, although leading to a degree, will not qualify him to take
a state bar examination due to the lack of accreditation of the school.
Once a taxpayer has begun the practice of law, additional training
incident to that practice will give rise to deductible expenses. For instance,
in Bistline v. United States,5" a two week federal taxation course was taken
by a practicing attorney. All his expenses incident to the training were held
deductible. Some caution, however, should be exercised if the attorney is a
recent graduate. In Richard M. Randich 9 the taxpayer was a recent law
school graduate. Shortly after taking the bar examination the taxpayer enrolled
in a post-graduate tax course. When he attempted to deduct the tax course
expenses as ordinary and necessary business expenses, the Commissioner
disallowed the deduction. The Tax Court, in agreeing with the Commissioner,
reasoned that these educational expenses did not have a sufficient nexus to
the taxpayer's trade or business to be a deductible personal expense.
In many cases where deductible educational expenses are found, the
employer reimburses the employee. Generally the treatment on the tax return
for such a situation would be as follows: The reimbursement would be in-
cluded in the employee's gross income "9 and the expense would be deducted
for adjusted gross income."' To avoid this some have tried to exclude the
reimbursement from their income. The general thrust has been that the
reimbursement is really an educational grant and therefore excluded from
income by Section 117. At first blush this appears to have merit, but an
examination of the regulation will show the futility of this approach in that
a grant which benefits the grantor is really compensation. 2
Revenue Ruling 76-7111 offers a better technique for excluding educa-
tional reimbursement from income. As previously stated, educational expenses
57 Rev. Rul. 76-62, 1976 INT. REV. BULL. No. 9 at 6.
58 145 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Idaho 1956).
5945 P-H TAX Cr. MEm. 76,045 (1976).
66I0NT. REV. CODE of 1954, §61.
e2 Treas. Reg. §1.162-5.
62 Treas. Reg. §1.117-4(c)(2).
6s Rev. Rul. 76-71, 1976 INT. REv. BULL. No. 9 at 16.
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are only deductible if they can qualify as ordinary and necessary business
expenses."4 However, the regulations 5 point out that when an employee pays
the business expenses of his employer, and is subsequently reimbursed to the
extent of the business expenses, the employee need not account for the reim-
bursement. Likewise, the employer is relieved of withholding if the employee's
compensation and expense reimbursement are separated.6" Thus if the employee
can report on his personal tax return that the reimbursement equaled the
ordinary and necessary business expense, he gains three advantages: First,
he does not have to include the reimbursement in his income; second, he
would be fulfilling his Section 1.162-17 (b) (1) accounting requirements with
his employer and therefore his substantion problems are reduced, and finally
he has freed his return of capital from all withholding.
4.07 Contingent Compensation Plans - Unreasonable Salary
Section 162 permits a deduction of all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid during the taxable year including "a reasonable allowance
for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered." '
Closely held corporations have utilized contingent compensation arrange-
ments to decrease their income tax liabilities.
In Central Freight Lines, Inc.,6 8 the Tax Court disagreed with the
Internal Revenue Service and held that a contingent compensation arrange-
ment with a major stockholder and his resulting salary were reasonable for
the amount of work he did. The corporation was reorganized by the controlling
stockholder and an executive committee form of management was adopted.
Under this plan, the taxpayer relinquished the presidency and became chair-
man of the board of directors. The taxpayer's new duties involved the develop-
ment of policies on operations, expansion, and management. He also acted
as the corporation's spokesman in important negotiations.
At the suggestion of the taxpayer, the corporation set up a contingent
compensation plan for top managerial personnel. This plan, adopted in 1952,
provided for low base salaries plus a set percentage of the company's profits
each year. The taxpayer was to receive a base salary of $15,000 plus 5
percent of the company's profits. In 1958 his share of the profits was reduced
from 5 to 3 percent. From 1953 through 1970, the taxpayer's salary ranged
from a low of $29,043 to a high of $115,024 in 1970.
The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the corporation's deductions
6 4 Treas. Reg. §1.162-5.
65 Treas. Reg. §1.162-17(b)(1).
6
eEmp. Tax Reg. §§31.3121(a)-1(h), 31.3306(b)-1(h), 31,3401(a)-1(b)(2).
67 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §162(a)(1).
es 45 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 76,025 (Jan. 7, 1976).
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for compensation paid to the taxpayer in excess of $50,000 in 1969 and
$52,500 in 1970 respectively. In upholding the deduction the Tax Court
noted that although the plan was not the result of arm's-length negotiation,
nothing in the record indicated that the taxpayer used his majority control
position to obtain either an excessive or unreasonable level of compensation.
The court noted that 22 other employees of Central also participated in the
plan, and the level of compensation of the taxpayer was consistent with the
compensation paid to the other participating employees. Finally, the Tax
Court held that the over-all involvement of the taxpayer in the day-to-day
activities of the corporation justified the compensation he received. Thus,
under the Regulations"9 the corporation was entitled to reasonable allowance
for compensation for personal services actually rendered.
However, in Repel Steel & Supply Co., Inc.,"0 the Service was successful
in disallowing $60,547 as unreasonable compensation in 1968 and $74,962
in 1969 for a close corporation that had been previously audited in 1961,
1962, 1963, and 1964. The corporation was owned by three stockholder-
officers. Since 1962 these officers had an agreement to receive bonuses
totaling 40 percent of the corporate net profits before taxes. On Service
audits of 1961, 1962, 1963, and 1964, total compensation as high as
$150,62271 in one year for the three officers was accepted as reasonable.
The amount of compensation for the year 1964 represented 27 percent of
the corporation's gross profit and 62 percent of the corporation's net profit
before taxes.
The total compensation for the three stockholder-officers increased
to $224,874 and $263,527 for the tax years 1968 and 1969 respectively.
However, these amounts only represented 22 percent and 24 percent of the
corporation's gross profit and 53 percent and 51 percent of the net profit
before taxes. Although these amounts represented a decrease in the percentage
of profits received by the stockholder-officers, the corporation had never
paid dividends.
The Tax Court agreed with the Internal Revenue Service and disallowed
$60,547 as unreasonable compensation for 1968 and $74,962 as unreasonable
compensation for 1969. Even though the Internal Revenue Service accepted
compensation as reasonable in previous years, the Tax Court found that they
were not compelled to give a considerable amount of weight to that fact
since the officers set their own salaries."2 In addition, the Tax Court found
69 Treas. Reg. §1.162-7(b)(3).
TO 45 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 76,086 (Mar. 22, 1976).
TiThis compensation was considered reasonable in the 1964 audit by the Internal Revenue
Service.
72See also Ridgewood Provisions, Inc., 6 T.C. 87 (1946). Cf. George F. Tollefsen, 52 T.C.
671 (1969), aff'd 431 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 908 (1971).
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that the bonuses paid were in substance a distribution of the profits to each
officer as a shareholder. Also, the amount of the bonus was determined
according to the amount of working capital necessary for the operation of
the business, not according to the value of the services actually rendered by
the officers.
4.08 Legal Expenses
Section 212(3) of the Code permits the deduction of ordinary and
necessary expenses incurred in connection with the determination of any
tax. The Commissioner has recently attempted to engraft an exception upon
this general rule by contending that legal fees should not be deductible if
the tax arose from a capital transaction.
In Sharples v. United States," the taxpayer deducted the legal expenses
incurred in resisting a Venezuelan tax liability for which he would have been
personably liable by operation of Delaware law. The taxpayer was the majority
shareholder of Sharples Oil Corporation, organized under the law of the
State of Delaware. In 1957, the corporation acquired a leasehold interest
in Venezuelan oil properties. A subsidiary corporation was formed in 1960,
called the Sharples-Venezuela Oil Corporation, to which the leasehold interest
was transferred in exchange for all of the subsidiary's stock. The leasehold
was sold to a subsidiary of Pure Oil Company in 1960. During 1963 and
ending in March of 1964, both Sharples Oil Corporation and its subsidiary
were liquidated. The Venezuelan Government mailed a notice of deficiency
to the taxpayer in October of 1964 relative to the sale of the leasehold interest
in 1960. Since the taxpayer was a recipient of the assets of a liquidated
corporation, he would have been personally liable for the tax. The taxpayer
retained Venezuelan counsel to contest the tax and paid a total of $168,609.95
in legal fees and claimed those expenses as a deduction.
The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction claiming first
that the "origin of the claim" doctrine"4 must apply, and since the obligation
of the tax was originally a corporate obligation, the taxpayer could not
use the legal expenses incurred in resisting the tax as a personal deduction.
However, the Court of Claims held that if the taxpayer was personally liable
for the tax by operation of law, the "origin of the claim" doctrine did not
apply and thus Section 212(3) of the Code was applicable."5
The second argument presented by the Government was that the expense
should be capitalized because the liquidation was a capital transaction.
73 533 F.2d 550 (Ct. C1. 1976).
74See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), reh. denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962). -
75 See Southern Arizona Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 386 F.2d 1002 (Ct. C1. 1967),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 967 (1968).
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The United States Supreme Court in Arrowsmith v. Commissioner,"'
Woodward v. Commissioner" and United States v. Hilton Hotels"' held that
since the "initial transaction" was a capital transaction, the expenses arising
therefrom should be treated as capital items and the business expense deduc-
tions should be denied. The government, in relying on these cases, stated that
the "initial transaction" expectation compels the court to adopt the same
exception to Section 212(3).
The court in Sharples noted that the legislative history of Section 212 (3)
did not mention a different treatment for expenses incurred in fighting tax
liability that arose from a capital transaction as opposed to a tax liability
that arose from a non-capital transaction. Furthermore, the court stated that
there was no case law supporting the proposition that the "initial transaction"
doctrine should override Section 212(3).
The Court of Claims therefore held the taxpayer was entitled to deduct
the legal expenses incurred under Section 212(3) of the Code.
4.09 Business Loss - Director's Personal Liability
In DePinto v. United States,"' a member of the board of directors of a
life insurance company was found personally liable for $314,794 plus
interest and court costs as a result of a shareholder's derivative suit for
wrongful acts and omissions.
The taxpayer as a member of the board of directors had $314,794 in
assets transferred to one of his personal friends in exchange for his friend's
stock in the company. At the time of this transfer, the capital of the company
was impaired. The stockholders filed a derivative action against DePinto for
wrongful acts and omissions arising from the transfer of the impaired assets.
On June 28, 1965 the District Court entered a judgment against DePinto
in the amount of $314,794 plus interest and costs. The taxpayer thinking
that he would not be able to pay this debt filed bankruptcy. He was subse-
quently adjudicated bankrupt on March 10, 1966.
The taxpayer and the trustee of the bankruptcy estate filed separate
tax returns during the period of bankruptcy. However, the trustee had a loss
for the period and the taxpayer wanted to deduct the loss from the bankrupt
estate against his personal income tax return. This would give the taxpayer
a large refund.
TO 344 U.S. 6 (1952), reh. denied, 344 U.S. 900 (1952).
7 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
78 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
T9 407 F. Supp. I (D. Ariz. 1975).
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However, since the taxpayer was engaged in the full time practice of
medicine and received no compensation for his services as a director, the
District Court held the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade of business0
and did not enter the transaction to make a profit.81 Therefore, the deduction
was denied.
4.10 Prepaid Interest Deduction
Section 163 (a) of the Code allows deductions for all interest paid on
indebtedness within the taxable year.82 In G. Douglas Burch,8 a cash basis
taxpayer and his wife borrowed $5,388,600 on December 29, 1969, from a
Michigan bank. The taxpayer left $2,388,600 on deposit in a non-interest
bearing account. Of the remaining $3,000,000, the taxpayer transferred
$1,000,000 to an existing account in New York and loaned $2,000,000 at
12% interest to the Comac Company. On December 30, 1969, the taxpayer
transferred $377,202 from his New York account to the Michigan bank
as prepayment of one year's interest on the $5,388,600 loan.
A deduction of $377,202 was claimed by the taxpayer for the taxable
year 1969. The Commissioner disallowed the majority of the deduction
claiming that any deduction in excess of 3/365th's of the amount claimed
would materially distort the taxpayer's income.
Section 446 gives the Commissioner the power to use an accounting
method that clearly reflects the income of a taxpayer "if no method of ac-
counting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method used
does not clearly reflect income .... 8 , The Tax Court upheld the Commis-
sioner's action under the authority of Section 446, however, the Tax Court
did grant to the taxpayer a deduction for the remaining 362/365th's in tax
year 1970.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's decision
on March 4, 1976.85 The taxpayer on appeal urged the Circuit Court to
interpret the Commissioner's power under Section 446 as the power only
80 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §162(a) provides:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid as
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade of business ....
81 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 165(c) provides:
... (1) losses incurred in a trade or business; (2) losses incurred in any transaction
entered into profit, though not connected with a trade or business..." are deductible
by individuals.
82 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §163 (a) provides:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable
year on indebtedness.
8363 T.C. 556 (1975), affd, 533 F.2d 768 (1976).
84 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §446(b).
85 533 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1976).
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to require a taxpayer to select a "method of accounting" that clearly reflects
the taxpayer's entire income and not to use a different method for one item.
However, the court determined that the Commissioner could select only one
item in determining the taxpayer's method of accounting.86
The Circuit Court also found the Commissioner did not abuse his
discretion under Section 446. The court further noted that under Revenue
Ruling 68-643,11 prepaid interest expense deductions for periods as short as
12 months or less would be examined on a "case by case basis" to assure
no material distortion of income results from the deduction. Therefore, the
combined effect of Treasury Regulation 1.446-1(a) and Revenue Ruling
68-643 afforded the Circuit Court ample basis for affirming the Tax Court's
earlier decision.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 amended Section 461 by adding the
following new subsection:
If the taxable income of the taxpayer is computed under the cash re-
ceipts and disbursements method of accounting, interest paid by the
taxpayer which under regulation prescribed by the Secretary, is properly
allocable to any period-
(A) with respect to which the interest represents a change for the
use or forbearance of money, and
(B) which is after the close of the taxable year in which paid, shall
be charged to capital account and shall be treated as paid in
the period to which so allocable. 8
4.11 Dependent Care Expense
Section 214 of the Code allows a taxpayer to deduct expenses for house-
hold and dependent care services necessary for gainful employment. The
Internal Revenue Service has ruled, however, that amounts paid for household
and dependent services are not deductible when the taxpayer is absent from
work because of illness and receives wage continuation payments which are
excludable as sick pay under Section 105(d).81
The Service's rationale is that for household and dependent care ex-
penses to be deductible under Section 214, they must be employment related.
Employment related expenses are defined as those expenses incurred to enable
the taxpayer to be gainfully employed. 0
86 Treas. Reg. §1.446-1(a) provides:
The term "method of accounting" includes not only the over-all method of accounting
of the taxpayer but also the accounting treatment of any item.
87 Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 76.
88 Pub. L. No. 94-455, §208 (Jan. 1, 1977).
89 Rev. Rul. 76-278, 1976 INT. REv. BULL. No. 30 at 5.
90 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §214(b) (2).
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In the proposed test situation, the Service considered the taxpayer gain-
fully employed because of the amounts received under the wage continuation
plan. However, the expenses incurred were not to enable the taxpayer to
be gainfully employed since they did not contribute to his ability to be
employed. Since the expenses did not meet the statutory definition of employ-
ment related expenses, no deduction was allowed.
4.12 Cattle Breeding Losses
Section 165(c) of the Code establishes limitations on loss deductions
for individuals. Generally, losses not connected with a trade or business
must be incurred in a transaction entered into for profit in order to be
deductible by an individual.9 Therefore, the deductibility of a loss can
depend on whether a taxpayer had the requisite profit motive. In Arnold L.
Ginsburg,12 the Tax Court decided that the taxpayer did not have the requi-
site profit motive. The taxpayer's loss from an investment in the Briarcliff
Farms, Inc. cattle breeding program was disallowed. The taxpayer testified
that he invested in the cattle breeding program on the advice of his accountant.
The accountant testified that he recommended the investment for three
reasons:
(1) the potentiality of "big profits" if the price of cattle rose,
(2) the limited risk involved because of Briarcliff's guaranteed cattle
repurchase plan, and
(3) tax savings.9
In assessing the taxpayer's motives, the Tax Court relied heavily on a
Briarcliff investment prospectus that projected a net loss over its five-year
period. For the five-year period the projected cash outlays totaled $240,200,
while the expected revenues totaled only $214,700. The Tax Court felt that
neither the taxpayer nor his accountant had shown he had any knowledge of
the cattle breeding business outside of the Briarcliff prospectus. Therefore,
the Tax Court decided that, based on the prospectus, the only gain this tax-
payer could have anticipated was from tax savings.
According to the Tax Court, the taxpayer in the Ginsburg case did
not have the requisite profit motive to allow deduction of the losses. Further-
more, the Tax Court expressed no opinion as to whether the same conclusion
would have been reached had the taxpayer offered other evidence demon-
strating his belief that the cattle investment would be a profitable one.
9
1INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §165(c)(2).
9245 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 76,199 (June 26, 1976).
93 Id. at 76-858.
94 Treas. Reg. §1.446-1(c)(ii).
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4.13 Accrued Compensation
An accrual basis taxpayer can deduct an expense in the year in which
all events have occurred which establish the taxpayer's liability, and the
amount of that liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy.9" In
Putoma Corporation,5 the Tax Court disallowed a deduction for accrued
officer's compensation on the basis that it was conditional. Two individuals,
Purselley and Hunt, each owned 50 percent of the stock in Putoma Corpora-
tion and the Pro-Mac Company. Purselley was president of both companies.
Hunt was the treasurer of one company, and secretary-treasurer of the other.
A portion of the salaries was not to be paid as earned but accrued until the
directors determined that the company had sufficient cash reserves in order
to make payment.
The Tax Court ruled that the salaries were conditional on financial
ability and, therefore, could not be accrued. The deduction for the accrued
salaries was disallowed. Note that in this case the two and a half month
payment limitation for unpaid expenses established by Section 267(a) did
not apply. Neither Purselley nor Hunt owned more than 50 percent of the
stock in either company.96
4.14 Commuting - Carrying Tools of Trade
Generally, the cost of commuting to one's place of employment is
considered a personal expense and hence not deductible as a business
expense.9" However, the taxpayer has presented the courts with a steady
diet of litigation concerning the deductibility of expenses incurred in trans.
porting the tools of the taxpayer's trade.
The first position adhered to by the Commissioner was to deny any
deduction claimed for commuting expenses regardless of the fact that the
taxpayer was also transporting tools. 8 Nevertheless, the Treasury modified
its position in Revenue Ruling 63-10099 and announced the "but for" test.
Where the taxpayer would not use his automobile "but for" the purpose of
transporting the tools of his trade, his transportation expenses would be
deductible.
In two cases, Sullivan v. Commissioner'° and Tyne v. Commissioner,1'
95 66 T.C. No. 60 (July 10, 1976).
9 6 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §267(b) (2). This section requires that an individual must own
more than 50 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation before the limitation
of Section 267(a) will apply.
97 Treas. Reg. §1.162-2(e).
98 Rev. Rul. 56-25, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 152.
99 Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 34.
100 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966).
101 409 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969).
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the Second and Seventh Circuits permitted deductions for an allocable pro-
portion of transportation expenses even though the taxpayers would have
driven their automobiles to work whether they were transporting tools or not.
The Second Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Sullivan, in Coker v. Commis-
sioner.'02
A split in the Circuits occurred when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a Tax Court decision that disallowed a deduction claimed by an
airline pilot for expenses incurred in transporting his flight equipment from
his home to his place of employment."0 3 In an effort to settle the dispute
among the Circuits, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision.'"
However, the Court failed to end the controversy by noting that "Additional
expenses may at times be incurred for transporting job-required tools and
material to and from work."'1 5 In addition to the "additional expense" test,
the Court also noted that if the situation arose where additional expenses were
incurred, the expenses should be allocated, if possible.'
In Olsen v. Commissioner,' the Tax Court denied a crane operator a
deduction for any portion of the expenses incurred in driving 62 miles from
his home to his place of employment. The taxpayer carried his tools in his
trunk. The Tax Court reasoned that the taxpayer failed to prove he incurred
any additional expense in carrying his tools in his trunk, thus his expenses
were personal and not deductible.
In Peter I. Kallander v. United States,' the Court of Claims was faced
with a similar factual situation to Fausner. Kallander, also an airline pilot,
was required to carry approximately fifty pounds of flight equipment to and
from work. The taxpayer claimed the difference between the cost of public
transportation and the cost of operating his automobile as his deduction.
The Court of Claims disallowed the deduction basing its decision on the
fact that the taxpayer did not prove he would have used public transportation
were it not for his need to carry his flight equipment. The Court of Claims
added that in order to permit an allocation for "additional expenses" it must
be shown "but for" the necessity of carrying tools the taxpayer would have
availed himself of public transportation.'
The Treasury has revoked Revenue Ruling 63-100 in Revenue Ruling
102 480 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1973).
103 Fausner v. Commn'r, 472 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973).
104 Fausner v. Comm'r, 413 U.S. 838 (1973), reh. denied, 414 U.S. 882 (1973).
105 Id. at 839.
106 Id.
107 44 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 75,360 (1975).
108 526 F.2d 1131 (Ct. C1. 1975).
109 Id. at 1136.
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75-380.1"' Thus, for expenses paid or incurred prior to January 1, 1976, the
sole focus will be placed on the fact that the taxpayer would not have used
the automobile for commercial purposes "but for" the need to transport the
tools. The taxpayer will be permitted to follow the tests established by
Revenue Ruling 63-10011 for expenses paid or incurred prior to January 1,
1976. However, deductions for expenses incurred in transporting tools after
January 1, 1976, will be limited to the "additional expense" tests. Specifically,
the taxpayer must establish that any expenses incurred in transporting tools
to and from work were incurred in addition to otherwise nondeductible
personal commuting expenses.
In Robert H. Karl12 and David L. Wisemore"I the Tax Court disallowed
deductions for tool-carrying expenses incurred prior to January 1, 1976.
In both cases the taxpayers could not establish that "but for" the necessity
of carrying their tools they would not have used their automobiles to travel
to and from work. The Tax Court further noted that neither taxpayer had
established that they incurred any "additional expense" as a result of trans-
porting their tools under the rationale of Fausner.
4.15 Charitable Contributions - Pledges
Section 170(a) (1) of the Code permits a deduction for charitable
contributions of which payment is made within the taxable year.114 In
Sheldon B. Guren,"' the taxpayer executed a pledge in the amount of$25,000 to the Jewish Welfare Fund Appeal on December 1, 1971. On
December 30, 1971, the taxpayer executed a noninterest bearing cognovit
demand promissory note in the amount of $25,000. The note was thereafter
paid in installments in 1972. The taxpayer claimed a deduction of $25,000
for the tax year 1971 arguing that the delivery of the promissory note to the
charity in 1971 constituted payment in the tax year 1971. The Commissioner
contended that the term "payment" as used in Section 170(a) (1) of the Code
meant payment in cash or in some cases by check, but delivery of a note
whether secured or unsecured would not constitute "payment" of a charitable
pledge.
The Tax Court held that delivery of a note by the maker to the payee
did not constitute "payment" within the meaning of Section 170(a) (1) of
the Code. Although the court stated the note would constitute "property"
in the hands of the payee, nevertheless, it would not be considered payment.
110 Rev. Rul. 75-380, 1975-2 CuM. BULL. 59.
111 Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 34.
112 45 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 76,087 (Mar. 22, 1976).
113 45 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 76,197 (June 17, 1976).
114 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §170(a)(1).
115 66 T.C. No. 16 (Apr. 19, 1976).
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The court cited Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner1
16 in support of its
position.
The Williams case concerned payment to a qualified employee profit-
sharing plan. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals construed the word
"payment" as used in Section 404 (a) (6) of the Code to exclude the delivery
of a secured interest bearing demand promissory note by the employer to
the trustees of the employee's fund.
4.16 Charitable Contributions - Insurance Policies
In Revenue Ruling 76-143, i11 the Treasury addressed the question of
the irrevocable assignment of the cash surrender value of life insurance
policies to a charity. For gifts made after July 31, 1969, the donor's gift of
the cash surrender value of his life insurance will not qualify as a charitable
deduction unless the donor of the policy had the right to assign the balance
of the policy.
Under Section 170(f) (3) (A) of the Code, a transfer where the donor
has retained the right to change beneficiaries or the right to assign the balance
of the policy would be considered a contribution of a partial interest that
would not qualify for a charitable deduction.
For gifts of the cash surrender value of life insurance made prior to
July 31, 1969, Revenue Rulings 69-79"18 and 69-2151" will apply and a
charitable deduction will be permitted for a gift of the cash surrender value
where the right to change the beneficiary and the right to assign the balance
of the policy were retained by the donor. However, Revenue Ruling 69-79
and 69-215 are revoked12 for the purpose of gifts made after July 31, 1969.
4.17 Travel and Entertainment
When a taxpayer attempts to claim a deduction for business related
entertainment and travel, he is confronted with Section 274's substantiation
requirements. Section 274(d) specifies that adequate records contain (1) the
amount of the expense, (2) the time and place of the travel or entertainment,
(3) the business purpose and (4) the business relationship between the cus-
tomer and the taxpayer.
As in Steel v. Commissioner,' the most obvious result of inadequate
116 527 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1975), afj'g. 62 T.C. 166 (1974). See generally Briner, Federal
Income Tax Developments: 1975, 9 AKRON L. REV. 411, 499 (1976).
117 Rev. Rul. 76-143, 1976 INT. REV. BULL. No. 16 at 9.
Is Rev. Rul. 69-79, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 63.
119 Rev. Rul. 69-215, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 63.
120 Rev. Rul. 76-143, 1976 INT. REV. BULL. No. 16 at 9, revoking Rev. Rul. 69-79, 1969-1
CuM. BULL. 63, Rev. Rul. 69-215, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 63.
121 437 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1970).
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substantiation is the disallowance of the claimed travel and entertainment
deduction. The Service has been somewhat lenient with taxpayers who sub-
stantially comply with Section 274(d)'s requirements. On the occasions
where the taxpayer's records do not fully establish the right to the deduction,
the taxpayer is permitted to produce additional evidence of records to prove
his right to the travel and entertainment deductions.
Where, however, compliance has been minimal, the Service has not
considered the disallowance of the traveling and entertainment deductions a
severe enough penalty for failing to keep adequate records. In Bennett v.
Commissioner,"2 the Service suffered a setback when the court decided that
the mere failure to keep proper and complete records did not constitute
cause for the imposition of a negligence penalty. However, with the advent
of Section 6653(a) negligence or intentional disregard for the rules and
regulations will be sufficient for the imposition of a penalty. Thus, since
Section 274 requires adequate records for travel and entertainment deduc-
tions, the claiming of the deduction without adequate records has been con-
sidered within the reach of Section 6653 (a). In Earl S. Echols, Jr.,"' a train-
man claimed to have lost his travel and entertainment records as a result
of divorce. But when he attempted to claim a travel deduction without the
records the Service not only denied the deduction but also imposed a 5
percent negligence penalty in addition, since it found that petitioner had not
attempted to adequately reconstruct his records as required by Internal
Revenue Service regulations."2 4
Travel and entertainment deductions are not the only instances where
a negligence penalty is imposed. Often, when Section 165 (d) gambling losses
are sought to offset gambling gains and the taxpayer has minimal records'25
or only a collection of a small portion of his losing stubs2"' it results in the
imposition of a negligence penalty. In Salvadore S. Taormina"' the Tax
Court indicated that the negligence penalty would not always be automatically
imposed. In Taormina the taxpayer was an addicted horseplayer whose only
records of his losses were a box full of losing ticket sheets; however, his
personal testimony was deemed sufficiently credible to substantiate his
claimed losses so as to avert the imposition of a negligence penalty.
In recent litigation involving travel and entertainment deductions,
the imposition of the negligence penalty has gained new teeth. In David N.
122 139 F.2d 961 (8th Cir. 1944).
122 45 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 76,264 (Aug. 8, 1976).
124 Treas. Reg. §1.274-5(c) (5).
125 Clifford F. Mack, 38 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 69,026 (Feb. 4, 1969).
126 James Clifford Rogers, 43 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 74,004 (Jan. 14, 1974).
127 45 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 76,094 (Mar. 24, 1976).
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Smith 8 the taxpayer was assessed deficiencies arising from the denial of
business deductions and travel and entertainment deductions. Because the tax-
payers had not adequately substantiated the travel and entertainment expenses
included within their claimed deductions, the Commissioner imposed a five
percent penalty against the entire assessed deficiency.
The hazard that this application of section 6653 (a) presents cannot be
overstressed. A larger deficiency associated with sources other than inadequate
records, coupled with a travel and entertainment deduction disallowance for
failure to maintain adequate records, could cause the imposition of a 5
percent penalty on a very large deficiency rather than just the travel and
entertainment portion.
4.18 Transportation Expense
The Internal Revenue Service has revoked two previous rulings which
allowed construction workers travel expense deductions for travel to and
from temporary worksites.'2 9 Under the new ruling certain travel expenses
incurred after 1976 between a taxpayer's residence and place of work, even
though temporary, will be nondeductible commuting expenses.' The ruling
contains examples which illustrate the types of transportation expenses that
are nondeductible.
Generally, an individual who regularly works in an office other than
his residence will not incur any deductible travel expense in going from his
home to his first work location and in returning home from the last work
location.' 3' However, if an individual's principal place of work is his residence,
travel expense to one or more other places of work will be deductible." 2
Example (3) of the ruling provides an exception whereby an individual with
a downtown office may deduct his entire travel expense to and from home.
Example (3) A, a self-employed individual, maintains a principal place
of work in a downtown office building. In order to attend a business
meeting in a distant city, A drives directly from A's residence to an
airport, ffies to the distant city, and later that same day returns directly
to A's residence. Due to the length of time required to make the trip
and attend the meeting, it is not unreasonable to expect A to stop at
the office on the way out of town and on the way back. However, in
effect, A is traveling between one work location and another. Trans-
portation costs incurred between work locations are deductible business
expenses. See Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 C.B. 261. Therefore, A should
128 66 T.C. No. 59 (June 29, 1976).
129 Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976 INT. REV. BULL. No. 47 at 6.
130 Id.
13' Id. at 8.
132 Id.
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be entitled to deduct the lesser of (1) the expenses incurred in traveling
between A's residence and the business meeting and (2) the expenses that
would have been incurred if A had traveled between A's office and the
business meeting by the same mode or modes of transportation.
However, because the difference between (1) and (2) is generally
de minimis compared with the total transportation expenses incurred
for the trip, the Service will allow A to deduct the expenses incurred
in traveling between A's home and the business meeting. 3 '
It is unclear at this time whether the Service will require the exact
factual pattern of example (3) before allowing travel expense to and from
home in similar situations. However, it is clear that taxpayers should maintain
a travel log so that the deductible transportation expense can be substantiated.
5.00 Tax Credit
5.01 Oil Companies - Tax v. Royalty
Section 901 (b) of the Code allows qualifying U.S. taxpayers to claim
a foreign tax credit for the amount of any income tax paid or accrued during
the taxable year to any foreign country. In Revenue Ruling 76-215"' the
Internal Revenue Service ruled that a share of production paid by a U.S. oil
company to the Indonesian government was a noncreditable royalty. Accord-
ing to its contract, the company was allowed to extract the oil and then
recover its cost from the oil production before giving the Indonesian govern-
ment its share of the production. However, the recovery of such production
costs could not exceed 40 percent of the value of all production during the
year. The contract also provided that the company was entitled to receive
30 percent of the remaining production, and the Indonesian government was
to receive 70 percent of the remaining production. The Service maintained
that Indonesia's share of production was always the property of the Indo-
nesian government and was not actually acquired from the oil company. The
Indonesian government was merely retaining a share of the oil it already
owned; thus, the payment was treated as a royalty and excluded from the oil
company's income.
Recently, the Service has stated its current position on whether levies
imposed by foreign governments owning minerals extracted by U.S. taxpayers
constitute a tax or a noncreditable royalty.3 5 In order for the taxpayer to
claim the foreign tax credit under Section 901 (b), the taxpayer must be able
to show that the foreign government required payment of an appropriate
133 Id. at 7.
134 Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976 INT. REV. BULL. No. 23 at 6.
235 6 P-H 1976 F4D. TAxE-s 55,387.
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royalty for the minerals in addition to the claimed tax.' The royalty must
be calculated separately and independently of the claimed tax." 7 Also, the
foreign tax must qualify in substance and form as an income tax under U.S.
tax concepts for the credit to be allowable.
The Internal Revenue Service has established five characteristics of a
creditable income tax.
(1) The amount of the income tax is calculated separately and inde-
pendently of the amount of the royalty and of any other tax or
charge imposed by the foreign government.
(2) Under the foreign law and its actual administration, the income
tax is imposed on the receipt of income by the taxpayer and such
income is determined on the basis of arm's length amounts. Further,
these receipts are actually realized in a manner consistent with
U.S. income taxation principles.
(3) The taxpayer's income tax liability cannot be discharged from
property owned by the foreign government.
(4) The foreign tax liability, if any, is computed on the basis of the
taxpayer's entire extractive operations within the foreign country.
(5) While the foreign tax base need not be identical or nearly identical
to the U.S. tax base, the taxpayer, in computing the income subject
to the foreign income tax, is allowed to deduct, without limitation,
the significant expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer. Reason-
able limitations on the recovery of capital expenditures are accept-
able. 8s
The Service warns that any departure from the five characteristics may
jeopardize the qualification of the foreign payment as a creditable tax."'
6.00 Depreciation
6.01 Depreciation Deductions
Depreciation deductions are often of great advantage; in fact, they
constitute a paper loss which does not affect the taxpayer's cash flow. As a
result, taxpayers are often anxious to begin taking this deduction as soon as
a depreciable asset is acquired. The Regulations, however, contemplate an
event other than acquisition as the point when depreciable life begins. " .'
Treasury Regulation 1.167(a)-10(b) states that an asset can only be depre-
ciated after it is put into service.
1"6Id.
137 Id.
138Id.
139 Id.
140 Treas. Reg. §1.167(a)-10(b).
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Taxpayers have often been inclined to start depreciating an asset at
the point it is acquired. The Courts have been receptive to such an approach.
In Duvin Coal Co. v. Commissioner,' the corporation purchased machinery
and equipment which was to be used in connection with its coal mine. For
tax purposes, the corporation began the depreciable life of the equipment on
the day the journal entry on its books was made. The Commissioner dis-
allowed the depreciation deduction. The Court sustained the deficiency that
resulted by stating that it was the taxpayer's obligation to show that the
assets had been placed in service and not merely acquired in order to take
the depreciation deduction. A similar result occurred in Raymond S. Briggs.' 2
In Briggs the physician taxpayer attempted to depreciate X-ray equipment.
The acquisition of the equipment was on December 14, 1957. On December
20 the tapxpayer put $100 down on the purchase price of the equipment.
Later on December 29 the taxpayer paid the remaining $6,600. On his 1957
tax return the taxpayer attempted to take a $3,350 depreciation deduction
on the X-ray equipment. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner and
disallowed the deduction by stating that the taxpayer had the burden of
showing the equipment was put into service before the depreciation deduction
could be taken. In Hillcone Steamship Co.,"' not only did the taxpayer fail
to assemble or install the sought-to-be- depreciated rock crusher, but he also
later abandoned the equipment as unsuitable for his business. As with the
preceding cases, the Tax Court had no problem disallowing the depreciation
deduction.
When a depreciable asset is never installed or applied to one's business,
the placed in service' requirement has a clear meaning. However, the waters
do get muddy when one tries to decide at what point in installation and
preparation the depreciable life begins. In Sears Oil Co., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner'.5 this question was partially answered. In that case the taxpayer
completed the fitting of a barge in a canal. At the time of completion,
December 1, 1957, the canal was completely frozen and the barge could not
be moved until May, 1958 when it could be used by the taxpayer. The Court
took a somewhat broader view of "in service" by holding that property is
placed in service when it is in a condition to be used by the taxpayer should
the occasion arise. Thus, the taxpayer was permitted to depreciate the barge
from December 1, 1957. However, one cannot regard "in service" as the time
when the property is unqualifiedly prepared for productive use. Revenue
1" 16 B.T.A. 194 (1929).
142 37 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 68,240 (1968).
143 32 P-H TAX Cr. MEM. 63,220 (1963).
1,4 Treas. Reg. §1.167(a)-10(b).
145 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir, 1966).
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Ruling 76-238146 has proposed that the standard is something less than un-
qualified readiness for use in the taxpayer's business. This ruling provided
some guidance as to when a manufacturing plant and the equipment included
therein begin their respective depreciation lives. A plant is placed in service
when its construction is completed to the point where the manufacturing
equipment can be installed. However, in the case of the manufacturing equip-
ment installed inside, this can not be placed in service until the equipment
is capable of producing an acceptable product. This is not to say that post-
installation testing need be completed or that the taxpayer must be confident
ienough to begin actual productive use of the equipment." '
In the author's opinion, this ruling causes as much confusion as it
eliminates. At what point in time is an acceptable product manufacturable
under the Service's interpretation? After a moderately successful pilot produc-
tion, after the changes made, after trial run, or after an acceptable initial
production run? To the author's way of thinking, Revenue Rulings 76-238"
and 76-2561'1 could allow any or all of these different events to signal the
beginning of the equipment's depreciable life.
7.00 Gains and Losses
7.01 Involuntary Conversion
In Revenue Ruling 70-46615° the Internal Revenue Service took the
position that the investment of the proceeds from an involuntary conversion
of residential rental property into personal residence for the taxpayer did
not qualify as a conversion into property similar or related in service or use.
Accordingly, the gain on the involuntary conversion could not be defined
under Section 1033 (a) and the gain would be recognized in full.
In Revenue Ruling 76-84... the Service amplified its position in Revenue
Ruling 70-466. The Service considered the same fact situation as in Revenue
Ruling 70-466 but considered whether the gain could be defined under
Section 1033 (g) alternatively. In recognition of the uniqueness of some real
estate parcels, Section 1033(g) provides that in the case of real property,
replacement property "of like kind" held for productive use in a trade or
business or for investment will satisfy the Section 1033 (a) requirement that
replacement property be "similar or related in service or use." '52
146 Rev. Rul. 76-238, INT. REV. BuLL. No. 26 at 6.
147 Rev. Rul. 76-256, INT. REV. BULL. No. 28 at 7.
148 Rev. Rul. 76-238, INT. REv. BULL. No. 26 at 6.
149 Rev. Rul. 76-256, INT. REV. BuLL. No. 28 at 7.
150 Rev. Rul. 70-466, 1970-2 CuM. BuLL. 165.
151 Rev. Rul. 76-84, 1976 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 10 at 15.
152 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1033(a).
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The Service found that the rental property obviously qualified as prop-
erty held for investment. Since the replacement property was to be the resi-
dence of the taxpayer, it did not qualify as investment property. The replace-
ment property was not then similar or related in service or use. The gain
realized on the conversions could not be defined under Section 1033 (a) and
the gain would therefore be recognized in full.
7.02 Silver Coins
In determining gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property
the amount realized is ". . . the sum of any money received plus the fair
market value of the property (other than money) received."' 53 When United
States coins are received in an exchange is the face value of the coins or their
fair market value considered the amount received for purposes of computing
gain or loss?
In Revenue Ruling 76-249"' the Internal Revenue Service has taken
the position that the fair market value of the coins and not their face value
is used to determine gain or loss under Section 1001 (a). The specific facts
in the Ruling deal with a taxpayer, not a dealer in coins, who received silver
coins having a face value of $2,000 and a fair market value of $6,000 in
exchange for real property having an adjusted basis of $2,000 and a fair
market value of $6,000. The Service takes the position that the coins are
in fact property and not money. As such, the fair market value of $6,000
should be used to compute the amount realized under Section 1001 (b) which
would be a realized taxable gain of $4,000.
8.00 Procedure
8.01 Self-Incrimination - Miranda Warning
A substantial conflict arose from the various circuits as to whether a
warning as stated in Miranda v. Arizona 55 was to be extended to a taxpayer
being interviewed by an Internal Revenue Service agent with respect to
potential criminal violations. Typically, such interviews are conducted in a
non-custodial situation and are preliminary to or in conjunction with an
examination of the taxpayer's records under Section 7602. The Supreme Court
resolved this conflict in favor of the Internal Revenue Service in Beckwith v.
United States. 56 In that case, the taxpayer sought to exclude certain state-
ments he had made to two special agents during the course of a non-custodial
interview conducted in his home. The taxpayer reasoned that cases are
153 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §1001(b).
154 Rev. Rul. 76-249, 1976 INT. REv. BULL. No. 27 at 7.
155 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
156 96 S.Ct. 1612 (1976). For a discussion of the district court decision see Briner, Federal
Income Tax Developments: 1975, 9 AKRON L. REv. 411, 475-76 (1976).
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assigned to the Intelligence Division only when there is some indication of
criminal fraud and that, therefore, the taXpayer becomes the focus of a full
criminal investigation as soon as such an assignment is made. The taxpayer
further argued that a confrontation with the Service's special agents necessar-
ily places the taxpayer under psychological restraints which are the functional
and, therefore, the legal equivalent of custody. The Court, however, stressed
that it was the custodial nature of the interrogation which triggered the
necessity for adherence to the specific requirements of its Miranda holding.
The majority opinion noted that this necessity was itself triggered by the
peculiar nature and setting of the custodial, or police dominated, interrogation.
Such a foreign setting places the taxpayer at a severe psychological disadvan-
tage and may in fact compel him to answer questions that he may not have
otherwise answered. The Court found Chief Judge Lumbard's opinion in
United States v. Caiello"7 to be a good statement of the Miranda rationale:
It was the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the
strength or content of the government's suspicions at the time the
questioning was conducted, which led the court to impose the Miranda
requirement with regard to custodial questioning.'58
Several factors in Beckwith would point to a lack of coercive tactics on
the part of the agents. The evidence indicated that the taxpayer was specifically
told that he was under investigation for possible criminal violations of the
Internal Revenue laws and that he was under no compulsion to answer any
of the agent's questions. The taxpayer was further advised that anything he
said could be held against him and that he could seek the assistance of an
attorney before responding. The interview was then conducted in a friendly
manner and, at the conclusion of the interview the taxpayer and the special
agents proceeded separately to the taxpayer's place of business to examine his
financial records. The taxpayer in this particular case was clearly not subjected
to any significant degree of compulsion inherent in a foreign setting or in a
particularly hard line of questioning. Nor was he in the custody of the
Internal Revenue agents.
The Beckwith case surely will not be final Supreme Court ruling with
respect to non-custodial interrogations. The Court was careful to point out
that:
[N]on-custodial interrogation might possibly in some situations, by virtue
of some special circumstances, be characterized as one where "the be-
havior of ... law enforcement officials was such as to overbear petition-
er's will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-deter-
mined .... ." When such a claim is raised, it is the duty of an appellate
'57 420 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970).
158 Id. at 473.
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court, including this Court, "to examine the entire record and make
an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness."' 9
The closing statements found in the majority opinion and Mr. Justice
Brennan's well-reasoned dissent indicate that the applicability of a Miranda
type warning will have to be decided on the facts of each individual case.
Generally, such a warning will not apply to the non-custodial interrogation;
however, in the exceptional case in which the taxpayer's free will is materially
obstructed, a Miranda warning may be found to be an essential ingredient to
a successful prosecution.
8.02 Self-Incrimination - Bank Records
In United States v. Miller,' the government gained access to a taxpayer's
bank records by means of defective subpoenas duces tecum served upon two
banks. "Mhe subpoenas were defective because they were issued by the
U.S. Attorney rather than a court, no return was made to a court, and the
subpoenas were returnable on a date when the grand jury was not in session."''
The taxpayer directly attatked the subpoenas on the ground that he had a
Fourth Amendment interest in the bank records. The Court noted that the
existence of a Fourth Amendment privilege did not turn on whether the sub-
poenas were defective, and therefore, it focused directly on the existence of
the privilege itself. The Court, relying on its earlier decision in Hoffa v.
United States,62 stated that:
"[No interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment" isimplicated by governmental investigative activities unless there is an
intrusion into a zone of privacy into "the security a man relies upon
when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected
area."'63
In denying the taxpayer's constitutional claim, the Court noted that the
documents involved were not his "private papers"; rather, they were the
business records of the bank. Furthermore, the taxpayer had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the records of the checks and deposit slips at issue.
They did not represent any confidential communication. They were merely
"negotiable transactions . . . and contained only information voluntarily
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course
of business.'164 A person cannot expect privacy when he has knowingly ex-
posed information to the public.
159 96 S.Ct. at 1617.
16096 S.Ct. 1619 (1976).
1 1, ld. at 1622.
162 385 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1966).
163 96 S.Ct. at 1622.
164 Id. at 1624.
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The taxpayer further argued that the Bank Secrecy Act'65 permits the
government to circumvent the requirements of the Fourth Amendment by
allowing it to obtain a depositor's private records without complying with
the legal requirements that would apply if it had proceeded against the
taxpayer directly. The Court noted that the avowed purpose of the Bank
Secrecy Act was to require certain records to be maintained by the bank
because such records "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax,
and regulatory investigations, and proceedings."'68 The Court ruled that the
Bank Secrecy Act's record keeping requirements did not create a protectable
Fourth Amendment interest of a depositor in the bank's records of account.
It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the gathering
of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to government
authorities." 7 The fact that the taxpayer disclosed the information on the
assumption that it would be used for a limited purpose is immaterial."6 8
The key then appears to be the voluntary relinquishment of a taxpayer's
financial records to a third party. By making such a relinquishment, the
taxpayer automatically loses any reasonable expectation of privacy and
consequently any right to assert a Fourth Amendment privilege.
8.03 Self-Incrimination - Accountants' Workpapers
The Supreme Court has directly addressed itself to the issue of whether
a taxpayer could assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion by obtaining possession of his accountant's workpapers and transferring
them to his attorney. In Fisher v. United States,'6' the taxpayer was under
investigation for possible violations of federal income tax laws. The taxpayer
retrieved certain documents used in preparing his income tax returns from his
accountant and transferred them to his attorney for use in the pending investi-
gation by the Internal Revenue Service. The Commissioner then issued a
summons on the attorney requesting him to produce the documents pursuant
to Section 7602. The attorney refused to comply claiming that the attorney-
client privilege, as well as the taxpayer's Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, precluded any compelled production of the papers in
question.
The attorney-client privilege generally arises when the taxpayer discloses
information to the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.7 0 Its
165 12 U.S.C. §1829b (1970).
166 12 U.S.C. §1829b(a)(1) (1970).
167 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
168 96 S.Ct. at 1624.
169 96 S.Ct. 1569 (1976). For a discussion of the district court decision, see Briner, Federal
Income Tax Developments: 1975, 9 AKRON L. REv. 411, 471-75 (1976).
170 96 S.Ct. at 1576, citing 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVrDENCE §2292 at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
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purpose is to encourage the taxpayer-client to make a full disclosure of
information to his attorney without fear that such information will subse-
quently be revealed to third parties.'' The Court in Fisher indicated that
when a transfer is made to an attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice, then,
[W]hen the client himself would be privileged from production of the
document either as a party at common law . . . or as exempt from
self-incrimination, the attorney having possession of the document is
not bound to produce.'7 2
The central issue before the Fisher Court was, therefore, reduced to
whether or not the taxpayer himself could have been compelled to produce
the documents in question if the summons had been directed to him while
they were in his exclusive possession. The taxpayer's only protection from
a summons directing him to produce documents relating to his income tax
liability is his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. If the
taxpayer himself would be protected from producing the documents, then
such protection would logically be extended to the same documents in the
hands of his attorney.
With this background in mind, the Court undertook an extensive review
of the nature of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and its history. The Court noted that it applies "only when the accused is
compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating. 1 7 3
It, therefore, turned to the issue of what type of incriminating testimony
is compelled by a documentary summons. The prevailing justification for
the Fifth Amendment's application to documentary subpoenas is the "implicit
authentication" rationale.7 7 The person complying with the subpoena "implic-
itly testifies that the evidence he brings forth is in fact the evidence
demanded."17 In other words, the testimonial nature of the summons is
limited to authenticating the documents' genuiness.
Carrying this rationale one step further, the Court reasoned that the
taxpayer was not compelled to give testimony by producing the documents
requested. The element of compulsion is unquestionably present; however,
since only the accountant and not the taxpayer can testify to the authenticity
of work papers prepared by the accountant, the mere act of producing the
work papers does not constitute authentication and does not involve
testimonial self-incrimination.
171 Id., citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2291, at 545.
172 96 S.Ct. at 1577, quoting 8 J. WiMoRE, EVIDENCE §2307, at 592.
'73 96 S.Ct. at 1579.
17
4 Id. at 1581 n. 12.
175 Id., quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 346 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The taxpayer, by complying with the summons, does implicitly admit the
existence and possession of the papers, but such an admission cannot be
said to be self-incriminating since there is nothing illegal about having an
accountant prepare one's tax return. Since the taxpayer himself is not
protected, the attorney cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege to preclude
his full compliance with the summons.
The Supreme Court was careful to point out that the testimonial and
incrimination features of the Fifth Amendment were not amenable to a
categorical characterization. Therefore, the facts and circumstances of each
individual case must control the applicability of the taxpayer's constitutional
privilege.
8.04 Self-Incrimination - Information on Tax Returns
In Garner v. United States,17 the taxpayer's income tax returns were
introduced as evidence of illegal gambling activities in a non-tax criminal
prosecution. The taxpayer therein had listed his occupation on his Form
1040 as professional gambler and this information was used to support the
prosecution's allegations that he was familiar with the gambling and wagering
business. The defendant-taxpayer, claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, objected to the introduction of this evidence at
trial; however, he had failed to indicate in any manner on his Form 1040
that this information was privileged. The limited issue before the Court was
whether the introduction of this evidence, over the taxpayer's Fifth Amend-
ment objection at trial, violated his fundamental right against compulsory
self-incrimination since he had chosen to disclose the information on his
Form 1040 rather than asserting his privilege at that time.
The taxpayer argued here that he was compelled to provide incriminating
evidence to the government on his tax return. There is clearly a certain amount
of compulsion inherent in filing a tax return. Section 72031"' prescribes certain
statutory criminal penalties for willful failure to file, and Section 760278
176 96 S.Ct. 1178 (1976). For a discussion of the district court decision see Briner, Federal
Income Tax Developments: 1975, 9 AKRON L. REV. 411, 470-71 (1976).
177 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §7203 provides, in part:
Any person ... who willfully fails to pay such . . . tax, make such return, keep such
records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations,
shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more
than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
178 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §7602 reads, in part:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where
none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax
.... or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized ....
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer
or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books
of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or
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enables the Commissioner to summon the taxpayer to appear and produce
his tax records. However, these statutory prescriptions do not necessarily
compel the taxpayer to incriminate himself because a taxpayer can raise a
Fifth Amendment objection in lieu of providing certain requested information
on the tax return itself. 17 9
The Supreme Court reasoned that the information disclosed on an
individual's tax return was essentially the testimony of a witness for purposes
of a Fifth Amendment analysis. An individual who is under compulsion to
appear as a witness and who discloses certain information rather than claiming
the privilege is said to have lost the benefit of the privilege. Therefore, one
who discloses information rather than asserting the benefit of his Fifth Amend-
ment protections cannot be said to have been compelled within the meaning
of the amendment. 8 The underlying rationale for this conclusion is that only
the taxpayer himself knows what information may be incriminating at the
time of its disclosure, and therefore, the burden of claiming the privilege
must fall upon him at that time.
The essence of the Garner decision is that a taxpayer must assert his
Fifth Amendment privilege at the time he files his return or forever lose its
benefits. A taxpayer who desires to assert the privilege must claim it instead
of making the requested disclosures. In other words, he cannot disclose certain
information and at the same time raise the claim of the privilege with respect
to its use. Since the taxpayer in Garner made certain disclosures in lieu of
claiming the privilege on his return, his disclosures cannot be considered to
be compelled incrimination.
8.05 Suppression of Material Evidence
In any criminal prosecution, the defendant is entitled to a full disclosure
by the prosecutor of any material information that may tend to negate his
guilt. The suppression of evidence favorable to an accused who requests it
violates such defendant's due process rights, where the evidence is material
to either his guilt or punishment. However, this obligation to disclose is
limited to evidence that is "material" in the constitutional sense. 181
The defendant in United States v. McCrane82 was a taxpayer who was
prosecuted for willfully aiding and assisting in the preparation of a fraudulent
required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem
proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the
summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such
testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry....
179 United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927).
180 96 S.Ct. at 1182, citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970).
181 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
182 527 F.2d 906 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3755 (June 30, 1976).
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income tax return prohibited under Section 7206(2). The government's case
in McCrane hinged on the jury's acceptance of the credibility of the prosecu-
tion's sole witness. The defendant was found guilty, but subsequently, the
defendant alleged that the government had withheld material evidence that
had necessarily deprived him of due process. The defendant discovered that
the key witness, a large contractor in the state, had been given immunity
from prosecution in exchange for his testimony and that the government had
written eight letters to various public and private organizations describing
the witness' conduct in the case. These letters typically requested these organi-
zations not to penalize the witness by denying him the right to bid on state
contracts for his role in ensuring a successful prosecution under a grant of
immunity. The defendant contended that his access to this evidence of prefer-
ential treatment was essential to his ability to impeach the witness before
the trial court.
The trial court ruled that the letters in question were factual in nature
and contained no evidence of any understanding indicating an expectation of
favors in exchange for cooperation in defendant's prosecution. The Third
Circuit, however, reversed and remanded saying that the government erred
in withholding material which would have assisted defendant in casting doubt
on the credibility of a crucial witness against him. 8' The court carefully
pointed out that although the letters may have had no impact on the jury,
they did in fact show that the witness was not hostile to the prosecution. The
Supreme Court vacated the Third Circuit's judgment"' and remanded the
matter for further consideration in view of its recent decision in United States
v. Agurs."'8
In Agurs, the Supreme Court ruled that the mere possibility that an item
of undisclosed information might have aided the defense or might have af-
fected the outcome of the trial does not establish "materiality" in the Constitu-
tional sense.'86 Therefore, a prosecutor does not violate his constitutional
duty of disclosure unless his omission is sufficiently significant to result in the
denial of a defendant's right to a fair trial. Agurs was a non-tax case in which
defendant alleged that the prosecutor's failure to disclose her murder victim's
record of criminal activity denied her an opportunity to support her claim
of self-defense. In denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the Court
stated that the proper standard for materiality of undisclosed evidence was
that "... if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt of guilt that
183 Id. at 912.
184 United States v McCrane, 96 S.Ct. 3197 (1976).
185 96 S.Ct. 2392 (1976).
186 Id. at 2400.
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otherwise did not exist, constitutional error has been commited."'' Therefore,
the trial judge must make a thorough review of the entire record and appraise
the effect that the undisclosed information might reasonably have on the
outcome of the trial. It is the trial judge's first hand appraisal then, that is
the key to a defendant's motion for a new trial based on the alleged suppres-
sion of evidence.
It seems clear that the Constitution does not mandate the disclosure
of everything that might affect or influence a jury. It seems equally clear,
that such a full disclosure might do irreparable damage to the judicial
process. The test of materiality outlined by the Supreme Court in Agurs
seems to best protect a defendant's due process guarantee without inundating
the jury with immaterial and often confusing trivia. Consequently, the non-
disclosure of potential impeachment material, by itself, as in United States v.
McCrane, cannot mandate the granting of a new trial.
8.06 Statute of Limitations - Assessment and Collection
Section 6501 of the Code sets forth the limitation periods for the assess-
ment and collection of taxes. The general rule is that the Service may assess
additional tax anytime within three years after a return is filed.'88 However,
there has been a dispute as to when a return is deemed filed. Is it filed when
it is mailed and postmarked'89 or when it is received by the Internal Revenue
Service? 9 ° This dispute was resolved in the case of Hotel Equities Corpora-
tion '9 where the Tax Court held that a return is deemed filed when it is
mailed and postmarked.
Hotel Equities' return for the fiscal 1970 year was due on July 15, 1970.
The return was mailed on July 14, 1970, and was received by the Internal
Revenue Service on July 17, 1970. On July 17, 1973, the Internal Revenue
Service mailed a deficiency notice to the taxpayer.
The Service argued that for the purposes of determining the expiration
date under Section 6501, the filing date is the date of receipt of the return
by the Service. The Service based its argument on the holding in the case of
Phinney v. Bank of Southwest National Association'9' which held that an
estate tax return was filed when it was delivered to the Service.
However, the Tax Court in arriving at its decision, relied on the intent
'18 Id. at 2401.
18 8 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §6501(a).
I8 9 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §7502(a)(1).
"90 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §6501(b).
191 65 T.C. 528 (1975).
'92 335 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1964).
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of Congress when they enacted Section 7502(a). The Senate Report con-
tained the following statement:
The provision of this bill which permits the Secretary of the Treasury
to require the filing of tax returns at service centers would technically
require many taxpayers (for example, those in Hawaii) to mail their
returns... at a much earlier date...
For these reasons, the bill amends the existing timely-mailing-timely-
filing provisions to include returns and payments of tax .... 111
The Court therefore concluded that the return was deemed filed when it
was mailed and postmarked. Further, since the deficiency notice was not
mailed until July 17, 1973, the statute of limitations expired under Section
6501.
8.07 Timely Filing - Lack of Postmark
In Fred Sylvan... the Tax Court held that the lack of a postmark does
not render the "timely mailing treated as timely filing" rule of Section 7502
inapplicable where in fact the taxpayer has mailed the petition or document
within the prescribed period or on or before the prescribed due date.
In the Sylvan case the taxpayer's period for filing a petition for redeterm-
ination of a deficiency expired on May 21, 1974. The taxpayer's petition was
received by the court via the mail on May 22, 1974 at 8:55 a.m. Since the
envelope in which the petition was mailed did not bear a postmark, the
government moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction19 based
on untimely filing, relying upon Jacob L. Rappaport,9 6 wherein the Court
held that even though the petition was timely mailed, evidence of when a
postmark would have been made was irrelevant because the requirement of
a postmark (whether legible or not) was essential to obtaining the benefits
of Section 7502(a).
The Tax Court in Fred Sylvan, upon an examination of the legislative
history of Section 7502, determined that Congress, in making the postmark
irrebuttable evidence of timely mailing, "sought to eliminate the inequalities
resulting from variations in postal performance when a document is timely
mailed."' 7 The Tax Court also stated that Section 7502 deals solely with
the normal situation involving a readable postmark, and that Congress did
not even consider the aberrant cases where, through inadvertance of the postal
193 S. REP. No. 89-1625, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD
NEws 3676, 3683-84.
194 65 T.C. 548 (1975).
195 See Angelo Vitale, 59 T.C. 246 (1972); Estate of Everest Moffat, 46 T.C. 499 (1966).
106 55 T.C. 709 (1971), aff'd mem., 456 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1972).
197 65 T.C. at 551.
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service, there is an illegible postmark, no postmark at all, or when the
original cover is destroyed and the petition is rewrapped in an envelope
with no postmark. The Court in Fred Sylvan reviewed prior cases of illegible
postmarks'98 and damaged envelopes199 wherein it had concluded that evidence
as to timely mailing was admissible, reaffirmed those decisions and expressly
overruled Jacob L. Rappaport, since it found indistinguishable in terms of the
remedial purposes of Section 7502 those situations where the postal service
has made random errors of commission rather than omission. In Fred Sylvan
the court concluded that the taxpayer's petition was in fact timely filed, and
that no production of additional evidence was necessary since it was clear that
the petition received through the mails early the day after the filing deadline
must have been timely mailed.
8.08 Jeopardy Assessments
Section 6331 allows the Service to levy upon the property or property
rights of a taxpayer who neglects or refuses to pay a tax liability within ten
days of a notice and demand. However, Section 6331 further provides that
if the Secretary makes a finding that the collection of the tax due is injeopardy, a notice and demand for immediate payment may be made. In
this situation, the Secretary may seek collection of the unpaid tax by levy
upon the taxpayer's failure or refusal to pay without regard to the prescribed
ten day period. Section 6331, therefore, appears to give the Service broad
powers to compel payment in a jeopardy situation.
In L.O.C. Industries v. United States,'00 the taxpayer instituted an action
against the Service for an injunction against its continued possession of
monies seized. In that case, the Internal Revenue Serivce terminated the
taxpayer's tax year at 6:00 a.m. on December 19, 1975. At 6:18 a.m., a
notice of termination was sent to L.O.C. Industries but was not received
until 9:30 a.m. the same day. At 7:12 a.m., a tax of $247,083 was assessed
against the taxpayer, and at 8:30 a.m. the taxpayer received a notice reciting
the date of assessment, the duration of the tax period, and the balance due.
At 8:18 a.m., the Service served a first notice of levy on the main office of
the taxpayer's bank. This notice was followed by a second notice at 8:30 a.m.
on a branch office of the same bank. On January 6, 1976, the bank paid
approximately $146,000 to the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to the
notices of levy served on December 19, 1975. The Service contended that the
198 Alexander Molosh, 45 T.C. 320 (1965). See also Skolski v. Comm'r, 351 F.2d 485 (3d
Cir. 1965); C. Louis Wood, 41 T.C. 593, aff'd, 338 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1964).
199 Perry Segura, 1975 P-H TAx CT. MEM. %75,080, (declining to follow Rapapport where
the mailing cover was destroyed and new cover was provided by the post office in which
petition arrived late with no postmark).
200 38 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 76-5494 (M.D. Tenn. July 6, 1976).
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taxpayer's action was in effect a claim for a refund under Section 7422 and
that the taxpayer was, therefore, precluded from recovery since he had not
paid the full amount of the deficiency and had not filed a claim for refund
with the Service.201
In effect the Internal Revenue Service claimed that Section 7422(a)
was the only method by which the Service could be forced to return monies
previously collected. The District Court, however, noted that as long as the
prerequisites for an injunction against the United States are met,2"2 a second
permissible method is an action for an "injunction against the continued
possession of monies seized."2 In this case the prerequisites would be met
and an injunction could issue if the Service failed to follow the jeopardy
assessment procedures of Section 6861. When a jeopardy termination is made
pursuant to Section 6851 (a) (1), as in the instant case, the Internal Revenue
Service must assess and follow the procedures outlined in Section 6861. It
should be noted that the Supreme Court recently merged Sections 6851 and
6861 into one continuous jeopardy process.2"' Section 6861 requires that the
Internal Revenue Service make a notice and demand for the payment of tax
without specifying any guidelines for when such notice and demand must be
made. The Service in L.O.C. Industries argued that it had complied fully with
Section 6861 since its notice of termination delivered to the taxpayer at
9:30 a.m. on December 19, 1975 contained a demand for the payment of
taxes due. If the Service had in fact complied fully with the Section 6861
prerequisites, then no injunction could issue against the levies pursuant to
Section 7421(a). The taxpayer, on the other hand, contended that the
notice and demand were received after the levies were issued, and that he
was given no opportunity to pay the deficiency or to refuse to do so. Therefore,
the availability of the taxpayer's action for an injunction presented an inter-
pretation of the notice and demand requirements of Section 6861.
201 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §6532(a)(1) provides, in part:
General Rule - No suit or proceeding under section 7422(a) for the recovery of any
internal revenue tax, penalty, or other sum, shall be begun before the expiration of 6
months from the date of filing the claim required under such section unless the Secretary
or his delegate renders a decision thereon within that time...
Here the taxpayer had initiated no claim against the government prior to filing suit in the
District Court.
202 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §7421(a), generally known as the Anti-Injunction Act, prohibits
a taxpayer's suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of a tax except
under very limited circumstances.
203 38 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 76-5497. See also Bailey v. Kelly, 372 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ohio
1974); Laing v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 469 (D. Vt. 1973), affd per curiam, 496 F.2d
853 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
20 4 Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Shapiro-°5 recently ruled that
in a jeopardy situation,
[T]he Commissioner may immediately assess the tax and, upon "notice
and demand" "for payment thereof" followed by the taxpayer's "failure
or refusal to pay such tax," may immediately levy on the taxpayer's
assets. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6861, 6331, 6213. When the Commissioner
follows this procedure, the Anti-Injunction Act applies in full force
and "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection
of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person." 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(2). 8
The District Court in L.O.C. Industries interpreted this language to
require that collection by levy can be effectuated only after the taxpayer's
failure or refusal to pay upon receipt of a notice and demand from the
Service." 7 In that case, the levy was served prior to receipt of any notice
by the taxpayer. The court concluded that ". . . a taxpayer in a jeopardy
situation is to be given some opportunity, however short, to fail or refuse
to pay the tax."2 8 The court's reasoning finds further support in Mrizek v.
Long, wherein the Illinois District Court found that ". . . no neglect, failure
or refusal to pay within the meaning of Section 6331 can occur prior to notice
and demand. ' '209 Since the Service in L.O.C. Industries failed to follow the
procedural mandates of Sections 6861 and 6331, the Anti-Injunction Act did
not apply and the taxpayer's action for an injunction against the "continued
possession of monies seized" was allowed to stand.21°
The taxpayer in a jeopardy situation is, therefore, to be accorded a
right to due process prior to the issuance of a levy directly against his
property. The Court in L.O.C. Industries characterized the procedure
employed by the Internal Revenue Service as a "mere mechanical attempt to
comply with the statutory notice and demand requirements ... [failing] to
comply with the letter or spirit of Section 6331. '"211 It is not clear, however,
how much notice will be deemed sufficient. The only real direction the Court
gives is that actual receipt of notice and demand by the taxpayer must
precede any levy proceeding. Where the Service fails to follow these essential
procedural requirements, it will become amenable to a taxpayer's action for
an injunction for the return of property levied. It is interesting to note further
that Section 6213 does not require irreparable injury as a prerequisite to
205 96 S.Ct. 1062 (1976).
206 Id. at 1066-67.
207 38 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 76-5500, citing 96 S.Ct. at 1068 n.7.
208 Id. at 76-5500.
209 187 F. Supp. 830, 835 (N.D. IIl. 1959).
210 38 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 76-5501.
211 Id,
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injunctive relief where the Service has failed to comply with the procedural
mandates of Section 6861.
8.09 Fraud Penalty
In Bennie F. Stewart,212 the taxpayer stipulated that he had fraudulently
understated his taxable income and tax liability for two consecutive years.
Nevertheless, he argued that he was not subject to the civil fraud penalty
under Section 6653(b)212 where he had paid his tax deficiency after the
Internal Revenue Service had audited his returns, but before he received a
deficiency notice.
In rejecting taxpayer's argument, the Court noted that strong precedent21"
has sanctioned the imposition of the fraud penalty on taxpayers who purpose-
fully file returns understating tax liability regardless of whether they file
an amended return between the date of filing and the date on which a notice
of deficiency is mailed.215 The court noted that it would be clearly inequitable
to allow a taxpayer to escape the fraud penalty, after he had fraudulently
understated his tax liability, by merely paying what he owes prior to the is-
suance of a deficiency notice. 16 To permit the taxpayer to escape the penalty in
this manner would circumvent congressional intent and "make sport" of the
fraud penalty.21
8.10 Swiss Bank Accounts
Increased individual travel abroad and a corresponding increase in
international business activities has led to a broad effort to eliminate
international double taxation. The mechanism of this effort has been the
binational tax treaty or convention. 18 Article XVI of the Double Taxation
Convention of May 24, 1951 between Switzerland and the United States219
212 66 T.C. No. 8 (Apr. 24, 1976).
213 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §6653(b) provides in part:
If any part of any underpayment... of tax required to be shown on a return is due to
fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 50 percent of the underpayment.
214 Romm v. Comm'r, 245 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 862 (1957);
Maitland A. Wilson, 7 T.C. 395 (1946); George M. Still, Inc., 19 T.C. 1072 (1953), affd per
curiam, 218 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1955).
215 See, e.g., P.C. and Ethel Peterson, 19 T.C. 486 (1953) (original deficiency in income
tax liability held proper base for computing fraud penalty despite later reduction due to
loss carry-back from subsequent year); Harry Sherin, 13 T.C. 221 (1949) (amended return and
payment of fine does not cure original fraudulent return); Aaron Hirschmann, 12 T.C. 1223
(1949) (filing of amended partnership return does not eliminate fraudulent elements from
original return).
216 66 T.C. No. 8 (Apr. 24, 1976).
217 Id. at 33, citing George M. Sill, Inc., 19 T.C. 1072, 1076-77 (1953).
218 8 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §45.69 (1970).
219 Convention with the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with
Respect to Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316 [hereinafter
cited as Convention].
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typically provides for a reciprocal exchange of information as necessary
to carry out the terms of the treaty. Such an exchange, however, seems to
run against existing Swiss law pertaining to secrecy of bank records.
The Swiss Supreme Court has ruled that Swiss authorities can provide
the Internal Revenue Service with data from a United States citizen's Swiss
bank account."' However, the exchange of information under the Convention
is limited to that which is necessary for the prevention of fraudulently criminal
acts and to otherwise implement the purpose of the Convention in eliminating
double taxation.' The only United States taxes that are contemplated by
the agreement are the federal income taxes, including surtaxes and excess
profits taxes.
In X. v. Confederation (Swiss) Tax Administration,12 the taxpayer at-
tempted to prevent the Swiss Tax Administration from conveying to the Inter-
nal Revenue Service certain information it had discovered during an investi-
gation of his Swiss bank accounts. The Swiss authorities, acting at the
official request of the Internal Revenue Service, conducted an investigation
of the taxpayer's bank records and largely confirmed the Internal Revenue
Service's suspicions. The taxpayer contended that internal Swiss law pertaining
to the secrecy of bank records prohibited the transmission of information as
sought by the Internal Revenue Service. The taxpayer also pointed out that
no action for tax fraud was, at the time, pending against him in the United
States.
In rejecting the taxpayer's claim the Swiss Confederation Supreme Court
ruled that there need be only a suspicion, substantiated by fact, that a
"fraudulently criminal act or the like" had been committed or that the com-
mission of such an illegal act is planned. The term fraudulently "criminal
act or the like" must be interpreted under Swiss tax law in accordance with
Article II, paragraph 2, of the Convention. 2' Consequently, an independent
investigation is generally undertaken by local authorities to confirm or sub-
stantiate the Internal Revenue Service's suspicions of fraudulently criminal
acts. An international exchange of information can be granted only where
the information "is available under the tax laws of both contracting states."22
In other words, the only information available for exchange is that which
could be obtained from the banks under Swiss law if the taxpayer had de-
frauded Swiss tax authorities with respect to his income tax. Article XVI of
220X v. Confederation (Swiss) Tax Administration, 28 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 71-5510 (Swiss
Confed. S. Ct. 1970).
221 Convention, supra note 219, at 1760. (Article XVI, para. 1).
222 28 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 71-5510 (Swiss Confed. S.Ct. 1970).
223 Id. at 71-5513.
224 Id. at 71-5514,
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the Convention, therefore, is limited in principle as to any firm obligation to
furnish information.
Since Swiss bank secrecy was not actually abolished by Article XVI of
the Convention, it, in effect, places a further limit on the Swiss authorities'
obligation to exchange information. The Swiss Tax Administration, before
undertaking its own investigation, must examine the allegation in a request
for official assistance to determine that "the evidence substantiates the
necessity of an investigation for tax fraud." '25 This determination is prelim-
inary to any detailed examination of a taxpayer's bank records and is designed
to ensure that certain standards of secrecy are maintained.
The extent to which Swiss authorities will go in assisting the Internal
Revenue Service has been limited by a further ruling of the Swiss Confeder-
ation Supreme Court in X v. Confederation (Swiss) Tax Administration.22
Swiss authorities furnished the Internal Revenue Service with certain informa-
tion pertaining to the taxpayer's Swiss bank accounts in accordance with the
Court's earlier decision. However, this information was not completely satis-
factory to the Internal Revenue Service in that it could not be introduced
as evidence in the American court system. The Swiss government had origin-
ally turned over an official report of its finding to the Internal Revenue
Service rather than authenticated original records. The Service, therefore,
initiated a second request for the production of items of evidence necessary
under United States procedural law. The Swiss Confederation Supreme Court
ruled that the 1951 Convention applied only to the transmission of information
in cases of tax fraud and did not encompass giving comprehensive legal
assistance. The Court pointed out that a proposed treaty,"2 then under con-
sideration between Switzerland and the United States, specifically addressed
the reciprocal exchange of legal assistance in punishable matters. That treaty,
not yet adopted, provides that legal assistance in tax matters will be given
only in cases of investigations against leading persons in organized crime.
Since this proposed agreement assures legal assistance in criminal tax matters
only in exceptional cases, and distinguishes such information exchange from
the more general information exchange provided for under the 1951 Conven-
tion, the Court concluded that the Convention, which itself envisions only
a reciprocal exchange of information, could not be broadly construed to
encompass such an obligation in the ordinary tax fraud case.2
The Swiss government does not appear to be ready to completely remove
225 Id. at 71-5518.
226 37 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 76-1282 (1975).
227 Id. at 76-1284-85.
228 Id. at 76-1284. (The failure of Swiss authorities to ratify this treaty to date is indicative of
their strong desire to maintain current secrecy laws now in effect).
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the veil of secrecy that has historically made Swiss bank accounts so popular
with foreign citizens. Bank transaction information will be released to the
Internal Revenue Service, but only where intentional fraud, rather than
mere tax deficiency, is alleged by the Internal Revenue Service, and where
a subsequent confidential investigation by Swiss authorities substantiates the
allegation of a fraudulent transaction which contravenes both Swiss and
American tax law. Furthermore, the obligation to give official assistance
under Article XVI of the Double Taxation Convention is limited to the
exchange of information only, and is not an obligation to participate in a
tax-fraud prosecution by performing the "additional investigatory actions" '229
necessary to produce evidence admissible under United States rules of evi-
dence.
8.11 Procedural Rules - Request for Rulings
It is the general practice of the Internal Revenue Service to answer
inquiries of individuals and organizations as to their status for tax purposes
and as to the tax effects of their transactions." The Service considers this
practice appropriate in the interests of sound tax administration. In effect,
the Service offers its own interpretation of the revenue laws under authority
of Section 7805 which authorizes the Service to "prescribe all needful rules
and regulations for enforcement" of the Code. Revenue Procedure 69-1 11
describes the general procedures of the Service in issuing rulings and determi-
nation letters to taxpayers. It should be noted that the Service will not rule on
all matters. Revenue Procedure 69-6... outlines in detail those areas and
issues on which rulings will not be issued.
Revenue Procedure 72-3, Section 6,1 contains a set of instructions for
the taxpayer in requesting a ruling from the Service. It is important for
taxpayer to fully comply with this set of instructions as any deviation may
result in a delayed disposition of the request.
The Service has recently adopted a permanent procedure for helping the
taxpayer obtain private letter rulings more easily and speedily. This pro-
cedure is incorporated in Revenue Procedure 76-29... and is applicable to
original ruling requests received on or after July 1, 1976 that meet the
requirements of Section 6 of Revenue Procedure 72-3.111 In effect, this new
procedure is designed to ensure that qualified taxpayers who have submitted
229 Id. at 76-1284.
230 26 C.F.R. §601.201 (1976).
231 Rev. Proc. 69-1, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 381.
232 Rev. Proc. 69-6, 1969-1 CuM. BuLL. 396.
233 Rev. Proc. 72-3, 1972-1 CuM. BuLL. 698.
234 Rev. Proc. 76-29, 1976 INT. REv. BULL. No. 29, at 17.
235 Rev. Proc. 72-3, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 698.
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certain ruling requests will be contacted within 15 workdays after receipt
of the request by a Branch representative to "... discuss informally the
procedural and substantive issues involved in the ruling ..2. "6
The new procedure accords special treatment exclusively to the following
special interest items:
(1) Individual Income Tax Branch
(a) Partnerships and trusts
(b) Code section 103
(c) Real estate investment trusts
(d) Stock options
(e) Charitable remainder trusts
(f) Pooled income funds
(2) All matters within the jurisdiction of the Corporation Tax Branch
except cases
(a) involving a request for change in accounting methods
or periods,
(b) relating to the last-in first-out method of computing
inventory,
(c) insurance issues involving contracts with reserves based
on segregated asset accounts,
(d) insurance issues requiring actuarial computations.
(3) All matters within the jurisdiction of the Wage, Excise and Admin-
istrative Provisions Branch, except ruling requests from individuals
for employment status submitted on Forms SS-8.
(4) All matters within the jurisdiction of the Engineering and Valuation
Branch, Reorganization Branch, and Estate and Gift Tax Branch. '
As previously stated, a Branch representative will contact the taxpayer
to discuss the procedural and substantive issues involved in a ruling request
covered by this new procedure. At that time and with respect to each issue
identified, the Branch representative will inform the taxpayer or his repre-
sentative:
(1) Whether he will recommend acceptance or rejection of the tax-
payer's ruling request; or whether he will simply recommend no
ruling be issued; or
(2) Whether additional information is required before he can fully
consider the taxpayer's request; or
(3) Whether, due to the unique nature of the request, a tentative con-
clusion on the issue cannot be reached.
236 Rev. Proc. 76-29, 1976 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 17.
237 Rev. Proc. 76-29, 1976 INT. REv. BULL. No. 29, at 17-18.
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If the requested information falls within the jurisdiction of more than
one Branch or more than one office within the same Branch, the Branch
representative will so inform the taxpayer within the initial 15 day period.
A representative of the office of prime responsibility will then contact the
taxpayer within 15 workdays of his receipt of the taxpayer's request. At
this time the taxpayer and Branch representative will informally discuss the
issues as outlined above. The taxpayer, therefore, will not be required to
wait more than a maximum of 30 workdays before receiving some type of
positive response from the Service.
If an adverse ruling is indicated as a result of the proposed transaction,
the Branch representative will inform the taxpayer how, in his opinion,
the transaction can be modified to warrant the issuance of a favorable ruling.
The Branch representative may conclude that a meeting of all interested
parties at the National Office would best serve the speedy resolution of the
issues at hand. It should be noted that "[a]ny such meeting will not constitute
the taxpayer's conference of right as described in Section 7.02 of Rev. Proc.
72-3 ."28
The taxpayer should be fully cognizant of the fact that the Service does
not consider itself bound by any informal opinions presented by the Branch
representative under this expedited procedure. However, Revenue Procedure
76-29 appears to be an invaluable planning device that will afford the tax-
payer prompt guidance on the Service's interpretation of its various Revenue
laws.
8.12 Criminal Procedure in Tax Proceedings
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Janis,29
the availability of the exclusionary rule to exclude illegally seized evidence
from a civil proceeding to assess a tax deficiency has been severely restricted.
In Janis, the taxpayer sought to exclude evidence of illegal bookmaking
activities which had been seized from him by the Los Angeles police pursuant
to a search warrant that was later ruled defective. After taxpayer's arrest,
the arresting officers contacted the Internal Revenue Service,2 " and an agent
examined the evidence seized, which included $4,940 in cash and records
revealing the gross volume of gambling wagers received by the taxpayer
238 Rev. Proc. 76-29, 1976 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 17, 18.
239 96 S.Ct. 3021 (1976), rev'g 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-1049 (C.D. Cal. 1973). For a
discussion of the district court decision, see Briner, Federal Income Tax Developmentss 1975,9 AKRoN LAw REV. 411, 475 (1976).
240 Officer Wiessman, the arresting officer, testified that his own sense of duty and not de-
partment policy caused him to contact the Internal Revenue Service. The issue of whetherthe federal government had encouraged such police conduct by enactment of Section 4401
was not reached by the district court and therefore was not before the Supreme Court in
this appeal. 96 S.Ct. at 3023, n.3.
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during the five days preceding the search. On the basis of this evidence, and
the statement by a Los Angeles police officer that he had observed the tax-
payer engaged in bookmaking activities for at least 77 days prior to the search,
the Service assessed a tax in the amount of $89,026.09 against the taxpayer
under Section 4401,241 and seized the $4,940 in partial satisfaction.
After the warrant had been ruled defective and quashed, Janis filed a
claim for refund of the cash seized, and when this claim was rejected, filed
suit. The Service counterclaimed for the balance of the tax alleged owed.
Both parties stipulated that "the sole basis of the computation of the civil
tax assessment . . . was . . . the items obtained pursuant to the search
warrant... and the information furnished by Officer Weissman with respect
to the duration of [respondent's] alleged wagering activities." '2 2 The District
Court granted the taxpayer's motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that
it had been illegally procured,4 ' and ordered the Service to return the $4,940
seized. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, defined the issue presented as
"is evidence seized by a state criminal law enforcement officer in good faith,
but nonetheless unconstitutionally, inadmissable in a civil proceeding by or
against the United States?"2 ' The facts in Janis presented the arguments for
admitting the evidence in their most favorable form, since the violation of
taxpayer's rights had been unintentional upon a presumed-valid warrant, "5
and thus without intent to violate the taxpayer's rights.
In refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to the present case, Justice
Blackmun noted that the established justification for invoking the rule was
to deter unlawful police conduct, and stated that evidence both reliable and
relevant upon the issue of an individual's wrongdoing should not be excluded
unless the deterrent purpose would be accomplished.2" In a case such as the
present, where the final use of the evidence against the taxpayer was by the
federal government rather than the State of California, and in a civil suit for
collection of federal taxes rather than in a criminal prosecution for book-
making, any additional deterrent effect upon the Los Angeles police would
be "highly attenuated",4 " especially in view of the fact that the evidence
2 4 1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §4401(a).
242 96 S.Ct. at 3024.
243 Id. at 3025.
244 Id. at 3023.
245 The warrant was found to be defective upon the basis of requirements set forth in
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), decided by the Court after the warrant
against Janis had been issued. 96 S.Ct. at 3024.
246 96 S.Ct. at 3028.
247 Id. at 3034.
Winter, 1977]
51
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1976 Part I
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
AKRON LAW REVIEW
would still be excluded in a criminal prosecution. For these reasons, Black-
mun concluded that the exclusionary rule should not be applied in the present
case.
The extent to which the exclusionary rule is no longer available in tax
assessment cases is not clear from the Janis decision. In arguing that the
exclusionary rule should be applied to the facts of his case, Janis cited a
number of decisions in the lower Federal courts,"4 8 none of which were found
to be wholly applicable to the present circumstances. With one exception,
all the cases cited by Janis involved "intrasovereign" violations4 9 in which
the same sovereign that committed the violation later sought to make use of
the evidence seized."8 Such cases were not comparable to the present case,
in which the Internal Revenue Service had no part in the violation of the
taxpayer's rights, and merely made use of the evidence furnished it by state
officers acting on their own initiative. 5'
The sole case cited by Janis which was found applicable to the present
case was Suarez v. Commissioner,52 in which the taxpayer was arrested by
Florida officials on the charge of conducting illegal abortions, and evidence
of the unreported income from this activity was turned over to the Service.
The Tax Court ordered the evidence excluded, a decision which Justice
Blackmun criticized because the Tax Court failed to consider the difference
between intersovereign and intrasovereign use of evidence, and did not con-
sider the deterrent effect of the exclusion of evidence." 3
Although a number of factors were considered in Janis to determine
that the exclusionary rule would not have its desired deterrent effect, only
the absence of intrasovereign use of the evidence was found to be a necessary
condition to the Court's refusal to apply the rule. While the proceeding in
248 Id. at 3032, n.30.
249 Id. at 3033.
250 See, e.g., Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, cert, denied, 396 U.S. 980 (1969),
where Internal Revenue Service officials themselves searched taxpayer's premises subsequent
to his arrest on gambling charges, and themselves discovered the evidence upon which the
deficiency was assessed.
251 In criminal prosecutions, the so-called "silver platter doctrine" allowing federal officials
to make use of evidence seized by state officers even where the federal officers could not
have themselves seized the same evidence lawfully, was abolished in Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960). Since the present case was a civil suit, and since the Supreme Court,
as Justice Blackmun notes, had never applied the exclusionary rule to a civil case, it was
not necessary for the Court to specifically overrule Elkins. However, Justice Blackmun
questions the continued value of the Elkins ruling in light of the fact that as a result of
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the same exclusionary rule standards that apply to
federal officers may be used to exclude evidence by state officers, thus eliminating the
possibility that federal standards will be circumvented by the actions of state officers. 96
S.Ct. at 3028-29.
252 58 T.C. 792 (1972).
253 96 S.Ct. at 3034.
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Janis was civil, rather than criminal, and the police officers who seized the
evidence did so in good faith, without intent either to violate the taxpayer's
rights or to circumvent the exclusionary rule, neither of these factors appears
to be necessary to the Court's decision not to exclude such evidence. Deter-
rent effect will apparently be presumed in cases where the same sovereign
that unlawfully seized evidence is denied the opportunity to use that evidence
against the individual whose rights were violated. However, where the tax-
payer is subsequently assessed for additional taxes due to the unlawful, but
good faith, seizure of evidence by state officials, he will not be able to invoke
the exclusionary rule to prevent the use of that evidence against him.
9.00 Inventory
10.00 Pension, Profit Sharing and Stock Ownership Plans
11.00 Corporations
11.01 Accumulated Earnings Tax
Sections 531 to 537 of the Code are Congress' way of forcing dividend
distributions of unneeded corporate assets. The tax is imposed on corporations
which are: ". .. formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income
tax with respect to its shareholders .. .by permitting earnings and profits
to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed."", 4 However, if the
accumulation of earnings was for a reasonable business purpose, the tax
will not be imposed. Reasonable business purposes include working capital,
new construction, capital improvement, acquiring a competitor, and just
about all other legitimate business needs which require money.
In the case of Brumer, Moss & Cohen, P. A. v. United States,2 55 a pro-
fessional corporation was seeking a tax refund for an accumulated earnings
tax penalty. The corporation was engaged in the practice of law entirely on
a contingency basis. The taxpayer argued that it had not accumulated earnings
beyond the reasonable and reasonably anticipated needs of the business.
Specifically, these needs and anticipated needs were:
( 1 ) to provide financing for new office facilities;
(2) to fund a stock retirement agreement; and
(3) to provide sufficient working capital for an increased case load.25 6
The jury in the Brumer case decided that there was no unreasonable
accumulation for the fiscal 1969 year but that there was an unreasonable
254 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §532(a).
255 37 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 76-802 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
256 Id. 76-803.
Winter, 1977]
53
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1976 Part I
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
AKRON LAW REviEw
accumulation for the fiscal 1970 year. The judge instructed the jury that
each year must stand on its own.25
The taxpayer in Brumer asserted the defense of reasonable business need
for both years. The jury accepted this defense for 1969 but rejected it for
1970. This suggests that with the passage of time a taxpayer may have to
provide more specific, definite, and feasible plans to substantiate anticipated
business needs.
11.02 Corporate Redemption - Complete Liquidation
In Claude J. Lisle.58 the taxpayers' ownership of the corporation was
terminated by a complete redemption of all of their stock. The taxpayers
were brothers and majority stockholders in Lisle Funeral Home. They desired
to retire from the business and each entered into an agreement with the
minority shareholders for the redemption of his stock. Joel Lisle entered
into a redemption agreement with the corporation in 1966. Claude Lisle
entered into a similar agreement in 1969.
In each case the corporation was unable to pay the full redemption
price at the time of the redemption. The taxpayers therefore agreed to a
$25,000 down payment and a twenty year payout with seven percent interest
on the unpaid balance. The stock was placed in escrow with the seller retain-
ing legal title and voting rights. The sellers also continued as directors and
unpaid officers of the corporation.
The Internal Revenue Service maintained that the redemption failed
to qualify as a complete termination of the shareholders' interest in the
corporation under Section 302(b) (3) and therefore the payments on the
principal and interest were dividends. The Service's position was that the
twenty year payout coupled with the retention of voting rights and a continued
voice in management kept the beneficial interest in the stock from passing
and therefore there was no actual sale of the stock.
The Tax Court rejected the Service's argument. The court held that
the twenty year payout period did not per se keep the sale from qualifying
as a redemption under Section 302(b) (3). While the court found merit in
the Service's contention that the length of the payout period coupled with
the retention of voting rights are indications of a retained interest, they did
not agree that that ended the inquiry. Happily for the taxpayer, the Service
had conceded that the obligations to him were in fact valid debts and not
equity interests. The court pointed out that the length of the debt obligation
257 Id.
258 45 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 176, 140 (May 15, 1976).
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does not change its basic nature from that of debt to that of equity.2 59
Although the twenty year payout period did not per se keep the trans-
action from qualifying as a redemption, it might have if sufficient beneficial
interest had been retained. The court found that this was not the case here.
In analyzing whether sufficient beneficial interest had passed, the court
found there was a fixed and definite plan by the minority stockholders to
acquire all of the stock of the taxpayers and gain complete control of the
corporation.26 ° The minority stockholders' interests were obviously adverse to
the taxpayers maintaining a disguised stockholder relationship. The stock
was placed in escrow and the title retained by the sellers only as a security
arrangement. Although the brothers, as owners of record, continued to re-
ceive dividends, any dividends received on the stock went to reduce the
balance outstanding on the purchase price under the redemption agreement.
The court also found the retention of voting rights by the seller to
be a security measure for the seller.6 ' Joel Lisle, in particular, needed the
voting rights prior to the redemption of Claude Lisle's stock to counter any
moves by Claude which would have endangered Joel's security.
The right to participate in management may indicate a retention of a
shareholder interest.262 However, the court found that the taxpayers were
officers and directors in name only. 62 Neither brother took an active role
in management or exerted an appreciable influence on the affairs of the
corporation. The Service had maintained that by retaining their roles as
officers and directors the taxpayers did not terminate their interest in the
corporation. The Tax Court pointed out that while retention of these positions
can have a bearing on whether there has been a termination of a shareholder's
interest for purposes of triggering the attribution rules, 64 that provision has
no bearing on the present case.265
11.03 Corporate Redemption-Charitable Gifts
Section 302 of the Code provides that in some instances a redemption
of stock can be treated as a dividend unless certain conditions are met. A
classic example of what Section 302 is aimed towards is the partial redemp-
tion of stock owned by one who is in control, either alone or in conjunction
259 See Comm'r v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 141 F.2d 467 (lst Cir. 1944); Rev. Rul. 57-295,
1957-2 CuM. BULL. 227.
260 45 P-H TAx CT. MEM. %76, 140 at 627.
261 Id.
262 See Perry S. Lewis, 47 T.C. 129 (1966).
263 45 P-H TAx CT. MEM. %76, 140 at 629.
264 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §302(c) (2) (A) (i).
265 45 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. %76, 140 at 628.
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with the members of his family,266 of a closely held corporation. In this case
the stockholder still owns the corporation but he has managed to receive a
distribution of assets from the corporation. At this point Section 302 inter-
venes and causes the proceeds from the redemption to be treated as a dividend
rather than as a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset.
An interesting spinoff can occur if that same stockholder donates the
stock to a qualified charity and the stock is later redeemed. There is no
doubt that if the taxpayer first had the stock redeemed, and then donated the
proceeds to a charity, he would be taxed on the proceeds from the redemption.
However, if as in Palmer v. Commissioner,267 the taxpayer donates stock to
a qualified charity and subsequent to the gift the corporation redeems the
stock, the taxpayer will receive a charitable deduction and not be taxed on
the proceeds from redemption. Thus, if the taxpayer retains no control over
the stock and transfers it outright to the charity, 68 the courts have been will-
ing to consider the transaction closed for the purposes of a charitable deduc-
tion and will not tax the subsequent redemption to the donor taxpayer.269
In Robert A. Wekesser' the taxpayer gave shares of his wholly-owned
corporation to his church. The church was under no obligation to hold the
stock for redemption and could block any attempted redemption of the
donated shares. Thus by severing all control over the stock, the subsequent
redemption of the stock by his corporation resulted in no income to the
taxpayer. However, one caveat must be made. If prior to the gift to charity
a plan of liquidation has been initiated by the corporation, the subsequent
redemption of the stock by the corporation will be taxed to the donor taxpayer
under the doctrine of anticipatory assignment of income." 1
11.04 Sale of Assets to Controlled Group
Prior to the passage of Section 1239 people were able to structure sales
of capital assets between themselves and their spouses or controlled corpora-
tions so as to create a market for the asset and allow the taxpayer to remove
his investment at capital gains rate. Such was the case in Sun Properties, Inc.
v. United States."' There the taxpayer sold a warehouse worth $125,000,
to his wholly-owned corporation by accepting 30 semi-annual payments of
$4,000 with no interest on the balance. The corporation's only source of
266 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §318.
267 62 T.C. 684 (1974).
268 E.g., Dewitt v. United States, 74-1 U.S. TAx CAs. §9369 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
269 See Humacid Co. v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 894 (1964).
270 45 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 76, 214 (July 24, 1976).
271 See Kinsey v. Comm'r, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973); Hudspeth v. United States, 471
F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972).
272 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955).
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income was the rental of the warehouse. The Commissioner viewed the
transaction as a $125,000 contribution of capital by the taxpayer, followed
by a series of dividend disbursements by the corporation. The court did not
accept this analysis and instead said that tax avoidance does not ipso facto
make the substance of the transaction differ from the form. As a result of
a decision like this, in which tax-structured closed sales were treated as
ordinary sales for capital gains purposes, Congress enacted Section 1239.
Section 1239 is rather blunt in its application. It denies capital gains
treatment to taxpayers who sell directly or indirectly their capital assets to
their spouses or controlled corporations. The importance of the policy to be
effected by this section is illustrated by the fact that the capital gains treatment
ordinarily accorded the sale of patents by Section 1235 is denied when the
sale is to a spouse or a controlled corporation.273 Thus, when a taxpayer, as
in Estate of Stahl v. Commissioner,7" accepts notes from his controlled
corporation as payment for the sale of patents and patent applications, the
retirement of the notes will be ordinary income to the taxpayer.
While the Service has been successful in applying Section 1239 to sales
between taxpayers and their controlled corporations, the position it has taken
in Revenue Ruling 69-109111 has been almost uniformly unsuccessful. That
ruling proposes that a sale between two controlled corporations causes the
controlling taxpayer to recognize ordinary income by way of that provision
in Section 1239 which makes it applicable to "indirect" sales. That the Tax
Court has been very unreceptive to this interpretation is evidenced by its
decision in 10-42 Corporation v. Commissioner.276 In that case the Commis-
sioner sought to deny capital gains treatment to the sale of real property
by one controlled corporation to another. The fact that both corporations
were owned by the same individual caused the Commissioner to believe that
if Section 1239 were not applied here, a simple means of circumvention
would be created. The Tax Court, however, felt that the legislative history
of Section 1239 indicated that Congress meant the "indirect" provision to
apply to sales through strawmen and not to bona fide inter-corporate trans-
actions. More recently, the Service has lost the same issue on the same reason-
ing in Walter Demkowicz 77
11.05 Net Operating Loss Carrybacks and Carryovers
In United States v. Foster Lumber Co.278 the Supreme Court has held
273 Rev. Rul. 59-210, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 217.
274 442 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971).
275 Rev. Rul. 69-109, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 202.
276 55 T.C. 593 (1971).
277 44-P-H TAx CT. MEM. 75,278 (1975).
278 97 S.Ct. 204 (1976), rev'g 500 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1974).
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that a corporation using the alternative tax method of Section 1201 (a) must
calculate any net operating loss carryover provided by Section 172(b) (2)
as if the regular tax method had been used. In general, net operating losses
occurring in taxable years prior to January 1, 1976 may be carried back to
each of the three preceding years and then carried forward to each of the
five succeeding years until the loss is consumed. Section 1201 (a) permits a
corporation to use either the regular tax on all income or the regular tax on
ordinary income plus a 30 percent tax on net long-term capital gain. The
alternative tax results in a lower effective tax rate for corporations with
substantial amounts of capital gain income.
In Foster the taxpayer carried back a 1968 net operating loss of$42,203 to 1966. The taxpayer's income for 1966 was $173,870 of which
$166,634 was net long-term capital gain. Consequently, the alternative tax
method of Section 1201 (a) yielded a significant tax savings. Because its$42,203 loss more than offset its $7,236 of ordinary income, Foster inter-
preted Section 172(b) (2) as permitting him to carry over the $34,967
difference to subsequent taxable years.
The Commissioner contended that the net operating loss must be offset
against both ordinary and capital gain income to determine the applicable
carryover amount. In finding for the taxpayer the Eighth Circuit followed
what, at the time, was "the unanimous weight of judicial opinion" '279 against
the Commissioner's position. 8 ' Since then, the Fourth 8' and Sixth'82 Circuits
have decided cases in favor of the Commissioner.
The Supreme Court has now reversed the Eighth Circuit in Foster.
Regarding net operating loss carrybacks and carryovers, Section 172(b) (2)
provides:
[The portion of such loss which shall be carried to each of the other
taxable years shall be the excess, if any, of the amount of such loss
over the sum of the taxable income for each of the prior taxable years
to which such loss may be carried....
In rejecting the taxpayer's contention that the phrase "to which such loss
may be carried" restricts the definition of "taxable income" to that amount
against which a deduction was taken, the Court required the carryover to be
reduced by the total amount of all taxable income. Consequently, although
279 500 F.2d at 1232; see, e.g., Chartier Real Estate Co., 52 T.C. 346 (1969), affd, 428F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1970); Naegele v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-5689.
280 For a discussion of the Appeals Court decision, see Briner, Federal Income Tax Develop-
ments: 1974, 8 AKRON L. REv. 206, 309-312 (1975).
281 Mutual Assur. Soc'y of Va. Corp. v. Comm'r, 505 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1974).
282 Axelrod v. Comm'r, 507 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1974).
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Foster received a lower tax with the alternative tax method, his $42,000 of
net operating losses was not fully utilized to reduce his taxable income.
The decision of the Supreme Court creates a difficult timing problem
for corporations. Whenever the corporation has net operating losses and
uses the alternative tax method, it will suffer if the loss carryback exceeds
the amount of ordinary income in the carryback year. Taxpayers in this
situation are unable to take full advantage of the tax savings offered by
Section 172 when they receive the tax benefit of Section 1201 (a). Mean-
while, other taxpayers with similar gains and losses over a number of years
can fully utilize the tax benefits of both sections through what has been
described as "accidents of timing.
'2 8 3
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 does provide some tax planning options
for taxpayers caught in the loss carryback squeeze. Section 806(c) 2 1 of the
Reform Act permits the taxpayer to elect not to carryback his net operating
losses at all. By making the election, the taxpayer may use the alternative
tax method of Section 1201(a) and still carry forward his losses. This will
be particularly desirable when the carryback years involve low or no ordinary
income and high capital gain. In addition, Act Section 806(a) increases the
number of carryover years from five to seven, providing a better opportunity
to offset net operating losses.
12.00 Subchapter S Corporations
12.01 Revocable Inter Vivos Trust
There are certain requirements a corporation which elects Subchapter S
status must follow. One of these requirements is that it cannot have a share-
holder who is not an individual." 5 Included in this class of non-individuals
is a trust.
In the case of W & W Fertilizer Corp. v. United States, 286 the corporation
elected Subchapter S status. The corporation's stock was entirely owned by
two brothers. Five years later, one brother transferred his shares to a revocable
inter vivos trust, retaining income for life. His main motive was to save
probate costs upon his death. The Service terminated the corporation's Sub-
chapter S status since a small business corporation may not have a non-
individual as a shareholder.
The taxpayer argued that for purposes of ownership he should be the
283 97 S.Ct. at 212.
28 4 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455 §806(c) (Oct. 4, 1976), adds the following
new subparagraph:
Any taxpayer entitled to a carryback period under paragraph (1) may elect to relin-
quish the entire carryback period with respect to a net operating loss for any taxable
year ending after Dec. 31, 1975 ... "
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shareholder and not the trust. He also argued that the "grantor-trust rules" '
should be applied to allow the grantor to be viewed as the owner of the
shares and not the trust. Since the grantor enjoyed the beneficial ownership
of the stock, his income was not only taxable to him,288 but he was also
treated as the owner due to his power to revoke.8 9
The taxpayer further argued that the grantor should be viewed as the
shareholder because his beneficial interest in the shares met with the intent
of ownership under Section 1371 (a) (2). His control of the trust should there-
fore be treated as ownership.
The Court of Claims rejected these arguments. It answered that the
"grantor-trust rules" do not give the grantor legal title to the trust corpus.
Indeed, since the "grantor-trust rules" deal with how to tax the trust income,
it is clear that legal title lies with the trust. Further, since the trust was
created for the legitimate purpose of avoiding probate costs, it was a viable
entity, and therefore owned the stock.
The court held that when the corporation's shares were transferred
to the trust the Subchapter S status of the corporation was terminated.
12.02 Shareholder's Operating Loss
A net operating loss of an electing small business corporation can be
deducted by the shareholders on their personal returns. 290 However, the
shareholder's portion of the net operating loss cannot exceed the sum of
the adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholder. 9'
In the case of Duke v. Commissioner,8 2 Duke had reorganized his
partnership into a Subchapter S corporation. After a few years Duke's
basis in his shares had been reduced to zero, and he could no longer per-
sonally deduct the corporation's net operating losses. However, Duke had
negotiated bank loans for the corporation, which the bank had him sign
as co-maker. Duke argued that this personal liability made him a creditor
of the corporation. Duke had, therefore, personally deducted the net operating
loss of the corporation against his basis in the supposed indebtedness of the
corporation to him.
The Tax Court supported the Commissioner in disallowing the deduction.
285 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1371(a) (2).
286 527 F.2d 621 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
297 See Clariss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
288 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §671.
289 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §671(a).
290 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1374(a).
291 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1374(c).
292 45 P-H TAx CT. MEM. §76,050 (Feb. 26, 1976).
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Since the corporation's books showed the loans as its obligations, and
the principal and interest was totally paid by the corporation, Duke's con-
tribution was no more than that of a guarantor.
If Duke had borrowed the money personally and then loaned it to the
corporation, he could have used this indebtedness to offset the net operating
loss of the corporation on his personal deductions. However, Duke's guaranty
of the corporation's loans created no indebtedness from the corporation to
him, and therefore could not be used by him as a basis for deducting the
corporation's net operating loss.
12.03 Investment Credit Recapture
A corporation which has previously taken investment tax credits and
then elects Subchapter S status may be liable for investment credit recap-
ture. 2 ' Treasury Regulation 1.47-4(b) states that a corporation's Section 38
property29 ' shall be deemed to have been disposed of when the Subchapter S
election is made and the rules of recapture shall apply. However, the cor-
poration may avoid the recapture by timely filing of an assumption agreement
in which the stockholders accept joint and several liability for the recapture
when the property is disposed. "[T]he district director may if good cause is
shown, permit the agreement to be filed on a later date." ''
In the case of Bell Fibre Products Corporation9 ' the corporation
elected Subchapter S status, but was not informed by its attorney or account-
ant of the need to file an assumption agreement. Fifteen months later,
Bell Fibre was alerted to the need for an assumption agreement by its
attorney and immediately filed one. Thereafter, Bell Fibre was audited and
a deficiency was levied for the recapture of investment credits previously
taken.
Bell Fibre disputed the deficiency and went to the Tax Court. One week
before trial, and five years after receiving the assumption agreement, the
Internal Revenue Service said there was no "reasonable cause" for the delay
in filing and the assumption agreement was therefore invalid.
The Tax Court, in deciding on the meaning of "good cause" as used in
Section 1.47-4(b) (2) (ii), rejected the Service's contention that while re-
liance on counsel might constitute reasonable cause, it is not good cause.
The Tax Court held that the good cause standard in the regulations intended
to provide flexibility in deciding when filing is timely. Since the Service
was not prejudiced or inconvenienced by the delay, and even had the pro-
293 Treas. Reg. 1.47-4(b).
294 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §38 gives the Secretary of the Treasury the power to prescribe
regulations as to what type of property an investment credit will apply.
29 5Treas. Reg. 1.47-4(b)(2)(ii).
296 65 T.C. No. 65 (Jan. 19, 1976).
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tection of the agreement for five years before invalidating it, the court said
they had accepted it by holding it so long. The court further relied on thefact that Bell Fibre had acted in good faith on advice from counsel, and had
immediately filed the assumption agreement as soon as they discovered the
need.
The court further stated that they were not creating a general rule,
each late filing must be judged on its own merits for good cause.
12.04 Passive Income
A corporation which has elected Subchapter S status will have that
status terminated if it receives more than 20 percent of its gross receipts
from passive investment income.297 Passive investment income includes rents,
royalties, dividends interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock or
securities.29 However, rents are not passive investment income if the cor-
poration also renders significant services to the user. 9 '
A Subchapter S corporation requested advice on whether their incomefrom operating tennis and handball courts was passive investment income.
The corporation provided players with a locker room, lockers, showers,
saunas, hair dryers, and parking facilities, as well as corporate employees to
maintain them.
In Revenue Rule 76-50,1°° the Internal Revenue Service ruled that the
rents received were not passive investment income due to the significant
services rendered by the corporation. Further, receipts from lessons and
the sale of sporting goods were not passive investment income as they are
not rents, royalties, dividends, or the like.
2 9 7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1372(e)(5)(A).
298 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §1372(e)(5)(C).
299 Treas. Reg. §1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi).
390 Rev. Rul. 76-50, 1976 INT. REV. BULL. No. 7 at 10.
TABLE OF RECENT REVENUE RULINGS
Paragraph Ruling
............................................... 4.14 76-50
..................................................... 4.05 76-62
------------------------------------......... 11.02 76-71
.............................................. . .1 1 .0 4 7 6 -7 9
.................................................... 4.14 76-84
.................................................... 4.10 76-88
.................................................... 4.16 76-143
............................................. . . . . . 1 1 0 4 7 6 -2 1 5
.................................................... 4.16 76-238
.................................................... 7.01 76-249
..................................................... 4 03 76-256
.................................................... 4.14 76-278
76-453
Paragraph
.................................................... 12.04
..................................................... 4.06
.................................................... 4.06
.................................................... 4.02
..................................................... 7 01
.................................................... 1.01
.................................................... 4.16
.............................................. 5.01
.................................................... 6.01
.................................................. 7.02
.................................................... 6.01
.................................................... 4.11
................................................... 4.18
Ruling
56-25
56-511
57-295
59-210
63-100
68-643
69-79
69-109
69-215
70-466
71-588
75-380
AKRON LAw REVIEW [Vol. 10:3
62
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss3/6
Winter, 1977]
Case Name Paragraph
Agurs, United States v ......................... 8.05
American Foundry v.
Commissioner .----------................... 4.03
Arrowsmith v. Commissioner .............. 4.08
Ashby, John L ..................................... 4.03
Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc ......... 4.04
Axelrod v. Commissioner .................... 11.05
B
Bailey v. Kelly ...................................... 8.08
Barrett, United States v ....................... 2.01
Beckwith v. United States .................... 8.01
Bell Fibre Products Corp ..................... 12.03
Bennett v. Commissioner .................... 4.17
Bistline v. United States ...................... 4.06
Brady v. Maryland .............................. 8.05
Briggs, Raymond S ............................. 6.01
Brittingham, Robert W ....................... 1.01
Brumer, Moss, Cohen v.
United States .................................... 11.01
Burch, G. Douglas .............................. 4.10
C
Caiello, United States v ..................... 8.01
Central Freight Lines, Inc ................... 4.07
Chartier Real Estate Co ..................... 11.05
Clariss v. Bowers ................................ 12.01
Coffey, R. C ......................................... 4.05
Coker v. Commissioner ...................... 4.14
Commissioner v. H. P. Hood
& Sons, Inc ....................................... 11.02
Commissioner v. Shapiro .................... 8.08
Condit v. Commissioner ....................... 4.06
Couch v. United States ...................... 8.03
D
Davis, United States v ......................... 4.08
Delhar, Inc. v. United States .............. 1.01
Demkowicz, Walter .............................. 11.04
DePinto v. United States .................... 4.09
DeWitt v. United States ...................... 11.03
Don E. Williams Co. v.
Commissioner .................................... 4.15
Duke v. Commissioner ........... 12.02
Duvin Coal Co. v. Commissioner ........ 6.01
E
Echols, Earl S., Jr ................................. 4.17
Elkins v. United States ........................ 8.12
Epstein, Nathan .................................... 4.03
F
Fausner v. Commissioner .................... 4.14
Fischer, C. Fink .................................... 4.01
Fisher v. United States ........................ 8.03
Foster Lumber Co., United States v. 11.05
G
Garner v. United States ...................... 8.04
Case Name Parag
George M. Still, Inc ...................
Ginsburg, Arnold L .............................
Greensburg v. Commissioner ................
Guren, Sheldon B .................................
'raph
8.09
4.12
4.06
4.15
H
Hillcone Steamship Co ......................... 6.01
Hilton Hotels, United States v ........... 4.08
Hirschmann, Aaron .............................. 8.09
Hoffa v. United States ........................- 8.02
Hotel Equities Corp ............................. 8.06
Hudspeth v. United States .................... 11.03
Humacid Co. v. Commissioner ............ 11.03
J
Jacob v. United States ........................ 2.01
Janis, United States v ........................... 8.12
K
Kallander v. United States .................... 4.14
Karl, Robert H ..................................... 4.14
Kaufman v. United States .................... 4.01
Keeton, United States v ....................... 2.01
Kingsbury, John C ............................... 4.05
Kinney, William R ............................... 4.05
Kinsey v. Commissioner .......... 11.03
Koerner v. United States .................... 2.01
Kordel, United States v ............ 8.04
Kowalski v. Commissioner .................. 2.01
L
Laing v. United States ........................ 8.08
Larkin, Alan B ..................................... 4.03
Leidy, Estate of ................. 4.03
Levine, Samuel ...................................... 4.03
Lewis, Perry S ....................................... 11.02
Lisle, Claude J ..................................... 11.02
L.O.C. Industries v.
United States ................................... 8.08
M
McCrane, United States v ..................... 8.05
Mack, Clifford F ................................. 4.17
Mapp v. Ohio ....................... 8.12
Martin, James R ................. 4.01
Miller, United States v ......................... 8.02
Miranda v. Arizona ............................ 8.01
Moffat, Estate of .................................. 8.07
Molosh, Alexander ................................. 8.07
Morelan, United States v ..................... 2.01
Mrizek v. Long .................................... 8.08
Mutual Assurance Soc'y of
Va. Corp. v. Commissioner ............ 11.05
N
Naegele v. United States ...................... 11.05
0
Olsen v. Commissioner ...................... 4.14
P
Pacific Northwest Food Club, Inc. ...... 1.01
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1976
TABLE OF CASES
63
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1976 Part I
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
AKRON LAW REVIEW
Paragraph Case Name
Palmer v. Commissioner ...................... 11.03
Palo Alto Town and Country
Village, Inc ......................................... 1.01
Peterson, P. C. and Ethel .................... 8.09
Phinney v. Bank of Southwest
Nat'l Ass'n ........................................ 8.06
Pittsburg Milk Co ................................. 4.04
Pizzarello v. United States .................. 8.12
Putoma Corporation ............................ 4.13
R
Randich, Richard M ........................... 4.06
Rappaport, Jacob L ............................. 8.07
Repel Steel & Supply Co., Inc ............. 4.07
Ridgewood Provisions, Inc ................. 4.07
Rogers, James Clifford ........................ 4.17
Romm v. Commissioner ...................... 8.09
S
Saunders v. Commissioner .................... 2.01
Sears Oil Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner .................................... 6.01
Segura, Perry ........................................ 8.07
Sharples v. United States .................... 4.08
Sherin, Harry ........................................ 8.09
Skolski v. Commissioner .................... 8.07
Smith, David N ................................... 4.17
Smith, E. B ........................................... 4.03
Southern Arizona Bank &
Trust Co. v. United States ........... 4.08
Spinelli v. United States ...................... 8.12
Stahl, Estate of v.
Commissioner .................................... 11.04
Steel v. Commissioner .......................... 4.17
Stewart, Bennie F ................................. 8.09
Suarez v. Commissioner ...................... 8.12
Sullivan v. Commissioner ............. 4.14
Sullivan, United States v ..................... 8.04
Sun Properties v. United States ............ 11.04
Sylvan, Fred .......................................... 8.07
T
Taormina, Salvadore S ......................... 4.17
Ten-Forty Two Corp v.
Commissioner .................................... 11.04
Tollefsen, George F. ............................ 4.07
Tyne v. Commissioner .......................... 4.14
U
United States Gypsum Co. v.
United States .................................... 1.01
V
Vitale, Angelo ...................................... 8.07
W
W&W Fertilizer Corp. v.
United States .................................... 12.01
Walters, Stanley S ................................. 4.05
Wekesser, Robert A ............................. 11.03
White, United States v ......................... 8.02
Wilson v. United States ........................ 2.01
Wilson, Maitland A ............................. 8.09
Wisemore, David L ............................... 4.14
Wood, C. Louis .................................... 8.07
Woodward v. Commissioner ................ 4.08
X
X v. Confederation (Swiss)
Tax Administration .......................... 8.10
TABLE OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTIONS
Section Paragraph
38 ................................ 12 03
61 ................................. 4.06
61(a) .......................... 4.03
105(b) ........................ 4.03
119 .............................. 2 01
152 ............................... 4 03
162(a) ........................ 4 09
162(a)(1) .................. 4 07
162(c)(2) .................. 4.04
163(a) ........................ 4 10
165(c) ........................ 4.09
165(c) (2) ............... 4.12
170(a)(1) .................. 4.15
170(f)(3)(A ) ............ 4.16
172(b)(20) ................ 11.05
172(b)(2) ................... 11.05
212 .......................... 4 05
212(3) ........................ 4.08
213 .............................. 4 01
213(e) ........................ 4.03
213(e)(1)(A ) ............ 4.02
Section Paragraph
213(e)(1)(B) ............ 4 02
214(b)(2) .................. 4.11
267(b)(2) .................. 4.13
274(d) ........................ 4 17
302 .............................. 11 03
302(b)(3) .................. 11.02
302(c)(2)(A)(i) ...... 11.02
312(e) ........................ 4 03
318 .............................. 11.03
446 ............................ 4.10
446(b) ........................ 4 10
482 .............................. 1 01
532(a) ............ 11.01
671 .............................. 12 01
671(a) ........................ 12 01
901(b) ........................ 5 01
1001(a)(b) ................ 7 02
1033(a) ....................... 7 01
1201(a) ...................... 11 05
1239 ............................ 11 04
Section Paragraph
1371(a)(2) ................ 12.01
1372(e)(5)(A) .......... 12.04
1372(e)(5)(C) .......... 12.04
1374(a) ...................... 12.02
1374(c) ...................... 12.02
4401(a) ...................... 8 12
6213 ........................ 8 08
6331 ......................... 8.08
6501(a) ..................... 8 06
6501(b) ...................... 8 06
6532(a)(1) ................ 8.08
6653(a) ...................... 4.17
6851(a)(1) ................ 8.08
6861 ............................ 8.08
7203 ............................ 8 04
7206(2) ...................... 8 05
7421(a) ...................... 8 08
7502(a)(1) ...... 8.06, 8.07
7602 .................... 8.01, 8.04
7805 ............................ 8 11
Case Name
[Vol. 10:3
Paragraph
64
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss3/6
TAx REFORM ACT
PART II
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph
1.00 Tax Computation
1.01 Corporate Tax Rates
1.02 Individual Income Tax Reductions
1.03 Revision of Tax Tables for Individuals
1.04 Minimum Tax
1.05 Maximum Tax
1.06 Low Income Allowance
2.00 Income
2.01 Qualified Stock Options
2.02 Income Earned Abroad by United States Citizens
Living or Residing Abroad
2.03 Foreign Grant or Trust with Citizens of the United
States as Beneficiaries
2.04 Non-Resident Aliens Married to United States Citizens
3.00 Exclusions
3.01 Amounts Received Under Accident and Health Plans
3.02 Military Disability Pensions
3.03 Prepaid Legal Expenses
3.04 Cancellation of Student Loans and Scholarships
3.05 Accumulation Trusts
4.00 Deductions
4.01 Prepaid Interest
4.02 Foreign Conventions
4.03 State Legislators' Travel Expenses Away From Home
4.04 Alimony
4.05 Moving Expenses
4.06 Charitable Contributions of Inventory and Other
Ordinary Income Property
4.07 Eliminating Architectural and Transportation Barriers
for the Handicapped
4.08 Business Use of Home
4.09 Vacation Homes
4.10 Partnership Organization and Syndication Fees
4.11 Nonbusiness Bad Debts
4.12 Bad Debts Owed by Political Parties
Winter, 19771
65
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1976 Part I
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
AKRON LAW REVIEW
4.13 Deductions Limited to Amount "at Risk" in Case of
Certain Activities
4.14 Farming-Accrual Accounting for Large Farm
Corporations and Limitations on Deductions for
Farming Syndicates
4.15 Investment Interest
5.00 Tax Credit
5.01 Credit for the Elderly
5.02 Disregard of Earned Income Credit
5.03 Earned Income Credit
5.04 Child Care Expenses
5.05 Extension of $100,000 Limitation on Used Property
5.06 Investment Credit
5.07 First-In First-Out Treatment of Investment Credits
5.08 Employee Stock Ownership Plans
5.09 Investment Credit for Movie and Television Films
5.10 Investment Credit for Certain Vessels
5.11 Investment Credit Limitation for Airlines
5.12 Work Inventive (WIN) Program Expenses
5.13 Welfare Recipient Tax Credit
5.14 Treatment of Certain Pollution Control Facilities
6.00 Procedure
6.01 Innocent Spouse
6.02 Waiver of Statute of Limitations for Activities not
Engaged for a Profit
6.03 Income Tax Return Preparers
6.04 Administrative Summonses
6.05 Public Inspection of the Internal Revenue Service's
Determination Rulings, Technical Advice Memoranda,
and Determination Letters
6.06 Minimum Exemption from Levy for Salaries,
Wages, and Other Income
6.07 Joint Committee Refund Review
6.08 Jeopardy and Termination Assessments
7.00 Loss
7.01 Net Operating Loss Carryover
8.00 Recapture
8.01 Recapture of Depreciation on Real Property
8.02 Amortization of Expenditures to Rehabilitate
Low-Income Housing
[Vol. 10:3
66
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss3/6
9.00 Partnerships
9.01 Retroactive Allocation of Partnership Income or Loss
9.02 Special Allocation of Partnership Income or Loss
9.03 Treatment of Partnership Liabilities Where a Partner
is not Personally Liable
10.00 Depreciation
10.01 Basis Limitation for Player Contracts Transferred in
Connection with a Sale of a Franchise
10.02 Additional First-Year Depreciation Allowance for
Partnerships
11.00 Amortization
11.01 Construction Period Interest and Taxes
11.02 Preservation of Historical Structures
12.00 Property Acquired by Bequest, Devise or Inheritance
1.00 Tax Computation
1.01 Corporate Tax Rates
Code Section 11-Act Section 901
Effective Date: Taxable years ending after December 31, 1974
Before the enactment of the 1975 Tax Reduction Act, the corporate
income tax was 22 percent on the first $25,000, and 48 percent on all
taxable income in excess of the $25,000. The Tax Reduction Act increased
the surtax exemption from $25,000 to $50,000, and changed the basic
income tax rate to 20 percent on the first $25,000 and 22 percent on the
second $25,000. Again, after $50,000 the total tax rate is 48 percent. The
Tax Reform Act of 1976 continued these rates until the end of 1977, even
though the Senate's amendment provided that the rates be made permanent.
1.02 Individual Income Tax Reductions
Code Section 141-Act Section 401
Effective Date: Taxable years ending after December 31, 1975
Made permanent by the 1976 Tax Reform Act are the increases in
standard deductions which originated with the Revenue Adjustment Act
of 1975. The standard deduction is increased from 15 percent to 16 percent,
subject to the maximum limitations as set forth in the following schedule,
showing both 1975 and 1976 amounts:
1976 1975
Single taxpayer -------------------------------------- $ 2,400 $ 2,300
Married taxpayer filing jointly ------------------- 2,800 2,600
Married taxpayer filing separately .............. 1,400 1,300
Surviving spouse -------------------------------------- 2,800 2,600
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Also made permanent are the increases in the low-income allowance,
also known as the minimum standard deduction, as set forth in the following
schedule:
1976 1975
Single taxpayer -------------------------------------- $ 1,700 $ 1,600
Married taxpayer filing jointly ------------------- 2,100 1,900
Married taxpayer filing separately ------------- 1,050 950
Surviving spouse ------------------------------------- 2,100 1,900
1.03 Revision of Tax Tables for Individuals
Code Section 3-Act Section 501
Effective Date: Taxable years ending after December 31,1975
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 has eliminated the use of the 12 optional
Tax Tables which permitted a taxpayer with adjusted gross income of less
than $15,000 to turn to the table which had the specific numbers of depen-
dency exemptions to which the taxpayer was entitled, and compute the
amount of income tax automatically therefrom. Congress' version of tax
simplification, which reduces the 12 tables to four tables, substitutes the
concept of taxable income instead of adjusted gross income. This means
that the taxpayer must deduct from his adjusted gross income the amount
of the dependency exemptions to which he is entitled multiplied times $750
each, plus either the itemized deductions or the standard deduction. Also,
the burden of computing the minimum standard deduction (low income
allowance) is placed upon the taxpayer. The taxpayer will thus have the
problem of determining which is more advantageous, taking the minimum
standard deduction, itemizing deductions, or merely taking the standard
deduction.
The author submits that this method of tax simplification is of benefit
only to those taxpayers who are in the business of providing income tax
preparation service to other taxpayers. I believe that this change will result
in thousands of more errors for the Internal Revenue Service and, addition-
ally, force many thousands of taxpayers into the hands of professional tax
preparers. It is also submitted that this concept will be changed after the
Internal Revenue Service has had the opportunity to review the results of
the 1976 returns. The use of these tables for computing the income tax on
taxable income is mandatory for all taxable incomes up to $20,000.
1.04 Minimum Tax
Code Sections 56 & 57-Act Section 301
Effective Date: Tax years beginning after December 31, 1975
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 introduced the concept of the minimum
tax, the goal being that all taxpayers should pay at least some tax. The
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purpose of this new statute was to prevent many high-income taxpayers from
paying little or no income tax. The minimum tax was 10 percent on the
total of all tax preferences reduced by a $30,000 exemption and reduced
by the amount of the normal income tax calculated without consideration
of the minimum tax. The following are tax preference items:
(1) Capital gains, the 50 percent portion which is excluded from the
calculation of taxable income.
(2) Accelerated depreciation in excess of straight-line depreciation
on personal property which is subject to a net lease.
(3) Accelerated depreciation in excess of straight-line depreciation on
all real property.
(4) Amortization of certified pollution control facilities in excess of
the amount of depreciation normally allowable under Section 167.
(5) Amortization of railroad rolling stock in excess of depreciation
allowable under Section 167.
(6) Stock options to the extent that the fair market value of the stock
at the time of exercise exceeds the option price.
(7) Percentage depletion in excess of the amount allowable under cost
depletion.
(8) Amortization of on-the-job training and child care facilities in
excess of the amount of depreciation allowable under Section 167.
(9) Bad debt deductions of financial institutions as permitted under
law, which are in excess of the actual bad debt loss experience.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 adds to the above list of tax preferences:
intangible drilling costs in excess of the amount deductible if the drilling
cost had been capitalized and then depreciated over ten years, and itemized
deductions other than medical or casualty deductions, in excess of 60 percent
of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. The preference item for accelerated
depreciation in excess of straight-line depreciation on personal property sub-
ject to a net lease has been amended to strike out "net lease" and is now
applicable to all personal property subject to a lease. The sum of the tax
preference can now be reduced by the greater of $10,000 or one half of the
taxpayer's regular income tax. The sum of the tax preferences, after deduct-
ing the exemption of $10,000 or one half of the taxpayer's regular liability,
is subject to a tax of 15 percent. It is interesting to note that Congress again
failed to include the interest on state and municipal obligations to its list
of preferences.
The intangible cost of drilling an unproductive oil or gas well is not
considered to be a preference. An unproductive well is defined as one in
which no oil or gas has been produced "in commercial quantites for any
substantial period of time." (Conference Report 426). If there has been
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some commercial production, then the determination of whether it is unpro-
ductive or not will take into consideration the relation of the value of the
production of oil or gas to the cost of drilling the well. If the
determination is made that a well is unproductive by the time the tax return
for the preceding year is required to be filed, the intangible drilling cost of
that unproductive well is not considered a preference. Although the tax
preference is only the amount of the intangible drilling cost in excess of the
amount which would have been deductible had the drilling cost been capi-
talized and then written off over a ten year period, this will be of little
assistance to the taxpayer. Typically, a well is drilled and placed in pro-
duction late in the calendar year. For example, if a well is placed in produc-
tion on December 1, and the cost of the intangible drilling was $100,000,
the amount of the tax preference is $100,000 less $100,000 divided by the
120 months (for the ten years) or a total of 99,167. It should be noted at
this point that the future write-off, if the drilling cost had been capitalized,
will be of no assistance either currently or in the future in determining tax
preferences.
The establishment of an item of tax preference for the itemized deduc-
tions, other than medical and casualty loss deductions in excess of 60 per-
cent adjusted gross income, will undoubtedly cause some contraction in
charitable giving, since charitable gifts along with interest, taxes, union dues,
miscellaneous deductions and certain investor-related expenses, to the extent
that they exceed 60 percent of the adjusted gross income, are all to be
considered tax preferences and subject to the 15 percent minimum tax.
Illustration:
Assume the Jones's file a joint return and have taxable income of
$50,000 plus tax preferences of $60,000. Their income tax would be cal-
culated as follows:
Income tax on the $50,000 is $17,060. The preference is calculated
by taking the total of $60,000 and reducing it by the greater of the ex-
clusion of $10,000 or the taxes imposed. Since one half the taxes imposed
is $8,530, the tax preference will be reduced by $10,000 which leads to
a taxable sum of $50,000. Applying the fifteen percent rate, the minimum
tax on preference items is $7,500. Total tax to be paid by the Jones's is
$24,560. The fifteen percent rate applies to corporations but the exemption
is the greater of $10,000 or the regular taxes paid. Also, the 1976 Tax
Reform Act disallows the carryover of any previous years taxes to offset
the tax preference income.
The Act eliminates the carryover of the unused regular tax as permitted
under the previous act. The treasury has been instructed to provide detailed
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regulations to deal with the situation whereby the taxpayer has obtained
no tax benefit from the items of tax preference.
When dealing with the accelerated depreciation in excess of straight-
line depreciation, the 20 percent reduction in lives due to the asset deprecia-
tion range election is now to be taken into consideration, and considered
along with the accelerated depreciation in calculating the excess. However,
the additional 20 percent first year bonus depreciation is not taken into
consideration as this item is deductible both on straight-line as well as
accelerated depreciation.
For corporations, the preferences related to intangible drilling costs
and excess itemized deductions are not applicable. Special rules have, in
effect, exempted timber income from the increase in the minimum tax. Also,
for taxable years commencing during 1976, only one half of the increase
in the minimum tax is applicable to corporations. The full increase of the
minimum tax will take affect only for taxable years commencing in 1977.
1.05 Maximum Tax
Code Section 1348-Act Section 302
Effective Date: Tax years beginning after December 31,1976
The concept of the maximum tax of 50 percent on earned taxable
income was introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The purpose of
this maximum tax was to minimize the need for high income bracket tax-
payers to invest in various tax shelters. Income, such as salaries, wages, and
professional fees were subject to the maximum tax, while the passive income
items such as rents, dividends, royalties, interest and capital gains were
excluded.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 expands the maximum tax to cover
personal service income, which in addition to the salaries, wages and pro-
fessional fees, includes annuities, pensions and deferred compensation.
Excluded from personal service income are lump sum distributions from a
qualified pension plan and premature penalty distributions from a Keogh
Plan. Under the 1976 Act, the income subject to the maximum tax must be
reduced by the entire amount of tax preference income for the current
year. Under prior law, income subject to the maximum tax needed only to
be reduced by the greater of the amount which the tax preferences exceeded
$30,000 or one-fifth of the sum of the taxpayer's tax preference items for
the taxable year and the four preceding taxable years.
The combination of the revisions to the minimum tax and the maximum
tax will have serious consequences to individuals with high income brackets
and items of tax preference, since not only will the preferential items be
subject to the 15 percent tax, but the same items of preference will reduce 71
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the amount of personal service income subject to the 50 percent maximum
tax.
1.06 Low Income Allowance
Code Section 141(c)-Act Section 401(b)
Effective Date: This revision is effective for tax years ending after
December 31, 1975
Prior to the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, a standard deduction of 15
percent of adjusted gross income was available to all individual taxpayers.
This deduction is available only in lieu of the itemized deduction and is
taken from adjusted gross income. The standard deduction was at that time
subject to a maximum of $2,000 and a minimum (low income allowance)
of $1,300.
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 increased the percentage standard
deduction from 15 to 16 percent. The low income allowance was also
increased from $1,300 to $1,600 for single persons and to $1,900 for
married taxpayers filing a joint return. The maximum standard deduction
was similarly increased from $2,000 to $2,300 for single persons and to
$2,600 for married taxpayers filing a joint return. These tax reductions
were originally designed to provide relief for certain taxpayers during a
time of economic hardship and consequently were to expire at the close
of the 1975 tax year.
The Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, however, continued a similar
modification of these reductions on through June 30, 1976. This Act in-
creased the low income allowance to $1,700 for single persons and $2,100
for married taxpayers filing a joint return. The maximum standard deduction
was also increased to $2,400 for single taxpayers and $2,800 for married
persons filing joint returns. Additionally, the percentage standard deduction
was to remain at 16 percent during the first six months of 1976.
The full year increases envisioned by the Revenue Adjustment Act of
1975 are now to be given permanent effect. It should be noted, however,
that the standard deduction is an election and can be taken only in lieu of
all other deductions from adjusted gross income except those for personal
exemptions. The standard deduction remains 16 percent of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income subject to the following limitations:
(1) The maximum standard deduction is:
a) $2,800 for a surviving spouse or taxpayer filing a joint return;
b) $2,400 for a single taxpayer; and
c) $1,400 for a married taxpayer filing a separate return.
(2) The low income allowance or minimum standard deduction is:
a) $2,100 for a surviving spouse or taxpayer filing a joint return;
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b) $1,700 for a single taxpayer; and
c) $1,050 for a married taxpayer filing a separate return.
(3) A taxpayer for whom a dependency exemption is allowable to
another cannot apply his standard deduction against unearned
income. In other words, the low income allowance cannot exceed
earned income, and the percentage standard deduction must be
computed with reference to earned income only!
Illustration:
1) X, the dependent son of taxpayer Y, received $1,800 in trust
income during the calendar year. The dependent son himself earned
$500 in wages during the same year. The trust income is unearned
and, therefore, ignored for purposes of calculating the standard deduc-
tions. Therefore, the son's taxable income is computed as follows:
Gross Income = $ 2,300
Less - Personal Exemption = 750
- Standard Deduction = 500 (i.e., limited to the amount
of earned income)
Taxable Income = $ 1,050
NOTE: If X's standard deduction was not limited to the amount of
his earned income, he would have had no taxable income:
Gross Income $ 2,300
Less - Personal Exemption 750
- Low Income Allowance = 1,700
Taxable Income - -0-
2) Y, a single taxpayer, earned $12,000 in wages during the calendar
year. If his standard deduction was based on the low income allowance,
he would receive a deduction of $1,700 only. However, in the alterna-
tive, he may wish to apply the percentage standard deduction of 16
percent to his adjusted gross income to achieve a more favorable tax
advantage. Here, 16 percent of $12,000 equals $1,920. Y would logi-
cally choose to apply the larger deduction of $1,920 in lieu of his low
income allowance.
2.00 Income
2.01 Qualified Stock Options
Code Sections 422 & 424-Act !Section 603
Committee Reports: S. Rep. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 438
(1976); S Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1976); H. R. Rep.
No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 171 (1976)
Effective Date: Tax years ending after December 31, 1975
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In effect, the new Act eliminates any advantage of qualified stock
options. After May 20, 1976, stock options granted to the recipient will be
ordinary income if they are capable of valuation at the time of receipt. If
the option does not have a readily ascertainable market value at the time
it is granted, then it is ordinary income to the recipient at the time the
option is exercised. The committee reports note that the Internal Revenue
Service will make every reasonable effort to determine the market value of
an option at the time it is granted. If the stock option plan was adopted on
or before May 20, 1976, then it can be granted after that date as long
as the option is actually exercised before May 21, 1981. Also exempted
from the new Act are options substitutions resulting from a corporate
reorganization to which Section 425 (a) applies.
2.02 Income Earned Abroad by United States Citizens Living or Residing
Abroad
Code Section 911-Act Section 1011
Effective Date: Tax years beginning after December 31, 1975
Under present law, citizens of the United States who are bona fide
residents of a foreign country for an entire taxable year, or who are present
in a foreign country for 510 days out of a consecutive 18-month period are
entitled to exclude up to $20,000 of earned income, which consists of
salaries, wages, professional fees, and payments for professional services.
The exclusion is increased to $25,000 if the citizen has been a bona fide
resident of the foreign country for three uninterrupted consecutive years.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 reduces both the $20,000 and the
$25,000 exclusion to $15,000. However, an exception is made for employees
of American charitable organizations working abroad, whereby the exclusion
is retained at $20,000. A taxpayer who has taken advantage of this exclusion
is not entitled to take a tax credit or a deduction for any foreign taxes paid
on the income applicable to the excluded income. In calculating the tax-
payer's income tax, the marginal tax bracket will be used as if the excluded
income had not been excluded. Not eligible for this exclusion is income
which is paid in a country other than the country in which it was earned if
the payment was made to avoid income taxes in the country of origin.
2.03 Foreign Grant or Trust with Citizens of the United States as Bene-
ficiaries
Code Sections 643, 678, 679, 6048 & 6677-Act Sections 1013-14
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, it was quite popular for taxpayers
to transfer large sums of money to foreign trusts which then made other
foreign investments which were not subject to any income tax. During the
period of accumulation, the income on these accumulation trusts was not
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subject to the United States income tax. When a distribution was made
from these trusts, capital gains retained their distinctive nature of taxation,
thus providing another benefit to these foreign or off-shore trusts. Under
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the income from these grants or trusts is to
be taxed directly to the grantor, if the transferor was a U.S. citizen, resident,
partnership, domestic corporation, or domestic estate and the trust had a
beneficiary, who was a citizen of the United States. In addition,
the Act eliminates the beneficial treatment of capital gains upon distribution
by requiring that all capital gains would be treated as ordinary income to
the distributee. These rules are effective for foreign trusts created after
May 21, 1974 as it applies to income received in taxable years ending after
December 31, 1975.
Another major attack was launched against foreign trusts by requiring
that all distributions of income accumulations which had not been subject
to the United States income tax would be subject at the time of distribution
to a six percent tax per year. For example, if the foreign trust had untaxed
income for seven years and then made a distribution, the distributee, in
addition to the other income tax, would be subject to an interest penalty
of six percent times seven years or 42 percent. Congress, in its benevolence,
has set a limitation that the interest and the tax cannot exceed the entire
distribution.
2.04 Non-Resident Aliens Married to United States Citizens
Code Sections 6013 & 879-Act Section 1012
Effective Date: Tax years on or after December 31, 1975
Under previous law, a joint return was not permissable if either spouse
was a non-resident alien. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 permits a citizen
with a non-resident alien spouse to file a joint tax return if they agree to
include in the joint return their worldwide income. It is incumbent upon
the taxpayers to agree to provide all necessary books and records for the
purposes of audit.
3.00 Exclusions
3.01 Amounts Received Under Accident and Health Plans
Code Sections 104 & 105-Act Section 505
Committee Reports: S. Rep. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 432
(1976); IS. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 135 (1976); H. R. Rep.
No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1976)
Prior to January 1, 1976, employees whose salaries or wages were
continued while they were sick, injured or disabled were entitled to exclude
$100 a week after a 30-day waiting period. If the wage or salary continu-
ation plan paid less than 75 percent of the employee's normal weekly wage,
TAx REFORM AcTWinter, 1977]
75
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1976 Part I
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
then the waiting period was reduced to seven days, unless the employee was
hospitalized one of those days, in which event there would be no waiting
period. In this situation the employee could exclude up to $75 a week
for the first 30 days and then $100 per week after the first 30-day period
had expired.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 repeals this sick-pay exclusion and
substitutes an exclusion of up to $100 a week, a maximum of $5,200 a
year, for employees who have not obtained age 65 and have retired due to
a permanent and total disability. The committee reports define the phrase
"permanent and total disability" to mean that the employee, due to a
physical or mental impairment expected to last at least a year or result in
death, cannot participate in substantially gainful work. Proof of the dis-
ability will have to be substantiated by the employer from time to time.
Unless a married taxpayer has lived apart from his spouse for the entire
taxable year, the filing of a joint return is a prerequisite to obtaining this
exclusion.
Although the maximum exclusion is $100 per week or $5,200 annu-
ally, this amount is to be reduced by adjusted gross income, including such
disability payments, in excess of $15,000. For example, if a taxpayer earned
$15,000 prior to disability, and then was paid $5,200 of disability pay-
ments during the year, this individual is not entitled to any exclusion. If
an employee was disabled for 25 weeks during the taxable year and his
total adjusted gross income, including disability payments was $17,000,
this individual is entitled to exclude $500 from his adjusted gross income.
The $500 exclusion is determined by taking the $100 per week for 25
weeks, or $2,500, and reducing this potential exclusion by the adjusted
gross income of $17,000, in excess of the $15,000 which is $2,000.
A special transitional rule makes this disability exclusion available
to taxpayers who on January 1, 1976 will retire due to disability, or were
entitled to retire on disability and who on January 1, 1976 were totally and
permanently disabled, even though they were not at the date of their retire-
ment.
Under prior law, the sick-pay exclusion was permitted to continue
until the employee's mandatory retirement date, even though it exceeded
age 65. Under the Tax Reform Act, the exclusion ceases at age 65 at which
time the disabled taxpayer becomes eligible for the credit for the elderly.
The above provisions apply to both military and civilian personnel.
3.02 Military Disability Pensions
Code Section 104(a) (4)-Act Section 505(b)
Committee Reports: S Rep. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1976);
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:3
76
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss3/6
S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1976)
Effective Date: Applies to Individuals joining Services after Septem-
ber 24, 1975
The Tax Reform Act eliminates the exclusion for amounts received as
pension, annuity, or allowance for personal injury or sickness resulting
from active service in the Armed Forces of any country, in the Coast or
Geodetic Survey, a public health service, or the foreign service. The repeal
of the exclusion is not applicable to individuals who were members of the
above services on or before September 24, 1975 or were retired from the
services and receiving disability payments therefrom. The exclusion of dis-
ability payments from the Veterans Administration is continued.
For members joining the Armed Forces after September 24, 1975, an
exclusion is permitted for combat-related injuries. The committee reports
define combat-related injuries as those caused by direct result of armed
conflict, extra-hazardous service, or under conditions simulating war, which
includes maneuvers or training, or caused by instrumentalities of war, such
as weapons. In effect, the intent of Congress as expressed in the committee
reports is to exclude from income any payments which are made to compen-
sate for injuries which were incurred due to the special dangers associated
with being in the Armed Forces.
A new exclusion is added for disability payments attributable to injuries
resulting from an attack by terrorists while the individual was serving as an
employee of the United States engaged in his official duties outside the
United States.
3.03 Prepaid Legal Expenses
Code Section 120-Act Section 2134
Effective Date: Tax years beginning after December 31, 1976 and
ending before January 1, 1982
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 opens up a new area of fringe benefits
for employers to provide Prepaid Legal Services. As with many other fringe
benefits, the employer is entitled to a deduction for his contribution or pay-
ment while the same amounts are excluded from the employee's income.
To prevent some of the abuses and litigation which were involved with the
Medical Reimbursement Plan, Congress has set forth very stringent rules
for a qualified legal reimbursement plan. The written plan must exclusively
benefit the employees, their spouses, or their dependents. The plan must
be structured so that it does not discriminate in favor of highly paid execu-
tives, shareholder employees and officers. The Act specifically requires that
no more than 25 percent of the contributions to the plan may be for the
benefit of shareholders who own 5 percent or more of the stock, as computed
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under the attribution rules. However, if a class of employees are covered
under a collective bargaining agreement, these employees may be excluded
if it is shown that legal services were the subject of good faith bargaining.
The Act specifically excludes from its coverage direct reimbursement of
legal expenses to an employee, and requires that the contribution by the
employer must be made to an insurance company, to a tax exempt trust, or
to the legal firm or organization providing the service, or to any combination
of the above three organizations.
The employees must be notified in detail as to the benefits which are
covered, and such notification must be in a manner in which they will clearly
understand the extent of their coverage. No reimbursement is provided
for business-related legal services.
As a prerequisite for qualifying for a prepaid legal service plan, the
Internal Revenue Service must be notified. However, notification is suffi-
cient if it is made within 90 days following the date upon which the new
treasury regulations become final.
3.04 Cancellations of Student Loans and Scholarships
Code Sections 61 & 117-Act Sections 2117 & 2130
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 overrules Revenue Ruling 76-99, whereby
the Internal Revenue Service had ruled that receipts under the Armed Forces
Health Professions Scholarship Program would be treated as taxable income.
The Reform Act extends the exclusion from income under P.L. 93-483 for
all amounts received under this program through the end of 1979.
The Service ruled in Revenue Ruling 73-256 and Revenue Rule
74-540 that income results when an educational loan is cancelled. The
problem typically arises from a state medical education loan scholarship
program whereby medical students are given loans while continuing their
education. If the student agrees to work in a rural or urban area upon gradu-
ation for a specified number of years, a certain portion of the loan is can-
celled each year.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 excludes from income the cancellation of
loans made by the United States, its instrumentalities or agencies, or by a
state or its political divisions or subdivisions, if the cancellation is based
upon the requirement that the loan recipient work in a specified geographical
area or for specified categories of employers.
3.05 Accumulation Trusts
Code Section 644-Act Section 701
Effective Date: This revision is applicable to all distributions made
in tax years commencing after December 31, 1975
Generally, a trust is treated as a separate taxable entity and is taxed
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in the same manner as an individual. However, a trust is allowed a deduction
for any distribution to an individual. The beneficiary-recipient is then re-
quired to report the full amount of the distribution in his individual return
as income.
Where income is distributed currently to the beneficiary, no real tax
problem arises. In this case, the trust is merely treated as a conduit through
which income passes to the beneficiary. The amount of income passing to
the individual and, therefore, allowable as a deduction for the trust is
deemed "distributable net income."
Some rather complex tax consequences generally arise in the case of
accumulation trusts. Such trusts accumulate current income for distribution
in later years. The distribution is then taxed to the beneficiary under the
so-called throwback rule. In effect, the distribution is thrown back to the
year in which it was earned, and taxed as if it had been received by the
beneficiary in that year. It should be noted that the distributed income retains
the same capital gain, ordinary income, tax exempt character that it had
in the hands of the trustee.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 provided two methods for determining
the beneficiary's tax liability on accumulation distributions. The "exact
method" required both the trustee and beneficiary to maintain detailed
records such that the beneficiary's tax liability could be recomputed for those
years in which the income was actually earned. In effect, the beneficiary's
income for those years was recomputed to include the trust income earned
at that time. The excess of the beneficiary's tax liability for these grossed-up
amounts over the tax he actually paid in those years was due and payable
as part of the tax for the year in which the distribution was made. The bene-
ficiary was, however, allowed a credit for those taxes previously paid by the
trust on this accumulated income prior to its distribution.
The "short cut" method was a simplified procedure which enabled the
beneficiary to average the distribution over the years in which it was earned
and to apply that average to his income for the three years immediately
preceding the year of distribution. The old law required the taxpayer to
compute his tax liability under both methods to determine which would have
the least severe tax consequences. Therefore, the "short cut" method did not
provide any real simplification to the individual taxpayer. The old rules
also encouraged tax avoidance by enabling a trust in a lower tax bracket
to accumulate and pay tax on its income rather than distribute it to a bene-
ficiary in a higher bracket.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 offers one simplified method of computa-
tion to replace the two alternate methods of applying the throwback rule.
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This new method is in effect a revision of the old "short cut" method. The
tax attributable to the distribution is now determined by averaging the
distribution over the number of years equivalent to that over which the
income was earned. Under this new method, a fraction of the income re-
ceived from the trust is included in the beneficiary's income for each of five
years immediately preceding the distribution. This fraction is based upon the
number of years in which the income was accumulated by the trust. The
revised procedure for taxing an accumulated trust distribution can best be
illustrated through the five-step analysis of the following example:
Illustration:
X received an accumulation distribution of $25,000 from a trust in
1982. The accumulated income was earned in each year that the trust was
in existence, the trust having been established in 1970. X's taxable income
for the five years immediately preceding the distribution was as follows:
$20,000 in 1981; $28,000 in 1980; $18,000 in 1979; $25,000 in 1978,
and $30,000 in 1977. The trust had previously paid $5,000 in taxes under
the undistributed net income rules of the Code. X elects to file a joint tax
return with his spouse who had no taxable income for the tax period in
question. X's tax liability is computed by using the following five-step
analysis:
(1) Determine the number of throwback years:
Throwback years are simply those prior tax years in which the
distribution was earned. It should be noted that a distribution
cannot be thrown back to a tax year beginning prior to January 1,
1969.
The number of throwback years in this example is 12. (The trust
was established in 1970 and income was accumulated through
1981).
(2) Determine the base period:
The base period is similar to that under the old law. The base
period is now defined as the five taxable years immediately pre-
ceding the year of distribution less the one taxable year in which
the beneficiary's income was the highest as well as the one year
in which it was the lowest. Thus the beneficiary is left with a
three year base period upon which to base his computations.
X's three-year base period includes only the years 1981, 1980,
and 1978. The years 1977 and 1979 are omitted from further
consideration since they represent the years of the taxpayer's high-
est and lowest income levels respectively.
(3) Compute the average accumulation distribution:
Here those taxes previously paid by the trust on the amount cur-
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rently distributed are added to the total amount of the accumula-
tion distribution. This sum is then divided by the number of
throwback years to determine the average accumulation distribu-
tion.
In the instant case, the average accumulation distribution equals:
$5,000 (taxes paid by trust) + $25,000 (amount of distribution)
12 (throwback years - from step 1)
- $30,000/12 = $2,500
(4) Compute the average increase in X's tax liability over the three
year base period:
The average amount of the accumulation distribution is now added
to X's taxable income for each of the three years, and X's
tax liability is recomputed based on these amounts. X's tax liability
is then averaged over the three-year base period and that average
is multiplied by the number of throwback years to determine X's
tax liability for the distribution.
X's tax liability for the three-year base period is computed as
follows:
1978 Tax on $25,000 taxable income $ 6,020
Tax on $27,500 ($25,000 + $2,500) 6,920
Increase in tax liability $ 900
1980 Tax on $28,000 taxable income $ 7,100
Tax on $30,500 ($28,000 + $2,500 8,050
Increase in tax liability $ 975
1981 Tax on $20,000 taxable income $ 4,380
Tax on $22,500 ($20,000 + $2,500) 5,180
Increase in tax liability $ 800
The average increase in X's tax liability over the three-year base
period is as follows:
$900 + $975 + $800 = $891.67
3
(5) Compute X's tax liability for the accumulation distribution:
Therefore, X's tax liability for the accumulation distribution
equals:
$891.67 x 12 (number of throwback years)
= $10,700.04
However, X is entitled to a credit for the taxes already paid by the
trust. As a result, the taxes due upon the accumulation distribution
to X are:
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$10,700.04 - $5,000 (taxes previously paid)
= $5,700.04
It should be noted that the new law has provided a special rule to deal
with accumulation distributions flowing to the same beneficiary under three
or more trust instruments in the same year. Furthermore, throwback rules
do not apply to distributions accumulated while the beneficiary is a minor
unless the distributions are to flow from multiple trusts. This provision in
effect prohibits the beneficiary from receiving a credit for taxes previously
paid by the trust on income distributed from the third or any additional
trust.
The capital gain throwback rule under the old law has now been re-
pealed. However, a new provision has been added which taxes the trust on
any gain from the sale of appreciated property within two years of the
date of transfer. This rule is applicable only where there is a bargain element
in the original transfer. The gain is taxed to the trust at the grantor's tax
rates as if the grantor had realized the gain and had transferred to the trust
the net proceeds after the sale.
4.00 Deductions
4.01 Prepaid Interest
Code Section 461(g)-Act Section 208
Effective Date: Taxable year ending after December 31, 1975
Under prior law, Revenue Ruling 68-643 denied a deduction for
interest prepaid more than 12 months in advance. The Revenue Ruling
stated that interest for periods not in excess of 12 months would be
deductible if there were not a material distortion of income and indicated
that the decision would be reached after a case by case examination. Revenue
Ruling 69-582 provided that points paid to a creditor for the use of money
were currently deductible, even though the period of time over which the
loan would be paid extended in excess of 12 months. In contrast to this
rule, accrual basis taxpayers were required to deduct the prepaid interest
over the period of time in which the loan was required to be repaid.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 requires capitalization of prepaid
interest by cash basis taxpayers and allocation of this deduction of interest
over the period to which it applies. No longer will the prepaid interest be
deductible at the time it is paid. This rule applies to all taxpayers, whether
they are individuals, corporations, estates, trusts, or partnerships, and
whether or not the loan is for personal, business, or investment purposes.
The Act also requires that points which are paid for the use of money,
normally paid at the time the loan is closed, can no longer be expensed,
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but must be deducted over the period of time for which the loan runs. An
exception to this rule for the deduction of points is permitted if the loan
is for the improvement or acquisition of the taxpayer's principal residence.
It is important to note that the funds must actually be used for the im-
provement or acquisition of the residence and not merely as a loan upon
the residence and then used for other purposes. The deductibility of points
is subject to two further limitations: (1) that points are the customary
method of doing business in the taxpayer's area, and (2) that the points
are not in excess of what is normally being charged in that area.
A transitional rule provides for an exception of interest payments before
January 1, 1977, made according to a binding contract or under a loan
commitment in effect on September 16, 1975.
4.02 Foreign Conventions
Code Section 274 (h)-Act Section 602
Committee Reports: S. Rep. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 436
(1976); S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1976); H. R. Rep.
No. 653, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 167 (1976).
Effective Date: Tax years after December 31, 1976
Congress has now acted to limit the number of foreign conventions
for which a deduction can be taken to two in any taxable year. In the
event a taxpayer travels to more than two foreign conventions, the taxpayer
has the option of electing the conventions for which a deduction are
applicable. A foreign convention "means any convention, seminar," sym-
posium, etc., which occurs "outside the United States, its possessions, and
the Trust Territory of the Pacific." (Code Section 274(h) (6) (A)). There-
fore, conventions in Nome, Alaska, Honolulu, Hawaii, or San Juan, Puerto
Rico are not foreign conventions while conventions in Mexico City, London
or Lisbon are. Even though a deduction is permitted for travel to two
foreign conventions, the deduction is severely limited. For a transportation
expense to be deductible, it must not exceed coach or economy fare. Also,
the taxpayer must have spent more than one half of the total trip in business-
related activity. For this calculation, travel days to and from are disregarded.
If the taxpayer spent less than one half of his total days in business-
related activities, then only that portion of the transportation cost applicable
to the business days are deductible. For example, if the taxpayer attended
the American Bar Association Convention in London for six days, and
stayed on in London for sightseeing purposes an additional four days, and
the ffight took one day each way, he would qualify for a deduction of the
entire transportation cost. The reason for this is that of the ten trip days,
excluding travel to and from, 60 percent was spent in business-related
activities. Had the taxpayer only attended the convention for three days,
then only 30 percent of the transportation cost would be deductible.
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The deductibility of meals, lodging, tips, taxi and other personal
subsistence expenditures is limited to the per diem rate for United States
civil servants in the particular area. Another limitation on the subsistence
allowance is that there must have been at least six hours of scheduled
business activities on that day, and that the individual taxpayer attended
at least two thirds of these hours. In the event of a half day session, there
must have been at least three hours scheduled and the taxpayer must have
attended two thirds of these hours. An alternate calculation is available on
an overall basis if the taxpayer can show that he attended at least two thirds
of all scheduled business activity.
It is interesting to note that the committee reports indicate that the
amount of time spent at social functions, parties, cocktail hours, or banquets
will not count toward the three or the six hour business activities. However,
if there is a speaker at the luncheon or banquet, then only the amount of
time which is devoted to the speech is counted for the three or six hour limit.
To substantiate this deduction, both the individual attending the
convention and an officer of the organization sponsoring the convention
must submit reports showing the total days of the trip, the amount of time
devoted to business activities, the attendance by the individual taxpayer, and
a summary of the program presented.
The preceding limitations apply both to the individual attending the
convention as well as to his employer. If the employer chooses to reimburse
the individual attending for subsistence expenses in excess of the per diem
limitation and for travel by first-class accommodations, the employer's
deduction is limited as set forth above and, in addition, the employee will,
in all probability, have taxable income.
4.03 State Legislators' Travel Expenses Away From Home
Code Section 162-Act Section 604
Effective Date: Tax years beginning before January 1, 1976 that are
open for assessment or collection before the date of enactment
Congress has now cleared up the confusion which existed under
present law as to where a state legislator's home was for the purpose of
computing expenses while away from home. The Act applies to all years
beginning prior to January 1, 1976 for which the tax years are still open
or subject to audit. However, there is a limitation that the deduction cannot
exceed the amount which was originally claimed under the previously filed
return.
The legislator is given the option of electing to have his tax home
considered to be his residence in his legislative district. For the purposes
of deducting expenses while away from home, the legislator is deemed to
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have spent an amount equal to the per diem allowance paid to employees
of the United States government. This per diem allowance is permitted for
all days that the legislature is in session plus all days of recess, if the recess
is less than four days. In addition, the legislator is entitled to count days
of attendance at committee meetings during a recess in excess of four days.
It is interesting and unusual that the deduction is permitted for the number of
days the legislature is in session, not the number of days which the legislator
attended such sessions. Under prior law the legislator was permitted to
deduct the cost of traveling to and from the state capital from his home
in the legislative district.
4.04 Alimony
Code Section 62 (13)-Act Section 502
Effective Date: January 1, 1977
Under prior law, alimony could be deducted by a taxpayer who
itemized his deductions. If the standard deduction was elected, then no
deduction was allowed for alimony.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 changes this by adding Item 13 to Sec-
tion 62, which enumerates the items that are deductible in arriving at ad-
justed gross income. This change will permit many additional taxpayers to
take advantage of this deduction even if they take the standard deduction.
4.05 Moving Expenses
Code Section 217-ActSection 506
Effective Date: January 1, 1977; Military Provisions, January 1,
1976
Prior to 1970 only employees were permitted to deduct the cost of
moving their household goods and family in connection with job-related
transfers. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 liberalized this deduction to include
house-hunting trips after obtaining employment to and from the new loca-
tion, meals and lodging while occupying temporary quarters at the new
location, and certain qualified expenses in connection with the sale or pur-
chase of a residence or termination and acquisition of a lease. To qualify
for this deduction, the distance between the taxpayer's new job location and
the old residence had to be 50 miles greater than the distance between the
old residence and the old job location. Also, the taxpayer had to be a full-
time employee in the general location of the new job for at least 39 weeks
of the following 12-month period. However, if the individual was self-em-
ployed, then the residence requirement during the next 24-month period
was 78 weeks.
The deductions were also made available to self-employed individuals
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who were moving to new locations as well as employees. The deduction for
house-hunting trips, temporary living expense at the new location, and
qualified expenses in connection with the sale and purchase of a residence
or lease were limited to $2,500, with a sublimitation of $1,000 on house-
hunting trips and temporary living expenses.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 reduces the mileage requirement from
50 to 35 miles and increases the overall expense limitation on house-hunting
trips, temporary living expenses, and qualified expenses in connection with
a sale and acquisition of a residence or lease to $3,000 from $2,500. Also,
the sublimitation on house-hunting trips and temporary living expenses is
increased to $1,500 from $1,000. As under prior law, if separate returns
are filed, the above amounts are cut in half to $1,500, and $750 respectively.
Code Section 217(g) exempts members of the armed forces from the
time limitations and the mileage requirements of this code section. Specifically
excluded from income are moving and storage expenses, whether furnished
in kind or reimbursed for a member of the armed forces, his spouse and
dependents. The exclusion applies both to the transfer of the member of the
armed forces as well as a separate move of his family, when they are not
permitted to accompany him to his assigned post. The Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of Transportation are exempted from the requirement of
reporting the amount of the moving expense to the employee.
4.06 Charitable Contributions of Inventory and Other Ordinary Income
Property
Code Section 170 (e)3-Act Section 2135
Effective Date: Contributions made after October 8, 1976
Under previous law, donors of appreciated property, which is sold,
were limited to their basis in the property as a charitable contribution
deduction. Ordinary income property included inventory as well as capital
assets held for less than six months. The new Act opens the door for contri-
bution of inventory and ordinary income property by a corporation, other
than a Subchapter S corporation, to charitable organizations. The require-
ments are that the property donated must be used for the care of the ill,
needy or infants and the transfer must be an outright gift with no considera-
tion passing to the donor. The donee is required to provide the donor with
a statement of the intended use and disposition of the property, indicating
that it meets the above qualifications. The amount of the charitable deduc-
tion is the donor's basis plus one half of the appreciation, subject to the
limitation that the deduction cannot exceed 200 percent of the property's
basis. No deduction is permitted for the unrealized appreciation to the extent
that had the property been sold, it would have been subject to the recapture
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provisions of depreciation, mining exploration, excess farm losses and cer-
tain soil and water conservation expenditures, and certain land clearing
expenditures.
Again we should note that this provision is applicable only to corpora-
tions and not to individuals.
4.07 Eliminating Architectural and Transportation Barriers for the Handi-
capped
Code Sections 190 & 263-Act Section 2122
Committee Reports: S. Rep. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 503
(1976) ; S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 438 (1976)
Effective Date: For years beginning after December 31, 1976 and
ending before January 1, 1980
Enacted for tax years beginning after December 31, 1976 and ending
before January 1, 1980, Congress has given taxpayers engaged in a trade
or business the option of electing to expense, rather than to capitalize, im-
provements to any facility or public transportation vehicle which increases
the usability or excessability by the elderly and the handicapped. This elec-
tion is subject to a $25,000 maximum in each taxable year.
Congress defines the elderly as individuals over the age of 65 or of
retirement age. Handicapped individuals are defined to be those with a
physical or mental disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deaf-
ness, which constitutes a functional limitation which substantially limits the
activities of the individual.
The Senate Report indicates that the barrier removal must meet the
standards promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury with the concur-
rence of the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board.
The Treasury is instructed to prescribe regulations within 180 days after the
date of enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
4.08 Business Use of Home
Code Section 280A-Act Section 601
Effective Date: For tax years beginning after December 31, 1975.
Prior to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, a controversy raged
between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service as to the deductibility
of offices in the taxpayer's home. The problem arose in connection with
employees and professionals who were provided an office elsewhere. The
self-employed individual who operated solely out of his home was permitted
a deduction for the percentage of the expenses based on the portion of the
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home used for business. As to employees and professionals, the Service main-
tained that the business use of the home must be required as a condition of
employment and that there must be regular use of the facility. Over a period
of years, a line of cases developed which permitted the deduction if the
office was merely "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness, or of his position of being an employee.
Congress enacted Section 280(A) for the expressed purpose of fore-
closing this controversy and denying deductions to individuals and Subchapter
S corporations who use a dwelling unit as a residence during the taxable
year. Deductions for interest, taxes, and casualty losses which are deductible
under other specific code sections are excluded from this blanket disallowance.
A deduction is permitted for the exclusive and regular use of a specific
portion of the dwelling for a trade or businesss, which is the taxpayer's
principal place of business or is used by the taxpayer to meet patients, clients,
or customers in the normal course of his trade or business. A deduction is
also allowed if there is a separate structure unattached to the dwelling which
is used in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business. No deduction is
allowed if an area, such as a family room, is used for office work several
hours each evening and on weekends and is also used by the spouse for sew-
ing in the mornings and by the children for viewing television after school
in the afternoon.
If the deduction is claimed by an employee, in addition to the exclusive
and regular use test, the employee must prove that it was for the convenience
of the employer. The fact that such use is appropriate and helpful will no
longer be a determinitive factor.
If the taxpayers is involved in the business of selling at wholesale or
retail, a deduction is permitted for that portion of space within the dwelling
unit which is used for the storage of the taxpayer's inventory. If the preceding
tests are met, the amount of the deduction is limited to the gross income
derived from the taxpayer's trade or business reduced by that portion of the
deduction such as interest, taxes and casualty losses attributable to the busi-
ness use of the property. For example, assume that a law professor who has
limited outside practice and uses 15 percent of his house on an exclusive
and regular basis for seeing clients generates $1,000 of gross income. His
total interest in taxes, which are deductible whether the property is used for
business or not, totaled $3,600. Total maintainance and depreciation total
$5,000. Taxpayer's deduction for his home office expense is calculated as
follows:
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Gross Income from Business
Less: 15% of Interest and Taxes of $3,600.
Limitation on Deduction of Other
Business Related Expenses
Maintenance and Depreciation Expense
Amount of Business-Related Expenses
From the Dwelling Deductible
$1,000
540
460
$5,000
x 15%
$ 750
$ 460
4.09 Vacation Homes
Code Section 280A-Act Section 601
Effective Date: For tax years beginning after December 31, 1975.
Section 280 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 places severe limitations
upon the deductibility of expenses incurred in maintaining a vacation home
which is deemed to have been used as a taxpayer's residence during the
taxable year. The Code sets forth a mechanical test whereby the property
is considered to have been used as a residence if the number of personal
days of use exceed the greater of 14 days or 10 percent of the days actually
rented. If the property was not used as a residence under the preceding test,
then deductibility of expenses is determined under existing Code Section 183,
activities not engaged in for profit. Under this section an activity is pre-
sumed to have been engaged in for profit if income exceeds expenses in two
out of five successive years.
The taxpayer is considered to have used the property for personal uses
for any day that it was used by himself, brothers, sisters, spouse, ancestors
or lineal decendents. Also considered to be days of personal use are days
which it is rented for less than a fair rental value and days for which the
unit was occupied by an individual under a reciprocal arrangement which
permitted the taxpayer to use some other dwelling unit. The consideration
of a reciprocal use as a personal day is designed to eliminate the situation
where both Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith own condominiums in Naples, Florida;
however, Mr. Jones never stays in his condominium but always stays in
the Smith condominium and vice-versa.
If the property was used as a residence under the preceding test, the
deductions are limited to the excess gross rental income over the portion of
the expenditures deductible under other Code sections, such as taxes, interest,
and casualty losses, which are attributable to the period the unit was rented.
Expenditures not deductible under other Code sections are deductible only
to the extent attributable to rental days. The mechanical calculation involves
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multiplying total expenditures not deductible under other Code sections
times the fraction, the numerator which is the days of rental use over a
denominator of total days of use (both personal and rental). The actual
calculation is more fully illustrated by the following example:
Taxpayer owns a cottage on a lake in Vermont which he occupies
during June. The cottage is rented in July, August, and September for $1,000
per month or a total of $3,000 for the year. Taxpayer's cost of owning the
cabin are: Interest-$1,600; Real Estate Taxes-$800; Maintenance-
$1,200; Utilities-$400; and Depreciation-$2,000.
Expenditures Deductible Rental Use Personal Use
Under Other Sections Total 3/4 1
Interest $1,600 $1,200 $400
Taxes 800 600 200
Total $2,400 $1,800 $600
Expenditures Deductible If
Attributable to Rental
Maintenance $1,200 $ 900 $300
Utilities 400 300 100
Depreciation 2,000 1,500 500
Total $3,600 $2,700 $900
The deduction is calculated as follows:
Gross Rentals $3,000
Reduced by Portion of Expenditures Other-
wise Deductible Attributable to Rental 1,800
Limitation on Deduction of Maintenance,
Utilities and Depreciation $1,200
Although the taxpayer is entitled to deduct the entire $2,400 of interest
and taxes, the deduction for maintenance, utilities, and depreciation is limited
to $1,200, not the total expenditure of $2,700.
It is worthwhile to note that had the test been made under existing
Section 183, as prescribed by Treasury Regulation 1.183-1 (d) (3), example
(i), the deduction for maintenance, utilities, and depreciation would be
limited to $600 since the limitation is based on the excess of gross rentals
over the entire amount of expenditures deductible under other Code sections.
Gross Rental $3,000
Less Total Interest and Taxes 2,400
Deduction $ 600
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Congress has established a de minimis rule whereby both income and
expenses are to be ignored if the property was rented for less than 15 days
during the taxable year. Congress also extends the sweep of this drastic
disallowance not only to dwelling units but also to houses, apartments,
condominiums, motor homes, boats, or similar property, as well as all ad-
joining property. If the property is owned by a Subchapter S corporation,
an estate, a trust, or a partnership, days of personal use will be considered
to be that used by any benefiiciary, partner, and/or shareholder. Specifically,
the new rules do not apply to a corporation. However, it is presumed that
the Internal Revenue Service has enough ammunition under the normal
ordinary and necessary business expense provision to disallow any non-
related corporate use of this type of a facility.
4.10 Partnership Organization and 'Syndication Fees
Code Section 709-Act Section 213 (b)
Committee Reports: S. Rep. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 421 (1976);
S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 638,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1976)
Effective Date: For taxable years of partnership beginning after
December 31, 1975
Amortization: Over 60 months effective for partnership taxable years
beginning December 31, 1976
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the cost of organizing a partner-
ship was permitted to be deducted in the year of payment. This was in
contrast to the cost of organizing a corporation which was required to be
capitalized, and amortized over a period of 60 months. Section 709 now
requires that all costs of organizing a partnership which are incidental to the
creation of the partnership, and which are chargeable to a capital account,
and which if incident to the creation of a partnership would normally be
amortizable over the life of the partnership, are to be capitalized and the
cost recovered through amortization over a period of 60 months. Since many
partnerships, more specifically limited partnerships, were involved with the
issuing and marketing of various partnership interests in the organization and
had incurred commissions, legal and accounting fees, and printing costs,
Congress elected to delete these costs of syndication from- the 60-month
amortization provision. The Conference Report indicates that this amend-
ment is not designed to cast any inferences as to the deductibility or non-
deductibility of organization and syndication fees incurred prior to January
1, 1976.
4.11 Nonbusiness Bad Debts
Code Section 166(d)-Act Section 605
Effective Date: December 31, 1975
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Section 166(d) has been repealed by the 1976 Tax Reform Act. After
December 31, 1975, the effective date of the repeal, a noncorporate tax-
payer who guarantees a loan and suffers a loss will be able to deduct the
loss in the same fashion as deducting a loss from a direct loan. However,
the manner of deduction will be determined by the guarantor's motive. The
guarantor will be able to deduct any loss against ordinary income if the
guarantee involved the guarantor's trade or business. However, the guarantor
will be only allowed a short-term capital loss if he entered into the transaction
for profit and the loan had no connection to the trade or business. If the
guarantor entered into the guarantee for other reasons than those previously
mentioned, he is not entitled to a deduction. The guarantor also will not be
permitted to make a deduction if he voluntarily made a payment where there
was no legal obligation or where there was a worthless debt.
4.12 Bad Debts Owed by Political Parties
Code Section 271 (c)-Act Section 2104
Effective Date: December 31, 1975
A taxpayer is precluded under Section 271 from deducting a bad debt
owed by a political party. A political party is defined as a party nominating
candidates for elective office, a committee of the party, or a committee or
organization which accepts contributions and makes expenditures for the
purpose of influencing elections. Candidates, themselves, are not included.
The major reason for this preclusion is the desire to prevent the deduction
of concealed campaign contributions. The only institution exempted from
this prohibition is a bank.
The 1976 Tax Reform Act has amended Section 271 for the purpose
of benefiting accrual income taxpayers. Under the old law, an accrual income
taxpayer had to report the account receivable as income even though no
income was actually realized and he could not deduct the bad debt because
of Section 271. The taxpayer, now, can deduct a bad debt from a political
party if (1) he is involved in a bona fide sale of goods or services with a
political party; (2) the sale was in the taxpayer's ordinary course of business;(3) the goods or services are used for a political campaign or candidate;
(4) more than thirty percent of the taxpayer's accrued receivables during
the year are from political parties; and (5) the taxpayer has made a sub-
stantial and continuing effort to collect the debt, though no lawsuit is neces-
sary to show intent. If the taxpayer fulfills these requirements, he can deduct
any bad debt after the effective date of December 31, 1975.
4.13 Deductions Limited to Amount "at Risk" in Case of Certain Activities
Code Section 465-Act Section 204
Effective Date; Taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975
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In the past, highly compensated executives and professionals have been
sold tax shelters upon the promise of large tax deductions in the early years
of operation. Although the normal rule is that a loss is limited to the investor's
investment in the project, the investment in the past has included nonrecourse
loans which the tax shelter has obtained, and for which the individual in-
vestor is not personally liable. Therefore, it has been possible for investors
to deduct amounts greatly in excess of their actual investment in a tax
shelter. This concept has been used not only by limited partnerships but also
by Subchapter S corporations which permit a pass through of any operating
losses to the individual shareholders. With the promise of large losses from
the tax shelter in the early years, many individuals have invested in projects
which are not otherwise sound.
To combat these tax shelters, Section 704(d) has been revised and
Section 465 has been added to the Internal Revenue Code for the purpose
of limiting losses to the amount which the investor has "at-risk". Section
465 addresses itself to certain specified activities which include motion pic-
ture and video tape production, exploration for oil and gas wells, farming,
and the leasing of equipment. Section 704(d), which will be discussed sub-
sequently, addresses itself to losses incurred by a partnership which is not
engaged in one of those activities set forth in Section 465.
The amount at risk is the total of the cash and adjusted basis of other
property invested in the activity plus those funds borrowed and invested in
the activity. For borrowed funds to be considered at-risk, the taxpayer must
be personally liable or must have pledged personal or real property which
he owns as security for the nonrecourse loans. Borrowed funds are not to be
considered at-risk if:
(1) the indebtedness is secured by an interest in the specified activity; or
(2) the indebtedness was borrowed from an individual who has an
interest in the specified activity, other than as a creditor. (This
limitation eliminates the possibility of a general partner lending
funds to a limited partner for their investment); or
(3) the creditor has one of the following relationships to the taxpayer
as set forth in Section 267 (b) :
(a) Members of a family (brothers, sisters, spouse, ancestors,
and lineal descendants);
(b) An individual and a corporation more than 50 percent in
value of outstanding stock of which is owned, directly or
indirectly, by or for such individual;
(c) Two corporations, more than 50 percent in value of out-
standing stock of each of which is owned, directly or indirectly,
by or for the same individual, if either one of such corpora-
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tions, with respect to the taxable year of the corporation
preceding the date of the sale or exchange was, under the
law applicable to such taxable year, a personal holding com-
pany or a foreign personal holding company;
(d) A grantor and a fiduciary of any trust;
(e) A fiduciary of a trust and a fiduciary of another trust, if
. the same person is a grantor of both trusts;
(f) A fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of such trust;
(g) A fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of another trust, if
the same person is a grantor of both trusts;
(h) A fiduciary of a trust and a corporation more than 50 percent
in value of the outstanding stock of which is owned, directly
or indirectly, by or for the trust or by or for a person who
is a grantor of the trust; or
(i) A person and an organization to which Section 501 applies
and which is controlled directly or indirectly by such person
or (if such person is an individual) by members of the
family of such individual.
It should be noted that if the property which has been pledged is
actually used in the activity, then it is not considered to be at-risk. If the
taxpayer has entered in to any type of arrangement whereby he is guaranteed
against incurring a loss in excess of a specified amount, or has obtained
insurance to cover any loss caused by his personal liability, he will not be
considered to be at-risk. He will also not be considered to be at-risk to the
extent of any nonrecourse loans which he may have invested in the activity.
Losses, as described in Code Section 465, are defined to mean the
amount by which deductions permitted under other code sections exceeds
the income generated by the specified activity. Losses incurred in the current
year are deemed to reduce the amount at-risk for subsequent year calcu-
lations. The determination of the amount at-risk and the loss deductible
from each activity must be calculated with respect to each film or video
tape, each piece of personal property which is leased or held for leasing,
each farm, and each oil or gas property. The significance of this requirement
is that each individual activity is considered as a separate entity and, con-
sequently, a loss nondeductible from one activity due to an insufficient amount
at-risk cannot be used to offset an amount at-risk in another activity. For
example, a loss in excess of the amount at-risk in a leased jet aircraft cannot
be applied against a farm where the amount at risk exceeds the loss. A loss
which cannot be deducted in the current year due to the at-risk limitation
can be carried over indefinitely to future years and deducted at such time
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as the amount at-risk for that particular activity has increased sufficiently
to cover part or all of the loss.
In summary, it is interesting to note that if property itself is invested
in the activity, the amount at-risk is limited to the adjusted basis of the
property; but, if the property is pledged as security for a loan and the proceeds
of the loan are then invested in the activity, the amount at-risk is the fair
market value of the property at the time it is pledged. Corporations, other
than Subchapter S corporations, are not subject to the at-risk provisions of
Section 465. Although Section 465 and Section 704(d) are both designed
to eliminate the deduction of losses in excess of the investor's actual
economic investment, Section 465 takes precedence where the specific
activities of investing include:
(1) Holding, producing or distributing motion picture films or video
tapes.
(2) Farming.
(3) Leasing any Section 1245 property, or
(4) Exploring for, or exploiting, oil and gas resources as a trader
business or for the production of income.
Section 704(d) is the overall general limitation on the deduction of
losses arising from a partnership operation. It should be noted that under
both of these new sections, real estate is exempted from coverage. These
Code Sections have application only to the deduction of losses, not to the
determination of the adjusted basis of the investor in the specific asset or
trade or business.
4.14 Farming-Accrual Accounting for Large Farm Corporations and Limi-
tation on Deductions for Farming Syndicates
Code Section 447 & 464-Act Section 207
Effective Date: For tax years beginning after December 31, 1976
In an effort to tighten up those tax shelters resulting from farming
operations by high bracket taxpayers, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 estab-
lished the concept of the excess deductions account, Section 1251. The
purpose of the excess deductions account was to accumulate deductions over
a period of years which were used to offset nonfarm income. Furthermore,
it converted what would otherwise have been long term capital gain into
ordinary income at the time certain farm property was sold or disposed of.
In effect, this was similar to the concept of the recapture of depreciation.
To insure that the ordinary farmer would not be caught by this preventive
legislation, the rules applied only to a taxpayer whose nonfarm gross income
exceeded $50,000, whose net farm loss was over $25,000 and who used
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the cash basis of accounting. The only amount which was added to the
excess deductions account were the farm losses in excess of $25,000. And
as previously mentioned, the balance in this account would then be used
to convert what would otherwise have been long term capital gain into
ordinary income at the time of sale of depreciable personal property held
for more than six months, cattle and horses held for more than two years,
other livestock held for more than one year for breeding, draft, dairy or
sporting purposes, land held for more than six months, and unharvested
crops growing on land which had been held for more than six months.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provides that no additions to an excess
deductions account are required to be made for net farm losses incurred for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975. The recapture rules in effect
since January 1, 1970 until the present time will still operate to recapture farm
losses. However, income earned after January 1, 1976 can be used to reduce
the amount of the existing balance in the excess deductions account. Also,
tax free divisive reorganizations under Section 368(a) (1) (D) will not
trigger the recapture of excess deductions. Section 447 requires all corpo-
rations other than Subchapter S corporations, family corporations of which
50 percent of the combined voting power of all classes of stock or 50
percent of the total number of shares of all classes of stock are owned by
members of the same family, and corporations with gross receipts of less
than one million dollars or certain corporations using hybrid accounting
methods for a period of at least ten years, and partnerships of which one
member of a partnership is a corporation to use the accrual method of
accounting. Also, preproductive period costs are required to be capitalized.
Specifically exempted from these requirements are corporations engaged in
the nursery business or engaged in the harvesting or raising of trees (other
than fruit and nut trees). The preproductive expenses are generally con-
sidered to be those which are required to be expended during the period
preceding the date of the first marketable crop or yield. Interest, taxes,
and casualty losses are exempted from this capitalization requirement.
Section 464 prohibits farming syndicates from deducting the cost
of feed, seed, fertilizer and other farm supplies prior to the time they are
actually used or consumed. The cost of poultry acquired for future resale
cannot be deducted until the year of sale, and the cost of poultry, such as
egg-laying hens, must be deducted ratably over the lesser of twelve months
or their actual useful life in the trade or business. Section 278(b)(3)
requires that preproductive development expense of groves, orchards and
vineyards in which fruit or nuts are grown must be capitalized and then
depreciated over their useful life, commencing with the first year in which
commercial quantities of the fruit or nuts are produced.
[Vol. 10:3
96
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss3/6
A farming syndicate is defined as a partnership or other enterprise
other than a corporation whereby more than 35 percent of the losses are
allocated to limited partners or a limited entrepreneur, or a partnership or
other enterprise which is required to register their offering with any federal
or state agency. This last requirement means that there may be discrepancies
between various states as to what organizations are covered by Section 464,
due to the difference in state laws requiring registrations of offerings.
4.15 Investment Interest
Code Section 163-Act Section 209
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 introduced the concept of limiting the
amount of investment-related interest which could be deducted. The purpose
of this statute was to prevent taxpayers from incurring large amounts of
interest expense to carry relatively unproductive property and currently
offsetting the deduction against their salary and other ordinary income. For
the years of 1970 and 1971 excess investment interest was categorized as
a tax preference. However, for years beginning in 1972 and thereafter, the
excess investment interest was disallowed and was permitted to be carried
over to future years. The deduction for the interest incurred for carrying
investment property was limited to $25,000 plus net investment income, plus
the excess of long-term capital gain over net short-term capital losses, plus
one-half of the excess investment interest over the total of the three preceding
items.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 continues the above philosophy, but
even more severely limits the deduction of investment interest by permitting
a deduction only to the extent of $10,000 plus the net investment income.
Excluded from this limitation is an additional $15,000 of interest incurred
to acquire either corporate stock or an interest in a partnership in which the
taxpayer, his spouse and children own at least 50 percent of the stock in
the case of the corporation, or 50 percent of the capital investment in the
case of a partnership. Although not mentioned in either the Act or in the
committee reports, it is assumed that interest incurred in connection with a
self-employed individual's business would also be deductible without limita-
tion, since this would be interest incurred in connection with a trade or
business, not an investment.
Again, interest incurred after December 31, 1975 is deductible under
the above rules and may be carried forward. The carry over of pre'-1976
interest is deductible under the rules as set forth in the 1969 Tax Reform Act.
It should be noted that the above limitation of $25,000 and $10,000 are
reduced by 50 percent if a married individual is filing separate returns.
TAx REFORm ACTWinter, 1977]
97
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1976 Part I
Published by IdeaExchang @UAkron, 1977
AKRON LAW REVIEW
5.00 Tax Credit
5.01 Credit for the Elderly
Code Section 37 - Act Section 503
Effective Date: This revision is effective for those tax years begin-
ning after December 31, 1975
In 1962 a retirement income credit was introduced to assist those elderly
taxpayers receiving little or no Social Security benefits or other forms of tax
exempt retirement income. The credit was designed to insure that these tax-
payers were treated on essentially the same basis as those receiving such
benefits.
In general, the credit was limited to 15 percent of the first $1,524 (or
$2,286 for joint returns) of retirement income received by a taxpayer who
is at least 65 years old. Retirement income included only dividends, interest,
rents, taxable annuities and pensions. Earned income was not considered in
computing the amount of credit allowable. Moreover, the amount of retire-
ment income must be reduced by the amount of any tax exempt pension
income (including Social Security) received by the taxpayer during the
tax year. Taxpayers under the age of 72 faced a further reduction in the
amount of one-half the earned income between $1,200 and $1,700 per year
and the entire excess of earned income above $1,700 per year.
To be eligible to receive the tax credit, the taxpayer must have achieved
the age of 65 and must have received earned income in excess of $600 per
year in each of any ten preceding calendar years.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 attempts to eliminate the difficulty of
computing the amount of the retirement income credit under the old law.
The new credit incorporates the present value of the dollar as well as the
various effects of revised Social Security benefits. It should be noted that
a major overhaul of the credit was required since these amounts had been
essentially unchanged since the credit was first introduced in 1962.
The new law significantly liberalizes the availability of the credit and
redesignates it as "credit for the elderly." The credit is now computed on
earned income as well as the so-called retirement income. Therefore, the
credit is now available to taxpayers of age 65 and over regardless of whether
they receive retirement income or earned income. Furthermore, individual
earnings in excess of $600 per year in each of ten preceding calendar years
are no longer a prerequisite to eligibility for the credit. In other words, prior
employment experience is no longer essential to the credit's availability.
Taxpayers under the age of 72 will no longer be required to reduce their
income base by one half the earned income between $1,200 and $1,700 per
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year and the entire excess of annual earned income above $1,700. However,
all eligible taxpayers will still be required to reduce their income by the
amount of any tax-exempt pension income (including Social Security) that
they receive during the tax year. The revised law also introduces a new
reduction that is equivalent to one-half the excess of all adjusted gross income
above $7,500 for single taxpayers and $10,000 for married persons filing
a joint return. This reduction is applicable to all taxpayers eligible to receive
the credit and is taken from their income base for figuring the credit allowable.
The credit itself is still computed at the rate of 15 percent; however,
the maximum amount of income to which this rate can be applied has been
raised to $2,500 for a single eligible taxpayer and for a married couple filing
jointly where only one spouse has attained the age of 65 and $3,750 for
a married couple filing jointly where both spouses are fully eligible to receive
the credit. As under the old law, the credit is not refundable and, therefore,
cannot exceed the amount of tax for the year in question. In addition, the
credit is generally available to married couples only if they file a joint return.
Act Section 503 made further modifications pertaining to the credit
available to public retirees under the age of 65. (i.e., those individuals
receiving pension income from the government). Generally speaking, the
old retirement income provisions will still apply to these individuals although
the maximum amount of such income subject to the credit has been increased
to $2,500 for single persons and $3,750 for married couples filing joint
returns. However, the old requirement that a taxpayer's eligibility to receive
the credit is predicated upon his earned income exceeding $600 in each
of ten preceding calendar years has been eliminated.
Illustration:
X, a 65 year old taxpayer, receives combined annual income of $4,000
from dividends, interest and rental of real property. He also has earned
income of $3,500 annually. His wife is 61 years old and a public retiree.
She receives earned income of $2,500 annually from her part-time job in
addition to her annual government pension of $2,000. Neither X nor his
wife receives social security or other types of tax exempt pension payments.
X and his wife elect to file a joint return.
The maximum amount of income subject to the credit is $2,500 since
X and his wife are filing a joint return, but only X is eligible to receive the
credit. This amount is now subject to a reduction of one-half the taxpayer's
combined adjusted gross income (AGI) in excess of $10,000. Here their
combined AGI is $12,000. Therefore, the income subject to the credit must
be reduced by one-half of $2,000 or $1,000. X and his wife have a credit
that is based on retirement income of only $1,500 ($2,500-$1,000). The
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credit is computed at the rate of 15 percent of this amount, leaving an
available credit of $225.
5.02 Disregard of Earned Income Credit
Code Section 43 - Act Section 402
Effective Date: This revision is effective for only those tax years
ending after December 31, 1975 and before January 1, 1978
The Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975 supplemented the earlier Tax
Reduction Act of 1975 and provided for a refundable tax credit to certain
eligible taxpayers. The Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975 in effect provided
that those refunds received before July 1, 1976 as a result of the earned
income credit were to be disregarded in determining the eligibility of the
recipient taxpayer for any federal or federally assisted aid program. The
earned income credit was to be discarded only if the taxpayer was a bene-
ficiary of such aid programs in the calendar month before the refund was
actually received.
The Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975 retained the refundable credit
through June 30, 1976 and further provided that the amount of the credit
was to be ignored in determining which taxpayers were eligible to receive
benefits under various federal aid programs.
5.03 Earned Income Credit
Code Section 43 - Act Section 401(c)
Effective Date: This revision is effective for only those tax years
ending after December 31, 1975 and before January 1, 1978
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 was designed to provide a stimulus
to a sluggish economy. Part of that Act featured a refundable tax credit of
10 percent of the first $4,000 of earned income. This credit was limited to
a maximum of $400 reduced by 10 percent of the excess earned income
over $4,000. Therefore, once earned income reached $8,000 the credit was
reduced to zero. The credit as originally designed was for 1975 only and
was available only to a taxpayer who maintained a household within the
Uninted States and had at least one dependent child who qualified for a per-
sonal exemption under Code Section 151 (e) (1) (B) (i.e., who is either
under the age of 19 at the close of the tax year or a student).
The Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975 (Public Law 94-164) retained
the refundable credit through June 30, 1976 and further provided that the
amount of the credit was to be ignored in determining which taxpayers were
eligible to receive benefits under various federal aid programs.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 in effect extends the earned income
credit through 1977 and further modifies Code Section 43(c)(1) pertain-
[Vol. 10:3
100
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss3/6
ing to the eligibility of taxpayers receiving the credit. The taxpayer's eligi-
bility is no longer dependent upon having at least one dependent child
qualifying for a personal exemption under Code Section 151(e) (1) (B).
Act Section 401(c) requires only that the taxpayer maintain a household
for any child who is under the age of 19 or a student. Moreover, the eligi-
bility requirements have been expanded to include a taxpayer who maintains
a household for a disabled child (of any age) for whom a personal exemp-
tion may be claimed. Therefore, a taxpayer is now eligible to receive the
credit if he maintains a household for a dependent child or for any child
(dependent or nondependent) who is under the age of 19 or a student. It
should be further noted that for married taxpayers a joint return must be
filed in order to qualify for the credit.
5.04 Child Care Expenses
Code Section 44A - Act Section 504
Effective Date: This revision is effective for tax years ending Decem-
ber 31, 1975
Code Section 214 provided a deduction for those expenses relating to
the care of a dependent child or disabled dependent. The maximum deduc-
tion allowable was $4800 per tax year. However, the amount of those
expenses incurred was to be reduced by one-half the excess of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income over $35,000. Section 214 placed further limitations
upon the amount of the deduction allowable where the expenses were in-
curred outside the home. Also, payments to related individuals, as defined
in Code Section 152 (a) were expressly omitted from the deduction. Further-
more, both spouses generally had to be gainfully employed in order to qualify
for the deduction. The eligible expenses were to be reduced by the amount
of any disability income. These limitations, in effect, eliminated the practical
availability of the child care expense deduction. In addition, taxpayers taking
the standard deduction were precluded from using child care expenses as
a deduction since itemized deductions must be taken from adjusted gross
income.
Due to the severe restrictions upon the availability of the child care
expense deduction, Congress chose to eliminate it altogether and establish
a new credit that is more attractive to the taxpayer. As a result, Code Section
214 has been repealed and replaced by Section 44A.
Act Section 504 establishes a non-refundable tax credit equal to 20
percent of the employment-related expenses incurred from the care of a
dependent child under the age of 15 or for an incapacitated dependent (in-
cluding a spouse) in order to enable the taxpayer to work. This credit is
available without regard to the taxpayer's income and consequently will not
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be subject to reduction once the taxpayer's adjusted gross income reaches
a certain level. However, the credit is itself limited to $400 for one dependent
and $800 for two or more dependents. In other words, child care expenses
cannot exceed $2000 per year for one dependent and $4000 a year for two
or more dependents.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 also eliminates some of the burdensome
restrictions associated with Code Section 214. The distinction between child
care expenses incurred inside and outside of the home has been eliminated.
Additionally, payments to relatives may be considered in computing the
credit, but only if these payments are subject to the social security tax. The
new law also modifies the old requirement that both spouses must be gain-
fully employed. The credit has been extended to married couples where
either one or both work on a part-time basis only, but the eligible expenses
are limited to the earnings of the spouse earning the smaller amount. It is also
extended to married couples when one spouse is a full-time student and the
other is gainfully employed. Furthermore, the credit has been made available
to a divorced or separated spouse who has custody of a child under the age
of 15 even though that parent does not qualify for a dependency exemption
for the child.
This extreme overhaul will make the child care expense deduction
available to a significantly larger number of taxpayers. Also, the elimination
of a variety of restrictions will considerably ease the burden of computing
the new credit.
5.05 Extension of $100,000 Limitation on Used Property
Code Section 48 - Act Section 801
Effective Date: This revision is effective only for those tax years
ending after December 31, 1974 and before January 1, 1984
Code Section 48 defines that depreciable property which is subject to
the investment tax credit. This section imposed a limitation of $50,000 on
the cost of used property that may be taken in a given year as a qualified
investment for purposes of the investment tax credit. The Tax Reduction
Act of 1975 increased the limitation to $100,000 for tax years ending prior
to January 1, 1977 as an incentive to stimulate the economy.
Act Section 801 simply extends the $100,000 limitation on used prop-
erty through December 31, 1980. Thus, $100,000 of the cost of used prop-
erty will remain available as a basis to compute the investment tax credit
for four additional years. The dollar limitation will revert to $50,000 for
tax years beginning after December 31, 1980.
By limiting the extension of the increased amounts to four years, Con-
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gress recognized the need to provide a further stimulus to the economy, but
at the same time, has concluded that permanent increases are not justified.
The downward adjustment to $50,000 for tax years beginning after December
31, 1980 should ensure maximum use of the credit prior to that time.
5.06 Investment Credit
Code Section 46 - Act Section 802
Effective Date: The revision is effective for tax years beginning after
December 31, 1975 and ending prior to January 1, 1981
Prior to the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, a taxpayer could receive a
seven percent credit for investment in certain qualified property. The credit
rate for investment in certain public utility property was four percent. The
Tax Reduction Act increased the investment credit to 10 percent for all
taxpayers investing in either qualified investment property or public utility
properties. The 10 percent rate was to remain in effect only for the period
January 22, 1975 through December 31, 1976.
Act Section 802 extends the effective date of the 10 percent rate through
December 31, 1980. By extending the higher rate for additional years,
Congress hopes to provide a further stimulus to the economy without enact-
ing a permanent change to the seven percent investment credit rate (four
percent in the case of certain public utility property). As a result, the invest-
ment credit rate will be adjusted downward to the old rates for tax years
commencing after December 31, 1980.
5.07 First-In First-Out Treatment of Investment Credits
Code Section 46(a) (2) - Act Section 802
Effective Date: This revision applies to all tax years beginning after
December 31, 1975
Code Section 46(b) called for utilization of current year investment
credits prior to any carryover or carryback of investment credits. Conse-
quently, a taxpayer could lose the benefits of any unused credit where that
credit plus other credits arising in the carry-back-carry-forward period ex-
ceeded the restrictions placed on the amount of credit available imposed by
Code Section 46(b) (2). Frequently, a credit arising in a given tax year was
unable to be fully utilized under the old rule because the cumulative unused
credits during the seven year carry-over period exceeded prescribed dollar
restrictions.
Congress has attempted to ensure maximum utilization of the invest-
ment tax credits by providing that any unused credits carried into a given
tax year shall be applied before the credit that actually arises in that year.
Therefore, investment tax credits carried "over" from a prior tax year are
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consumed first and then current investment credits are applied to
the extent that the dollar limitations imposed on the credit have
not been exceeded. Revised Code Section 46 (a) simply states that the allow-
able credit for a given tax year will be made up of carryovers to that year,
followed by credit actually accrued in that particular year, and finally carry-
backs to that year. In this manner, the oldest credit is always used first,
thereby reducing the likelihood that it will expire unused at the end of the
seven year carry-over period.
5.08 Employee Stock Ownership Plans
Code Section 46 - Act Section 803
Effective Date: This revision is effective for tax years beginning
after December 31, 1974 and ending prior to January 1, 1981
Section 4975(e) (7) (which addresses prohibited transactions for tax
qualified plans) generally defines an Employee Stock Ownership Plan
(ESOP) as a written and defined contribution plan designed primarily for
investing in employer securities. In essence, such plans are established to
enable employees, or participants in the plan, to purchase stock of the em-
ployer thereby providing a viable incentive for increased efficiency and
productivity. Congress has enacted a variety of provisions to encourage the
adoption of ESOP's. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 entitled an employer
to an additional percentage point of investment credit if he contributed to
an ESOP employer securities equal in value to the additional one percent
credit. Therefore, a qualifying employer is entitled to an 11 percent invest-
ment credit in lieu of the 10 percent credit generally available under Code
Section 46. This additional credit was to expire under the Tax Reduction
Act of 1975 on December 31, 1976.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 extends the additional percentage point
of investment credit to qualifying employers through December 31, 1980. As
under the old law, a qualifying employer is generally one who contributes
employer securities equal in value to the additional percent of investment
credit to an ESOP.
An additional one half percent credit is now available where the em-
ployee, as well as the employer, contributes that one half percent to the plan.
Thus a total investment credit of 11.5 percent is allowable but only to the
extent of employee matching contributions to the ESOP. This new provision
is allowable only for qualified property acquired after December 31, 1976
and before January 1, 1981.
The Act also provides for a number of technical changes to the invest-
ment tax credit provisions of ESOP's. If any part of the investment credit
is subject to recapture or disallowance, the amount of such a decrease can
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be applied to offset employer contributions in future years or may be taken
as a deduction under Code Section 404. In addition, stock from a member
of a controlled group of corporations, such as brother-sister corporations,
may be used as employer securities for ESOP purposes. A third important
technical change allows the taxpayer to defer his contribution of additional
credit to the plan in certain situations. Here, if the entire amount of the
credit is not allowed in a given tax year because it exceeds the tax liability
for that year, the additional credit can be contributed to the plan as it is
allowed. Therefore, the taxpayer will no longer be denied the effect of the
additional credit merely due to a technicality that was not designed to
operate in that manner.
It should be further noted that the additional credit will not be avail-
able to a public utility if a public service or regulatory commission requires
a "flow-through" of any part of the additional credit to consumers. This
provision becomes effective for tax years commencing on January 1, 1976.
Numerous other changes have been made to a variety of technical
provisions relating to the establishment and administration of ESOP's. The
new Code provisions should be directly consulted to ascertain the impact
of these changes on a particular plan.
5.09 Investment Credit for Movie and Television Films
Code Section 48 (K) - Act Section 804
Effective Date: This revision is effective for those tax years begin-
ning after December 31, 1974
In general, the investment tax credit is available on tangible personal
property having a useful life of at least seven years and having no predomin-
ant foreign use during a given tax year. Motion pictures and television films
have been deemed to constitute tangible personal property for investment
tax purposes. However, the useful life of motion pictures, the basis of such
films, and the predominance of foreign use have all been sources of frequent
litigation.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 attempts to eliminate this litigation and
develops two sets of rules with respect to the investment tax credit treatment
of films placed in service in the past and those to be placed in service in the
future. In both instances, however, the credit is available for only those new
films and tapes produced primarily for public entertainment or educational
purposes. It is clearly not available for used films or those which are topical
or transitory in nature.
For those fims placed in service in future years, taxpayers will generally
receive two-thirds of the full investment credit without regard to the film's105
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useful life or foreign use. As an alternative, the taxpayer may elect to deter-
mine the useful life and applicable tax credit rate on a film-by-film basis.
If this alternative is elected, the taxpayer would be entitled to a full credit
if the particular film had a useful life of seven years or more but would
receive no credit if the film's useful life were for any shorter period. It should
be noted that under this alternative, the film's useful life is treated as ended
at the close of first taxable year in which 90 percent of the basis of the film
has been recovered through depreciation.
The general rules for placing films in service in the future were designed
to encourage domestic film production and to create jobs. Therefore, under
the new rules, the basis of the film for investment credit purpose includes
all direct costs which are allocable to domestic production. Furthermore, if
at least 80 percent of all direct production costs are allocable to United
States production, then the credit basis is expanded to include all indirect
production costs such as general overhead, screen play development costs,
etc.
For those films placed in service in the past (tax years beginning before
January 1, 1975), the taxpayer may select one of three alternative methods
for computing the investment credit for qualified films. Generally, the tax-
payer will select to compute the credit on a film-by-film basis. In this instance,
the taxpayer must demonstrate that the film is qualified by meeting both the
useful life and foreign use requirements existing under the old law. The 90
percent rule described above may be applied to determine the film's useful
life. The film is said to have a predominant foreign use when at least 50
percent of the film's revenues resulted from showings outside of the United
States.
Secondly, the taxpayer may elect a 40 percent credit on all qualified
films. Within six months of the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
such an election is required and is irrevocable without the consent of the
Commissioner. The primary advantage to this election is that the credit is
allowable without regard to the film's useful life or predominant foreign use.
Finally, where a taxpayer initiated an action in a competent court prior
to January 1, 1976 with no result to date, he may elect to have the invest-
ment tax credit for tax years beginning prior to January 1, 1975 determined
under prior law. Again, such an election is irrevocable and can be made
only where proper litigation has not yet been concluded.
5.10 Investment Credit for Certain Vessels
Code Section 46 (g) - Act Section 805
Effective Date: This revision is effective for those tax years begin-
ning after December 31, 1975
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In 1936 Congress enacted the Merchant Marine Act (46 U.S.C.§ 1177)
to encourage domestic ship building. The Amended Act provides for the
deferral of income taxes on income realized from domestic shipping where
such income is set aside in a capital construction fund. This money can be
withdrawn only for the acquisition, construction or reconstruction of qualified
vessels to be used in domestic trade. However, when these funds are with-
drawn for such uses they have no tax basis and consequently the tax basis of
the vessel itself is reduced accordingly. As a result, property constructed
solely from this capital construction fund has no basis for determining either
depreciation or the investment tax credit.
Act Section 805 adds Code Section 46(g) to provide for a limited in-
vestment tax credit for certain qualified vessels placed in service after Decem-
ber 31, 1975. The taxpayer is now permitted to receive a tax credit equal to
one-half of the allowable credit on the untaxed monies withdrawn from the
special capital construction funds and used to construct or acquire qualified
vessels. Furthermore, the taxpayer may be able to sue in court to collect the
other one-half of the investment credit based upon the Court's interpretation
of whether such a credit is allowable under present law.
It should be noted that the new law has made no changes with respect
to the depreciation of these vessels. Therefore, ships, or any portions thereof,
that are constructed from special capital construction funds will remain not
amenable to depreciation.
5.11 Investment Credit Limitation for Airlines
Code Section 46 (a)9 - Act Section 1703
Effective Date: This revision is effective for those tax years begin-
ning after December 31, 1976 and ending prior to January 1, 1983
Under existing law, the investment credit for airlines is generally limited
to the first $25,000 of tax liability plus one-half of that liability in excess of
$25,000. In an effort to spur the future expansion and modernization of the
airline industry, Congress has enabled the airlines to use their investment tax
credits to offset as much as 100 percent of their tax liability in excess of
$25,000 for tax years ending in 1977 and 1978. However, the tax credit
limitation will be reduced by 10 percentage points per year for tax years
beginning in 1979 until it returns to its current rate of 50 percent in 1983.
Thus in effect Congress has given the airlines the following percentage limita-
tions in addition to the 50 percent limit already imposed by Code Section
46(a) (2):
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Year Percentage Maximum Investment Credit
Tax Available (Assume Tax Liability Exceeds $25,000)
1977 50% Total Tax Liability
1978 50% Total Tax Liability
1979 40% $25,000 plus 90% of excess tax liability over $25,000
1980 30% $25,000 plus 80% of excess tax liability over $25,000
1981 20% $25,000 plus 70% of excess tax liability over $25,000
1982 10% $25,000 plus 60% of excess tax liability over $25,000
1983 and 0 $25,000 plus 50% of excess tax liability over $25,000
thereafter
The rule in effect for tax years subsequent to 1982 is identical to that
for tax years ending prior to 1977. It should be pointed out that this addi-
tional investment credit is available only where the qualified investment in
airline property is greater than 25 percent of the taxpayer's total qualified
investment property. This new Code provision applies to common carrier
airlines subject to the control of either the Federal Aviation Administration
or the Civil Aeronautics Board. Lessors of airline property, however, are
not eligible to receive the additional credit.
5.12 Work Inventive (WIN) Program Expenses
Code Section 50A - Act Section 2107
Effective Date: This revision became effective on October 4, 1976, the
date of enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
Under prior law, taxpayers could take a tax credit equal to 20 percent of
the wages they paid during the first twelve months of employment to employees
undergoing training under a Work Incentive Program. An employer was
entitled to receive the credit for only those employees certified by a local
WIN agency. No credit was available unless the employment relationship
continued for an additional twelve months (i.e., for 24 months from the
original date of hiring). The credit, however, was available if employment
was terminated in a shorter period of time if the employee was discharged
for misconduct, voluntarily quit, or became disabled. The amount of credit
available in any tax year was limited to the first $25,000 of the employer's
tax liability plus 50 percent of his tax liability in excess of $25,000.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 makes essentially three changes to exist-
ing law. The credit is now available if employment is not terminated without
cause prior to the first six months of employment. Therefore, in effect the
credit is allowable from the date of hiring if employment is not terminated
prior to 90 days after the first 90 days of employment. In addition, the
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:3
108
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss3/6
employer will not be required to recapture a claimed credit if the employee
is laid off prior to these statutory time limitations because of a decrease in
business. Thus, today the credit will not be lost due to early termination of
employment if such termination is caused by either the employee's voluntary
departure, employee misconduct, employee disability, or a decrease in
business. Lastly, the amount of the credit allowable has been doubled to the
first $50,000 of the employer's tax liability plus 50 percent of the excess
liability over $50,000.
5.13 Welfare Recipient Tax Credit
Code Section 50B - Act Section 2107
Effective Date: This revision is effective for tax years ending prior
to January 1, 1980
The welfare recipient tax credit was closely related to the WIN credit
and was enacted as an employment incentive for welfare recipients. The
credit expired on July 1, 1976 and was available to all employers, including
those providing employment for private household workers, who employed
qualified welfare recipients who had been receiving benefits for a period of
at least 90 days. As under the WIN credit, qualified recipients were those
employees who had been certified by a state or local welfare agency. The
credit allowable was limited to twenty percent of all eligible wages paid to
a qualified recipient and, for a given tax year, was further limited to the first
$25,000 of tax liability plus 50 percent of the excess liability above $25,000
for business employees.
The welfare recipient tax credit has been extended to December 31,
1979. To introduce consistency with WIN tax credit provisions, the Congress
has now limited the period for which the wages of any one employee would
be eligible for the credit to twelve months. A second change to the welfare
recipient tax enables local WIN agencies to certify eligibility for the credit.
Lastly, the amount of the credit allowable has been doubled to the first
$50,000 of the employer's tax liability plus 50 percent of the excess liability
over $50,000. As a result of these changes, the welfare recipient credit has
been modified to more closely resemble the WIN credit in all major aspects.
5.14 Treatment of Certain Pollution Control Facilities
Code Section 169 - Act Section 2112
Effective Date: (1) The revision applying to the extension of the
5-year amortization election is effective for tax years beginning after
December 31, 1975
(2) The revision applying to the investment tax credit is effective
for tax years beginning after December 31, 1976
From 1969 through December 31, 1975, a taxpayer who installed a
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new certified pollution control facility in connection with property that was
in operation prior to January 1, 1969 could elect to amortize that facility
over a 60-month period. If such an election was made, the facility became
ineligible for the investment tax credit. The availability of the election expired
on January 1, 1976.
The five-year amortization election has now been made a permanent
feature of the Code as an incentive for installing pollution control equip-
ment. As an added incentive, an investment credit is allowable for tax years
beginning after December 31, 1976 despite the taxpayer's election of an
accelerated amortization schedule. This credit, however, is limited to one-
half of the normally allowable investment credit and is applicable to only
that property having a useful life of more than five years. In addition, the
definition of a certified pollution control facility has been expanded to in-
clude facilities that will prevent the creation or emission of pollutants when
installed at the site of other property in existence prior to January 1, 1976.
Such a facility must not significantly "increase the output or capacity, extend
the useful life, or reduce the total operating costs of such plant or other
property" or significantly "alter the nature of the manufacturing or produc-
tion process or facility." A significant change for purposes of amended Code
Section 169 is more than five percent. Thus, a pollution control facility
eligible for this new tax credit includes such property as a recovery boiler
that removes pollutants from material at some point in the production pro-
cess without changing the process itself.
6.00 Procedure
6.01 Innocent Spouse
Code Section 6013 (e) - Act Section 2114
Section 6013 (a) permits a married couple to file a joint return for the
taxable year in lieu of filing separate, individual returns. There is no require-
ment that both spouses realize income during the year. However, both must
sign the return and both are jointly and severally liable for the tax. Prior to
1971, if a married couple filed a joint return and one of the spouses omitted
to report a portion of his or her gross income, the innocent spouse would be
held liable for the tax deficiency on the omitted amount. Congress, thus,
enacted the "innocent spouse" rule in 1971 to limit the spouse's liability on
the deficiency for the omitted income. Section 6013(e) precludes the in-
nocent spouses's liability only if: (1) the omission exceeds 25 percent of the
gross income stated on the return; (2) the omission is attributable solely to
the other spouse; (3) the innocent spouse had no knowledge of the omission;
and (4) under the circumstances, it would be inequitable to hold the in-
nocent spouse liable. Congress also instituted Section 6653(b) to relieve
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the innocent spouse of the civil fraud penalty, even if the provisions of Sec-
tion 6013 (e) were not met.
The innocent spouse rule was only effective for those who could obtain
relief at the time of the enactment and during any years retroactively per-
mitted. For those who had received an adverse judicial decision or had
permitted the statute of limitations to run, the innocent spouse rule was not
applicable. The 1976 Tax Reform Act, however, changes this rule and
permits any innocent spouse to file for a refund in any tax year beginning
with 1962. This redetermination is permitted only for those who received
an adverse judicial decision or allowed the statute of limitations on a refund
action to run at the time of the rules' enactment in 1971. The taxpayer can
file for the refund only during 1977 and cannot take advantage of the
innocent spouse rule after January 1, 1978.
6.02 Waiver of the Statute of Limitations for Activities not Engaged for
a Profit
Code Section 183(e) - Act Section 214
Effective Date: December 31, 1969
Section 183 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction in certain
circumstances from gross income for an activity not engaged in for profit.
There are several presumptions which regulate the administration of the
hobby loss deduction; mainly the activity is considered engaged in for profit
when the activity's gross income exceeds the deductions two out of five
consecutive taxable years. However, a taxpayer may elect to postpone final
determination of this presumption until the end of a certain period, usually
the end of the fourth year after the initial activity engagement. The 1976
Tax Reform Act has given the taxpayer added relief by extending the statute
of limitations on the assessment for the deficiency until two years after the
due date for the tax return on the last year of the determination period. Thus,
a tax deficiency may not have to be paid until at least seven years after the
initial engagement in the activity.
6.03 Income Tax Return Preparers
Code Sections 6060, 6107, 6109, 6696, 7407, 7427, 7701
- Act Section 1203
Committee Reports: S. Rep. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 483
(1976); S. Rep. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 349 (1976); H. R. Rep.
No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1976)
Effective Date: December 31, 1976
The 1976 Tax Reform Act is an indication that Congress is attempting to
reform the area which governs the liability of the income tax preparer. Prior
to 1977, sections 7206 and 7207 were the only sections which regulated
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the income tax preparer. However, these provisions only regulated willful
conduct and the Internal Revenue Service had a difficult time enforcing those
particular sections. Thus, Congress enacted new sections in order to give
the Secretary more power to regulate the tax return preparers.
Under newly enacted Section 7701 (a) (36), an income tax preparer is
one who prepares fully or partially a return for compensation or employs
another who prepares fully or partially for compensation. An income tax
preparer is not one who furnishes mechanical or typing assistance, prepares
a return for his or her fulltime employer, prepares a return for a trust and
estate as fiduciary, or prepares a claim for a refund when the taxpayer
is in the process of being audited or contesting a deficiency statement. An
example of an income tax preparer would be one who for a fee gives suffi-
cient advice to the taxpayer to make completion of the return a mere clerical
exercise for the taxpayer. However, if the advisor gives advice on hypothetical
matters not relating to the taxpayer's actual liability, the advisor is not an
income tax preparer, even though he is paid a fee. A fee must have a mone-
tary worth. A dinner, a vacation with no known monetary worth, or a
minor service performed is not considered compensation.
Sections 6694, 6696, and 7427 all regulate the income tax return
preparer's liability for understating the amount of the tax deficiency. If a
person has prepared the return for compensation and has understated the
liability, he is an income tax return preparer and is subject to a statutory
fine. Section 6694(a) states that if the preparer negligently or intentionally
disregards the regulations and rules governing the determination of the tax
liability, the preparer is subject to $100 fine if an understatement occurs.
A good faith dispute over a statute's interpretation will not be grounds for
the penalty. Both the Senate and House Committees believe that the dispute
must be undertaken in bad faith to warrant liability.
Section 6694(b) states that if there is a willful and intentional attempt
to understate the liability, the preparer is subject to $500 fine. A willful
understatement of liability is an intentional disregard of facts which causes
either an understatement of the tax liability or an overstatement of the
net amount refundable. A tax return preparer is also subject to a $500 fine
if he guarantees refunds. Section 6694, however, limits the amount of the
penalty to $500 even though the preparer is guilty of intentional disregard
of the rules and regulations and intentional understatement of the liability.
The burden of proof in an action for willful understatement of the tax
liability lies with the government. The burden is on the tax preparer in an
action for negligent or intentional disregard of the rules and regulations.
The statute of limitations in an action for disregarding the rules is
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three years. There is no statute of limitations on an action for willful under-
statement of liability.
Section 6107 requires that a copy of the tax return be presented to the
taxpayer no later than the time he must sign the form for filing purposes.
Failure to comply warrants a $25 fine against the income tax preparer. The
tax preparer is also required to retain a copy of the return for three years
after the filing date (April 15) and he must be prepared to present the
return to the Secretary for inspection. Failure to fulfill these requirements
warrants a $50 fine.
The income tax preparer is required under Section 6109(a) to disclose
his identification number on the return. In many cases, the identification
number will be the preparer's social security number. Section 6060 requires
the income tax return preparer to file an information return which provides
the name of the preparer, the preparer's identification number, and place
of employment. If one employs several tax preparers, that person must file
an information return for each employee. The employee does not have
to file an informaion return even though he is an income tax preparer.
Section 6695 provides that each violation of Section 6109 will cause the
preparer to be fined $100 minimum with each additional violation causing
$5 to be added onto the penalty. The maximum penalty is $20,000.
If there is a penalty assessed against the income tax return preparer
by the government, the government must give a notice and demand to the
preparer. The preparer has two options. The first option is to pay the penalty
and file for a refund within three years from the date of payment. Denial of the
refund claim gives the preparer the right to appeal the administrative decision
to the District Court. The second option is to pay fifteen percent of the
penalty within thirty days of assessment and file for a refund at that time.
Further collection on that penalty is delayed until after the refund claim
is heard. Denial of the refund claim allows the preparer to file an appeal
in the appropriate district court which will decide the entire amount of
liability. It should be noted that payment of the penalty is not the final act
in this area. If there is a judicial or administrative decision finding that the
return does not declare an understatement of tax liability, the preparer will
be entitled to a refund on the penalty paid.
Section 7407 permits the government to seek an injunction against
an income tax return preparer prohibiting any future engagement in the
field by the preparer because of conduct which is unbecoming a preparer.
Specific types of conduct are: (1) failure to follow the rules and regulations
governing disclosure; (2) negligent or willful disregard of the rules and
regulations; (3) willful understatement of the tax liability; (4) criminal
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conduct relating to tax matters; (5) misrepresentation of the preparer's eligi-
bility for practice; (6) misrepresentation of his experience and education
as an income tax preparer; (7) guaranteeing a tax refund payment; (8)
allowing a tax credit; and (9) other conduct interfering with the adminis-
tration of the internal revenue laws. The government may file the action
in the district of the preparer's residence, preparer's principal place of
business, or residence of the taxpayer with respect to whose return the
action arises. The court has the power to enjoin the preparer from practice,
active or passive, if the preparer is guilty of any form of conduct mentioned
above. It should be noted that not only may the preparer be subject to
criminal penalty for such conduct, the preparer may also be enjoined from
the practice of income tax preparation. The preparer may prevent the
institution of this action if he files with the Internal Revenue Service a bond
of $50,000 as surety for all penalties that might accumulate.
The 1976 Tax Reform Act has greatly reformed this area of the law.
Prior to 1977, a tax preparer was subject to a limited amount of penalties
which proved to be unenforceable. The Tax Reform Act has given the
government power to penalize preparers for misconduct. Congress, in effect,
is telling the preparers to watch their step.
6.04 Administrative Summonses
Code Sections 7609 and 7610 - Act Section 1205
Effective Date: December 31, 1976
Congress, in enacting the 1976 Tax Reform Act, attempted also to
clarify the area of administrative summonses. Section 7609 states that if
a summons is presented to a third party recordkeeper to compel the produc-
tion of records made or kept of business transactions or affairs, notice must
be given within three days to the person who is described in the summons
as the principal party. A third party recordkeeper is defined as a savings
and loan association, a cooperative bank, a mutual savings institution, a com-
mercial bank, a credit union, a state or federally created savings institution, a
credit bureau, consumer reporting agency, a broker, an attorney, or an
accountant. Records are books, papers, and other data which pertain to
the taxpayer's business transactions or affairs. Included in the notice to the
taxpayer is a copy of the summons and directions on the method of staying
compliance with the summons.
Notice to the taxpayer is accomplished in three ways: (1) by personal
service on the taxpayer; (2) by certified or registered mail to the last known
address; and (3) by personal service on the person summoned, if the person's
whereabouts are unknown. The Service is permitted to forward the notice
by registered or certified mail to the last known address of the fiduciary of
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the taxpayer even if the fiduciary is deceased or incompetent. No notice is
required for a "John Doe" summons, a summons to determine if business
records do exist, or a summons used to identify a particular person.
The summons to be valid must identify the taxpayer, unless it is a
John Doe summons, or the person to which the records pertain. The summons
must also describe the records specifically enough in order to be located.
The taxpayer, upon receipt of the notice, the summons, and the de-
scription of the staying action, can personally intervene or give notice of
noncompliance within fourteen days of notice. The notice of non-
compliance must be given to the third party recordkeeper and to the
appropriate office which the Secretary designates in the description of the
staying action. Upon the issuance of the notice of noncompliance, the statute
of limitations on civil actions, principally the assessment and collection of
the tax liability, and the criminal prosecution are stayed. Furthermore, the
Service cannot examine the records during the fourteen day period in which
the taxpayer can file notice of noncompliance and cannot examine after
the notice is given unless a judicial body rules such noncompliance is un-
reasonable.
The Service can apply to the court for a "John Doe" summons. The
Secretary must establish that the summons relates to a particular person,
ascertainable group, or ascertainable class of persons. Usually, the Secretary
cannot specifically identify the person or persons described in the summons.
The Secretary must prove to the District Court that there is probable
cause to believe that there is in the process noncompliance with the Internal
Revenue laws and that the information is not readily available from other
sources. The court can issue a summons without notice if probable cause
is shown.
"John Doe" summons usually are given in ex parte proceedings. The
Secretary merely has to present a petition and affidavit to the court. Denial
of the application is a final appealable order. Section 7609 further states
that this type of proceeding will be given preferential treatment in the docket.
The Secretary must file this action in the district where the taxpayer is residing
or in the district where the taxpayer is found.
Section 7610 gives further powers to the Secretary in this area. The
Secretary, after December 31, 1976, can establish a fee and cost rate
schedule for witnesses in the actions concerning the business records. Fees
and costs do include mileage, costs for locating records, and costs for
the production of the records. The Secretary does not have to provide
reimbursement if there is a proprietary interest in the records on the part
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of the witness or the witness is an officer, employee, agent, accountant or
attorney of the taxpayer.
6.05 Public Inspection of the Internal Revenue Service's Determination
Rulings, Technical Advice Memoranda and Determination Letters
Code Section 6110 - Act Section 1201
Committee Reports: S. Rep. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 474
(1976); S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 303 (1976); H. R.
Rep. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 312 (1976)
Effective Date: October 31, 1976
Effective as of November 1, 1976, any written determination issued by
the Service and background file on the determination prepared by the Service
will be open to the public's inspection. The public will be allowed to inspect
the determinations made prior to November 1, 1976, subject to certain excep-
tions discussed later. For definitional purposes, a written determination is
either a ruling, determination letter, or technical advice memorandum. The
Senate Finance Committee further states that a written determination must
contain the relevant facts, the applicable law, and the application of the law
to the facts. A background file relates to the written determination and in-
cludes: (1) the request for the written determination; (2) any material
which supports the request; and (3) any communication between the Service
and an outside third party which concerns the written determination. It
should be noted that the supporting material does not have to be written in
a formal manner and that a communication between the Service and the
Department of Justice does not have to be disclosed if it relates to a criminal
or civil action or investigation. A background file does not include an inter-
nal memorandum concerning Internal Revenue Service's legal position on
the matter.
In providing for public inspection, Congress intended to open to in-
spection only those documents which recite the relevant facts in a tax dis-
pute, the applicable provisions of law, and the relation of the law to the
facts. Documents which relate solely to the administration of tax laws in a
specific situation, such as notices of deficiencies, claims for refunds and
similar documents are exempted from the edict of Section 6110(a). Further-
more, a technical advice memorandum which is an item to be disclosed
will not be subject to disclosure in a situation of civil fraud or criminal
investigation or a situation concerning jeopardy or termination assessments.
Disclosure is not required for a general written determination and related
background file which affects a taxpayer's annual accounting period, a tax-
payer's method of accounting, a partner's or partnership's taxable year, and
the funding method of a qualified pension plan. This is subject to Section
6103 which requires the Service to disclose any documents which are the
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subjects of a request made after October 3, 1976. A closing agreement which
closes the taxpayer's tax liability is not a written determination. Further, dis-
closure of a compromise of liability will not be disclosed in its entirety, even
though two executive orders require a summary of a compromise to be
disclosed.
Prior to November 1, 1976, the Freedom of Information Act permitted
nondisclosure in several situations. The reason was to prevent burdening the
various agencies with mass disclosure. The 1976 Tax Reform Act has em-
bodied these exemptions in Section 6110. The Internal Revenue Service will
be allowed to: (1) delete the name, addresses, and other identifying details
of the person referred to in the determination; (2) classify for nondis-
closure any information concerning national defense or foreign policy; (3)
suppress information exempt from disclosure under another federal statute
pertaining to the Internal Revenue Service; (4) protect trade secrets or
confidential and privileged financial information given by a third party;
(5) protect by nondisclosure the personal privacy of those affected by the
determination; (6) regulate without fear of nondisclosure any financial
institution subject to the guidelines of an agency report; and (7) protect
any information pertaining to geological and geophysical research. Concern-
ing exemption (1) any information which may identify the subject of the
determination will be governed by the standard of a reasonable person gen-
erally knowledgeable about an appropriate community. An example is a
person knowledgeable of the automobile industry who can identify the com-
pany by referring to the contents of the written determination. The criteria
which will help establish the determination of confidentiality in exemption
(2) will be set forth by an executive order. In all other exemptions, the
Service's regulations will establish the extent of the Service's power to delete
or suppress. The Commissioner can also be required not to disclose if he (1)
made a prior agreement; or (2) is subject to an order from the Tax Court
not to do so. Failure to fulfill these past two requirements subjects the Com-
missioner to a civil action in the Court of Claims. The victim of the non-
deletion has to prove a wilful or intentional failure to delete.
Once a request for disclosure is granted by the Service, the locations
for inspection are in various areas. A written determination is available in
the reading room at the issuing National or District Internal Revenue Offices.
All rulings or technical advice memoranda are available in the Service's
public reading room in Washington, D. C. A subject matter index will be
available in the reading rooms but a specific index will not. Background files
are not available in the public reading rooms.
Section 6110(f) requires the Service to notify the person concerned
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that it intends to disclose the written determination. This section is effective
only after November 1, 1976, and is not retroactive. Section 6110(f) also
pertains to the disclosure of a background file. The person notified has sixty
days to discuss with the Service any information to be deleted. Disclosure
will not occur if there is a disagreement over several items of information.
If there is an exhaustion of administrative remedies which would resolve the
disagreements, the person who has an interest in the determination may file
for a judicial determination of the disagreement. The statute of limitations
is sixty days after the final intent to disclose given by the Internal Revenue
Service. Notice must be given to the Commissioner who has 15 days to
inform all others. Section 6110 does permit subsequent intervention, but once
the original petition is filed, no subsequent petition can be filed. The Tax
Court's decision will determine the extent of disclosure.
After the disagreements are settled and all parties agree to the dis-
closure, the determination will be made available for disclosure no
earlier than fifteen days after settlement and no later than thirty days. If
there has been a court action, then the Internal Revenue Service has thirty
days to disclose the determination.
However, the final settlement of the disagreements for disclosure is
subject to attack by third parties. Section 6110(f)(4) permits a third
party to file administratively for additional information. Exhaustion of
administrative remedies allows the third party to file in the Tax Court
or the District Court for the District of Columbia. The action will be a de
novo action and will be governed by the procedure of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act. The third party must notify the Commissioner who in turn
must notify all interested parties. The Commissioner is not required to be
an active participant nor is he liable for any additional disclosure. The
statute of limitations for an action for additional information is three years
after the disclosure of the determination.
Section 6110 permits a retroactive disclosure of determinations, but
the exemptions which govern the disclosure after November 1, 1976, are
different from those prior to November 1, 1976. One deterrent to disclousre
is the amount of funds available to the Service for the specific purpose of
disclosing prior determinations. If there are no funds, pre-November, 1976
determinations will not be disclosed. Disclosure, if there are funds, will be
done on a priority basis. [The priority list begins with prior determinations
issued under the 1954 Code and used as a reference for other determina-
tions.] Those determinations begin with the most recent. General determina-
tions or non-guideline determinations issued after July 4, 1967, will be the
next priority. Third will be pre-1954 Code specific guideline determinations.
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The pre-July 5, 1967 general determinations are last on the priority list
and the requester is subject to a monetary charge.
There are other written determinations which are exempted from dis-
closure because under prior revenue laws the exemptions were in effect.
They include: (1) exempt status of charitable organization determination;
(2) letters and documents concerning the exempt status of a pension, profit
sharing, or stock bonus plan or individual retirement annuity or account
issued prior to September 2, 1974; (4) Commissioner approvals; (5) deter-
mination letters; and (6) background files for non-guideline written deter-
minations prior to July 5, 1967. Notice of intent to disclose must be given
by the Service in the Federal Register. The Service must also wait ninety
days after notice is given before disclosing the material. A court action to
prevent disclosure will toll the statute until final determination. The Service
will have thirty days to disclose after the final determinations.
6.06 Minimum Exemption from Levy for Salaries, Wages, and Other
Income
Code Section 6331(d) (3), 6334 (d)-Act Section 1209
Effective Date: December 31. 1976
After 1976, there will be an exemption from federal tax levies on
salaries, wages, and other income. This exemption is in addition to the
exemptions which protect a portion of wages and salary designated by court
order for child support. The exemption is $50 per week plus $15 for the
spouse and each dependant. Notice must be given to the employer who
must comply with the levy. Thus, if a taxpayer has a weekly income of $350,
and he has a spouse and four dependants, $125 is exempt from the tax levy.
Provision is made for those who are paid bi-monthly or monthly. The levy
will be viable on all non-exempt income until the liability is extinguished
or unenforceable.
6.07 Joint Committee Refund Review
Code Sections 6405 (a) (c), 8023(a)-Act Section 1210
Effective Date: January 1, 1977
One of the duties of the Joint Committee on Taxation is the review of
refund claims or income, gift, or estate credits in excess of $100,000. The
1976 Tax Reform Act has expanded and limited the Committee's authority.
The Act expands the refund review to pension plans and private founda-
tions, but has limited the review to amounts in excess of $200,000.
6.08 Jeopardy and Termination Assessments
Code Sections 7429, 6863(b)(c), 443(a), 6213(a) and 6851(b)-
- Act Section 1204
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Committee Reports: S. Rep. No. 484, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 484(1976); S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 359 (1976); H. R. Rep.
No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 299 (1976)
Effective Date: December 31, 1976
Sections 6851, 6861, and 6862 permit the Secretary to make a jeopardy
or termination assessment when the Secretary or his agents believe that a tax
deficiency would be jeopardized if an assessment were not made immediately.
These sections do not require judicial or administrative review of the assess-
ments and do not restrict any means of collection upon the assessment by the
Service. The termination restriction will create a shorter taxable year if the
Secretary believes that the current year's deficiency will be jeopardized by
concealment of property, flight of the taxpayer, or transfer of property to
another.
The 1976 Tax Reform Act has changed the administration of the
jeopardy and termination assesment. Under recently enacted Section 7429,
the Secretary must provide various administrative remedies to the taxpayer
and the latter, in turn, may file for a judicial determination in the appropriate
District Court when all administrative remedies are exhausted. The Secretary,
within five days of the initial assesment, must provide the taxpayer with a
written statement outlining the assesment. The taxpayer then has thirty
days to request an administrative review of the assesment, in which the
Secretary must determine whether, under the circumstances, the assessment
is reasonable and the amount assessed is appropriate. The taxpayer may file
for a judicial determination within thirty days of the Secretary's ruling or
within fiteen days of the filing for the administrative determination. The
District Court has twenty days to determine the reasonableness of the
assessment or the appropriateness of the amount assessed. The taxpayer
can file for an extension of forty days if he has reasonable grounds to do so.
If the District Court holds in favor of the taxpayer, it will order the Secretary
to either abate such assessment, redetermine the assessed amount, or take
further appropriate action. The new Act states that the court's determination
will be final with no right of apeal to a higher court.
Section 7429 also has instituted a new method in computing the time
period for a determination of the review and determining the venue of the
District Court. Weekends and holidays are included in the time periods except
when they are the final days of the period.Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C.§ 1402 which states that venue will be in the taxpayer's residential district or,
if a business, in the district where the principal place of business is or where
the tax return is made.
Congress has also instituted a new burden of proof for a jeopardy or
termination assessment. In an action determining the reasonableness of an
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assessment, the burden is upon the Secretary. However, in an action determ-
ining the appropriateness of the amount assessed or demanded, the Secretary
will provide information on his determination but the taxpayer will have
the burden to prove the amount inappropriate. Congress has instituted the
same burden as in the civil fraud action. The reason for the division of this
burden of proof appears in the Senate Committee report which states:
The burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the assessment is
placed on the Treasury Department because the making of a jeopardy
or termination assessment involves more severe consequences to the
taxpayer than a normal assessment...
The Committee Report, however, emphasizes that the analogy of this division
in the burden to the civil fraud division does not carry over the civil fraud's
standard of "clear and convincing" evidence. If the District Court orders a
redetermination of the tax liability, a Section 7429 action will not affect the
subsequent proceedings.
Prior to 1977, there were no restraints placed upon the government's
attempts to levy on the taxpayer's property. The 1976 Tax Reform Act
has placed several limitations on the levying upon property. Property cannot
be sold unless it is perishable, the taxpayer consents to the sale, or the main-
tenance expenses are extremely high.
Section 6851 has also been amended by the 1976 Tax Reform Act.
Congress, having enacted the procedure under Section 7429, amended
Section 6851 to provide that a termination assessment does not terminate
a taxable year, create a deficiency, or require the Service to give the taxpayer
a notice of deficiency within sixty days of the assessment. A taxable year
under the Reform Act will not end at the time of the assessment, but will
continue until its normal end.
7.00 Loss
7.01 Net Operating Loss Carryovers
Code Sections 172(b), 172(g), 812(b), 382, & 383 - Act Section 806
Effective Date: December 31, 1975
Prior to January 1, 1976, an individual taxpayer or corporation who
suffered a loss during that particular tax year was entitled under Sections
172 and 812 to carryback that loss for three years and to carryover that
loss for five year. A regulated transportation company could carryover for
seven years. The reason for this was to permit the taxpayer to deduct as
much of the loss as possible. The 1976 Tax Reform Act has amended these
sections and now permits the carryover period to be extended to seven years
for individuals, corporations, and insurance companies, and nine years for
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regulated transportation companies. The net operating loss carryback is now
subject to an election by the taxpayer. However, if the taxpayer elects not
to use the carryback period, he cannot extend his carryover period past the
statutory limit.
The Tax Reform Act has also limited and expanded the amount of
the loss available to the taxpayer. Under the previous Section 382(a), the
carryover amount was controlled by a highly restrictive "purchase" rule. The
carryover was eliminated if: (1) during the preceding two tax years fifty
percent of the stock value changed hands, and (2) the trade or business of
the corporation was changed by the stock transfer. This rule included a
present shareholder increasing his ownership of stock by fifty percent. The
Reform Act amends the purchase rule of Section 382 by (1) changing the
period for the stock transfer prior to the loss from two to three years; (2)
eliminating the changing trade or business determination; (3) amending the
complete elimination of the net operating loss when the stock transfer in-
creased the transferee's holdings by fifty percent by simply instituting a
reduction in the amount permitted by statute; and (4) basing the stock
holding increase as a percentage against either the value of the loss corpora-
tion's participating stock or the value of its entire stock.
In relation to above subsection (3), the amount of the carryover will
be limited if one of the fifteen largest shareholders increases his holdings by
60 percent over a two-year period. The fair market value is eliminated as a
determinant and the percentage is determined in accordance with above
mentioned subsection (4). The increase in stock ownership results either
(1) by purchase of the loss corporation's stock, stock of another corpora-
tion owning stock in the loss corporation, or interest in a partnership or trust
owning stock in the loss corporation; (2) acquisition by contribution, merger
or consolidation of an interest in a partnership owning stock in the loss
corporation or acquisition by the same methods by a partnership; (3)
liquidation of a partner's interest in a partnership owning stock in the loss
corporation; (4) a decrease in the amount of the loss corporation's outstand-
ing stock or the amount of the outstanding stock of the loss corporation's
stock; or (5) a partial or total tax-free exchange of property for stock. Thus,
if any of the preceding occurs and the increase amounts to over 60 percent,
the net operating loss will be reduced by 3 percent for each percentage
point which is greater than 60 percent but lower than 80 percent. For
instance, if a shareholder increases his holdings by 65 percent, the net
operating loss will be reduced by 17 percent or 3 percent multiplied
by 5. Each point in excess of 80 percent will reduce the loss by 1 percent.
However, if the shareholders owned at least 40 percent of the stock prior to
the transfer there will be no deduction.
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There are several types of transactions which are exempted from the
purchase rule of the 1976 Tax Reform Act. The net operating loss will not
be reduced if: (1) there are start up losses from a new corporation; (2) the
transferee had constructively owned the stock prior to transfer; (3) there
was an acquisition from an estate or by gift; (4) there was an acquisition
by a creditor or a security holder in satisfaction of a claim; (5) there was an
acquisition of stock for a key employee over a thirty-six month period; (6)
there was an acquisition by a qualified employee retirement plan; (7) there
was an acquisition by an investment credit ESOP; or there was an acquisi-
tion for a recapitalization controlled by Section 368 (a) (1) (e). The new
purchase rule is effective as of June 30, 1978.
Similar rules apply for mergers and tax-free reorganizations. Under
the old law, if the shareholders of the merged or reorganized company retain
less than twenty percent of the stock interest in the acquiring corporation, the
net operating loss is reduced by five percent for each percentage point under
20 percent. There is no requirement that the merged company continue the
same trade or business the previous companies maintained. The 1976 Tax
Reform Act amends this rule and now requires that the shareholder retain
at least 40 percent of the stock to qualify for the full net operating loss. The
loss is reduced proportionately by 3 percent for each percentage point
under 40 percent but greater than 20 percent and 11 percent for each per-
centage point under 20 percent. The reference for the value of stock owned
is either the total value of the acquiring corporation's participating stock or
the total value of the stock. This rule also governs the "stock for stock"
exchange reorganization, the "triangular" reorganization, and holding com-
pany reorganization.
The Internal Revenue Service can deny any carryover if the transferee
is attempting to avoid his tax liability by purchasing a loss corporation with
a net operating loss. However, the Service must prove that the taxpayer
has attempted to circumvent the purpose of the carryover restrictions.
8.00 Recapture
8.01 Recapture of Depreciation on Real Property
Code Section 1250 - Act Section 202
Effective Date: Taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975
Recapture is a concept which transforms what would ordinarily have
been long term capital gain into ordinary income when certain depreciable
assets are sold or exchanged. Section 1245, which applies to personal prop-
erty, requires that all depreciation, whether straightline or accelerated, taken
after January 1, 1963, be recaptured as ordinary income when the asset
is sold. Section 1250 applies to real property and requires the recapture of
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depreciation in excess of straight line taken after January 1, 1964. Again
note that when dealing with real property only depreciation in excess of
straightline is required to be recaptured.
For the period from January 1, 1964, to December 31, 1969, Congress
made no distinction between residential and commercial property. One
hundred percent recapture was required if the property was held twenty
months or less, and the recapture percentage decreased by one percent for
every full month the property was held after the initial twenty months. There-
fore, there was no recapture of the excess of accelerated over straightline
depreciation if the property was held one hundred twenty months (10 years).
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 provided for the full recapture of all
accelerated depreciation in excess of straightline taken after January 1, 1970
on commercial or industrial real property. For residential real property there
was a 100 percent recapture of the excess depreciation for the first one
hundred months, and then the recapture percentage decreased by one per-
cent per month for every full month the property was held after the initial
one hundred months. Therefore, there was no recapture of the excess of
accelerated over straightline depreciation deducted from January 1, 1970
through December 31, 1975, if the residential real property was held for
two hundred months (16 years, 8 months).
Now the Tax Reform Act of 1976 eliminates the distinction between
commercial, industrial and residential real property and provides that the
excess of accelerated over straightline depreciation taken after December
31, 1975 will be recaptured in full at the time of sale. However, the declin-
ing recapture percentage rules which were in effect from January 1, 1970
through December 31, 1975, are continued for low-income rental housing
if it qualifies under the National Housing Act property, or low-income hous-
ing rehabilitation expenditure property, under Section 8 of the Housing Act
of 1937.
In all of the above calculations the amount of depreciation subject to
recapture is limited to the lesser of the amount of depreciation taken during
the applicable time period or the amount of gain upon the sale of the
property as determined by deducting adjusted basis from the selling price.
In calculating the recapture, the excess depreciation attributable to post
December 31, 1975 years is recaptured first, followed by the excess for the
period beginning January 1, 1970 through December 31, 1975, and finally
the excess for the period commencing January 1, 1964 through December
31, 1969.
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8.02 Amortization of Expenditures to Rehabilitate Low-Income Housing
Code Section 167(k) - Act Section 203
Expenditures made or incurred prior to December 31, 1978 to re-
habilitate low-income housing can be amortized over a sixty month period.
This rapid amortization applies to expenditures between $3000 and $20,000
per dwelling unit. Low-income housing is defined by the Leased Housing
Program under Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937. This act section
merely extends a program that was initiated with the Tax Reform Act of
1969.
9.00 Partnerships
9.01 Retroactive Allocation of Partnership Income or Loss
Code Sections 704 (a) and 706 (c) - Act Section 213
Effective Date: For tax years beginning after December 31, 1975
Congress amended the above code sections in an effort to reduce the
amount of year-end acquisitions in tax shelters by a partnership interest.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, it was not uncommon for taxpayers
to purchase an interest in a limited partnership in late December and, under
the partnership agreement, be allocated the partnership's losses for the
entire year, not just for the period in which the taxpayer held his partnership
interest. Since case law was unclear and it was generally uncertain whether
or not this could be done, the allocation of partnership losses to an incoming
partner became a frequent source of confrontation between the Service and
the taxpayer.
The Act specifically provides that the income or loss will be allocable
to a partner only for the portion of the year for which he was a member
of the partnership. There can be no retroactive allocation of income or loss
prior to the date of entry into the partnership.
9.02 Special Allocation of Partnership Income or Loss
Code Section 704 (b) - Act 213
Effective Date: For partnership taxable year beginning after Decem-
ber 31, 1975
Code Section 704 (a) and (b) permitted a partnership agreement to
establish different methods of allocating income, gain, loss, deductions, or
credits. The regulations required that the allocations have a "substantial
economic effect". In essence this meant that the allocation of dollars should
correspond basically with the tax consequences thereof. Also, many limited
partnerships engaged in the practice of allocating the net profit or loss
differently for different years between the general and the limited partner.
For example, in the early years when the limited partnership would be
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incurring large amounts of construction period interest, taxes, etc., with
little or no income, the net loss would be allocated almost entirely to the
limited partners who had purchased their interest for this tax shelter. Sub-
sequent to these loss years, the profits then would be allocated on some
other basis, perhaps equally between the general and the limited partners.
The statute has now been amended to disallow special allocations which lack a
"substantial economic effect" so as to prevent the use of special allocations
for tax avoidance or tax shelter purposes. However, the possibility of using
these allocations where a genuine business purpose exists has been retained.
If the allocation based on the partnership agreement is disallowed, then
the individual shares will be determined in accordance with the partner's
interest in the entire partnership, taking into account all the relevant facts
and circumstances. Some of the facts and circumstances to be considered
include: the partner's interest in profits and losses, if different from that
of the taxable income or loss; the cash flow to each partner, and the respective
rights of each partner to a distribution upon liquidation of the partnership.
9.03 Treatment of Partnership Liabilities Where a Partner is not Person-
ally Liable
Code Section 704(d) - Act Section 213
Effective Date: Liabilities incurred after December 31, 1976
Under pre-existing law, a partner's distributive share of the partnership
loss was deductible by him only to the extent of his interest in the partner-
ship at the end of the partnership year. However, a limited partner was
permitted to add to his interest, not only his investment in the partnership,
but also his proportionate share of all partnership liability, even though
he was not personally liable on this indebtedness. This had the effect of
materially increasing the number of deductions which could be passed through
to a limited partnership, thereby facilitating the use of tax shelters.
Section 704 (d) has been amended by adding a sentence which prohibits
the inclusion in a partner's interest of any partnership liability for which
the partner is not personally liable. Specifically exempted from this. pro-
vision is any partnership which has as its principal activity investment in
real property (other than mineral interest). Also exempted are those
activities which are covered by the more extensive, at-risk provisions of
Section 465. It is interesting to note that Section 704(d), as amended, is
applicable to "any" partners, but Section 465 is made non-applicable to cor-
porations, other than Subchapter S corporations and personal holding
companies,
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10.00 Depreciation
10.01 Basis Limitation for Player Contracts Transferred in Connection with
a Sale of a Franchise
Code Section 1056 - Act Section 212
Effective Date: Sport Franchises purchased after December 31, 1975
To eliminate the problems which occurred under pre-existing law,
Congress has set forth rules for determining the basis of player contracts.
When a player contract is transferred as part of the sale of a sports franchise,
the basis to the purchaser of each of the player contracts shall be the basis
to the seller of the contract plus the amount of gain the seller recognized.
The new law also establishes a presumption that no more than 50 percent
of the consideration paid for the sports franchise can be allocated to player
contracts. However, this presumption may be overcome if the purchaser
can establish to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury that the
amount in excess of 50 percent is justifiable.
10.02 Additional First-Year Depreciation Allowance for Partnerships
Code Section 179 (d) (8) - Act Section 213
Effective Date: Tax years beginning after December 31, 1975
The additional or bonus first-year depreciation was designed to assist
small businessmen in recovering the cost of new capital equipment. The
statute provided that self-employed individuals filing a Schedule 1040(C)
and filing a joint return, were entitled to a 20 percent additional depreciation
on the first $20,000 of equipment acquired during the year, or an additional
depreciation of $4,000. For corporate taxpayers, the limitation was a 20
percent bonus depreciation on the first $10,000 of assets acquired, or an
additional depreciation of $2,000. However, for partnerships the rules
were applied as to each individual partner. Therefore, if a partnership had
ten individual partners and each individual partner filed a joint return, they
were each entitled to a $4,000 additional bonus depreciation, or a total
additional first-year depreciation of $40,000.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 places an overall limitation of $10,000
on the cost of assets to which the additional first-year depreciation is
applicable. Now, the partnership and the corporation are on equal footing
and the maximum amount of additional first-year depreciation is $2,000
($10,000 of assets times 20 percent additional first-year depreciation.)
11.00 Amortization
11.01 Construction Period Interest and Taxes
Code Section 189 - Act Section 201
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Committee Reports: S. Rep. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 408
(1976); S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1976); H. R. Rep.
No. 653, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1976)
Under prior law a taxpayer had the option of deducting or capitalizing
real property taxes and the interest cost of carrying both unproductive land
and property which was under construction. This option provided what was
considered to be a tax loophole, in that many limited partnerships and other
real estate ventures were able to deduct large amounts of interest and property
taxes during the time that the facility was being constructed.
Congress, in reaction to these large deductions, now requires that
the interest and taxes incurred during the construction period of the facility
must be capitalized and amortized over a period of time in which it is
being phased-in. This rule is applicable to interest and real property taxes
on business or investment property during the period in which it is under
construction.
If the property is sold before the interest and real property taxes have
been fully amortized, then the unamortized amount will be added to the
basis of the real property for purposes of calculating gain or loss. However,
if the property is transferred in a tax-free exchange, such as a like-kind
exchange or a transfer to a control corporation, where a carryover basis is
involved, the taxpayer is required to continue to amortize the property for
the remainder of the amortization period. The Act segregates the business
investment property into three categories and sets different effective dates
for each as follows:
(1) Non-residential real estate for years beginning after December 31,
1975,
(2) Residential real estate for taxable years beginning after December
31, 1977, and
(3) Low-income housing for taxable years beginning after December
31, 1981.
Ultimately all construction period interest and taxes will be capitalized
and then amortized over a ten-year period commencing with the taxable
year in which the real property is ready to be placed in service or ready
to be held for sale. However, Congress has authorized a seven year phase-
in period for each of the three different types of investment property as
set forth in the following schedule:
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AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE
Commercial Low-Income
Year Real Estate Residential Housing
1977 20% - -
1978 16 2/3 25%
1979 14 2/7 20
1980 12 1/2 16 2/3
1981 11 1/9 14 2/7 -
1982 10 12 1/2 25%
1983 10 11 1/9 20
1984 10 10 16 2/3
1985 10 10 14 2/7
1986 10 10 12 1/2
1987 10 10 11 1/9
1988 10 10 10
For amounts paid or accrued for years commencing in 1976, 50
percent will be deductible in 1976, with the remaining balance being
deducted equally over the following three years at the rate of 16 2/3 percent.
This applies to non-residential realty. A committee report gives the following
illustration of the phase-in:
Assume that $120,000 of interest and taxes are paid or accrued in
1980 with respect to the construction of residential real estate (other
than government subsidized)and that the property is ready to be placed
in service in 1982. For taxable year 1980, the $120,000 must be cap-
italized under this provision, but a deduction is to be allowed for $20,000
(1/6 of the amount capitalized). The remaining $100,000 (i.e. 5/6 of
of the total) is to be deducted ratably over a five year period beginning
in 1982 (the year in which the property is placed in service). Thus,
$20,000 is to be allowed as a deduction for taxable year 1982 and each
of the next four years.
Again, interest incurred after December 31, 1975 is deductible under
the above rules and may be carried forward. The carry over of pre-1976
interest is deductible under the rules as set forth in the 1969 Tax Reform
Act. It should be noted that the above limitations of $25,000 and $10,000
are reduced by 50 percent if a married individual is filing separate returns.
11.02 Preservation of Historical Structures
Code Sections 191, 280, 167(n), 167(o), 170(f) (3) (C) - Act Section
2124
Effective Dates as cited below
Congress has again turned to the tax statutes to achieve economic and
social goals by giving out rewards and penalties for those who respectively
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improve and maintain or destroy historical structures. Section 191 (d)
defines a certified historic structure as real property which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation and which is listed in the National Register,
is located in a Registered Historic District, and is certified by the Secretary
of Interior as being of historical significance to the district, or is located in a
historic district designated under a statute of the individual state or local
government provided that such statue is certified by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior to the Secretary of Treasury as containing criteria which will substantially
achieve the objective of preserving and rehabilitating buildings of historical
significance.
Under existing law, a deduction is permitted for the expense of
demolishing a building and also for the unamortized adjusted basis of the
building if the property was not acquired with the intent of demolishing and
removing the existing building. If a building located in a Registered Historic
District is demolished without the prior certification of the Secretary of the
Interior that such a building is not of a historical significance to the district,
no deduction shall be permitted for the cost of demolition or for the unadjusted
basis of the building demolished, and the cost thereof shall be added to the
capital account of the land. In effect, this means that no immediate deduction
is permitted nor is a deduction permitted for depreciation over the useful
life of the newly constructed building. This section is effective for demolitions
commencing after June 30, 1976 and before January 1, 1981.
Section 167(n) penalizes taxpayers who construct property on a site
formerly occupied by certified historical structure, which was demolished or
substantially altered, by denying the use of accelerated depreciation. De-
preciation is thereby limited to the straight-line method for a structure
constructed on the site of a former historical structure. This limitation on
accelerated depreciation applies to additions commencing after December
31, 1975 and before June 15, 1981.
As an incentive to taxpayers to improve and rehabilitate historical
structures, Congress has authorized the use of accelerated depreciation,
150 percent declining balance for commercial structures and 200 percent
declining balance for residential buildings, if within the last 24 months
the rehabilitation expenditures have exceeded the greater of taxpayer's ad-
justed basis in the structure or $5,000. Under existing law, a taxpayer
would be limited to straight-line depreciation for commercial buildings and
125 percent declining balance depreciation for residential property for any
improvements made to used buildings for which he was not the original
user. The adjusted basis, which is one of the determining factors as an alternate
to $5,000, is the adjusted basis on the first day of the 24-month period, which
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ends on the last day of the taxable year. This section applies to additions
occurring during the period of July 1, 1976 through June 30, 1981.
As an alternative to the accelerated depreciation, the taxpayer may
elect to amortize the rehabilitation cost over a period of 60 months if the re-
habilitation of the certified historical structure has been certified by the
Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of the Treasury as being con-
sistent with a historical character of the property or with the district
in which the property is located. It should be noted that the pro-
vision for rapid amortization is applicable only to the rehabilitation cost,
not to the underlying historical structure. Upon sale, the amortization in
excess of the depreciation which would otherwise be allowable, based on
the historical structure, will be recaptured as ordinary income. This section
applies to additions to the capital account made after June 14, 1976 and
before June 15, 1981.
The third and last carrot held out to the taxpayer is the promise of a
charitable contribution deduction of a lease, an option to purchase, or an
easement in connection with real property for at least 30 years duration,
which is granted to a charitable organization exclusively for conservation
purposes. Also, a charitable deduction is authorized for a remainder interest
in real property granted to a charitable organization for conservation pur-
poses. The phrase "conservation purposes" means to preserve land for
public outdoor recreation, education or scenic enjoyment, or to preserve
historical lands, or structures or to protect the natural environment of the
land. This charitable deduction applies not only to income tax, but also
to the gift and the estate tax. This section applies to transfers made after
June 13, 1976 and before June 14, 1977.
While the preservation of these historically significant structures is a
desirable social goal, it appears that Congress has overlooked their goal
of tax simplification by establishing a myriad of effective dates.
12.00 Property Acquired by Bequest, Devise or Inheritance
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the basis of property acquired
from a decedent was the fair market value at date of death or the alternate
valuation date six months after death if the property was included in the
decedent's gross estate. If the value of decedent's property had appreciated
in value from the time it was purchased, the beneficiary of the property
did not have to pay any income tax on this appreciation when the property
was sold. Therefore, it was common to refer to inherited property as taking
a "stepped up basis." This is in contrast to gift property which had a basis
to the donee of the donor's basis plus any gift tax paid. Here the basis of
gift property was referred to as "carryover basis."
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The 1976 Tax Reform Act eliminates the stepped up basis of property
acquired from decedents and substitutes the concept of carryover basis
property. In general the basis of carryover basis property for decedents
dying after December 31, 1976 will be the decedent's basis immediately
before his death with certain adjustments.
Excluded from the definition of carryover basis property are the fol-
lowing:
(1) Life Insurance proceeds
(2) Income in respect of a decedent. (Section 691)
(3) Joint and survivor annuities taxed under Section 72
(4) Deferred compensation and stock option plans, if income to
beneficiary
(5) Property transferred within three years preceding death (Section
2035)
(6) Stock in a personal holding company
(7) Personal and household goods, such as clothing, furniture, sporting
goods, jewelry, collections of coins, stamps or firearms, silver, china,
crystal, cooking utensils, books, cars, television, stereo equipment,
etc.
a. An executor is permitted to exclude $10,000 worth of these
personal and household goods from the effect of the carryover
basis rules by electing which items are not to receive carryover
basis treatment
b. These items will receive a stepped up basis as under pre-1976
Tax Reform Act law. Note that basis cannot exceed fair mar-
ket value at date of death.
(1) Adjustment to Basis of Carryover Basis Property:
For the purpose of determining gain, but not loss, on any property ac-
quired prior to and held by decedent on December 31, 1976, all taxpayers are
provided with a "Fresh Start." Note that Fresh Start applies to property
acquired by decedent from a prior decedent or donor who held the property
on December 31, 1976.
a. All marketable bonds and securities which are listed on any national,
city or regional exchange for which quotations appear on a daily
basis are to be taken on a basis equal to the market value at Decem-
ber 31, 1976.
Example: IBM stock acquired by decedent in 1930 for $30, valued
at $270 on December 31, 1976 and valued at $476 on June 15,
1987 when decedent dies has a basis of $270.
b. All other property, whether it be closely held corporation stock, a
house, land, equipment, an apartment or commercial building is
valued at decedent's original acquisition cost increased by that por-
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tion of the appreciation in value from acquisition to date of death
which is applicable to the period held from acquisition to December
31, 1976. The formula assumes a linear appreciation throughout
the entire holding period. The formula for non-depreciable property
is:
Decedent's Basis Number of days property
+ Fair Market Value at Death X held prior to 12/31/76
- Decedent's Basis Total number of days property held
Illustration:
Fair Market Value at Death $25,000
Decedent's Basis 10,000
Date of Acquisition 1/1/73
Date of Death 12/31/82
Holding Period before 12/31/76 4 years
Total Holding Period 10 years
Fair Market Value at 12/31/76 $20,000
Basis = $10,000 + ($25,000 - 10,000 X 4/10)
Basis = $10,000 + ($15,000 X 40%)
Basis = $10,000 ± $6,000
Basis = $16,000
If depreciable property is involved the calculation takes on an additional
complexity. The Formula is:
Multiply: Decedent's Basis (at Death) + Number of Days Property held prior
to 12/31/76
Number of Days property held
by
Value at Death
- Decedent's Basis + Depreciation by 12/31/76
-Total Depreciation
Illustration:
Fair Market Value at Death $60,000
Decedent's initial cost 30,000
Depreciation to date of Death 5,000
Depreciation to 12/31/76 4,000
Total Holding Period 5 years
Holding Period to 12/31/76 4 years
Decedent's Basis at Death ($30,000-$5,000) $25,000
$25,000 + 4/5 X ($60,000-$25,000-$5,000) + 4,000
$25,000 + (4/5 X $30,000) + $4,000
$25,000 + $24,000 + $4,000
Basis to Distributee = $53,000
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Note: The above complex calculations are required because Congress
wanted to avoid the inconvenience to taxpayers which would be
necessitated by requiring an appraisal of all property held on
December 31, 1976.
(2) Adjustment for Federal and State Estate Taxes:
To eliminate the inequity of requiring taxpayers to pay both an estate
tax and an income tax on the appreciation in value of each asset, the carry-
over basis is increased by the estate taxes, both federal and state, paid by
the estate, attributable to the appreciation.
Note: The basis is not increased by the total estate taxes paid, but
only the estate taxes attributable to the appreciation from date
of acquisition to date of death.
Note: This adjustment is applicable only to property which is subject
to the estate tax. Therefore, property for which a marital deduc-
tion or charitable contribution is allowed does not qualify for this
adjustment. The formula is:
Net Appreciation X Total Estate Taxes
Value of Property Subject To Estate Tax
Illustration:
Value of Stock at Death $250,000
Decedent's Basis (Cost) 50,000
Estate Tax on $250,000 70,800
200,000
250,000 X 70,800
80% X 70,800
56,640 = Adjustment for Federal and State Estate Taxes
(3) Adjustment for $60,000 Minimum Basis:
The 1976 Tax Reform Act provides that the total basis of all property
may be increased to $60,000 minimum basis. Only property covered by the
carryover basis rule is considered for this adjustment. Therefore, the per-
sonal and household property of up to $10,000 is not included in this
computation.
The sequence in which the four adjustments are made is vital in that
the $60,000 minimum basis is applied only after the fresh start basis is
calculated and then increased by the federal and state estate taxes.
Example 1: Assume the fresh start basis of the property is $53,000
and the applicable federal and state estate taxes are
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$5,000. The adjustment for the $60,000 minimum basis
is limited to $2,000 [$60,000-(53,000 + 5,000)]
If the fresh start basis in the preceding example was
$55,000 or more and the federal and state estate taxes
remained at $5,000, no minimum basis adjustment is
permitted.
Note: This adjustment is applicable only when the total of
the basis of all the individual assets in the estate, after ad-
justment for federal and state estate taxes, is less than
$60,000. Again, the $60,000 minimum basis refers to
basis, not the fair market value used for valuation of
the gross estate.
This adjustment is prorated to all the individual assets based on the
following formulae:
(60,000-Total Basis) X net appreciation of each carryover basis assettotal appreciation of all carryover basis assets
Illustration:
Estate Consisting of
(1) Stock (XYZ Co.)
(2) Lot-Sand Dune
Estate
(2) (3)
Carryover
Basis
40,000
F.M.V.
at Death
75,000
10,000 25,000
50,000 100,000
Appreciation
(Col. 2 - Col. 1)
35,000
(4) (5)Distribution
Minimum Basis
Basis Adj. (Col. 1 & Col. 4)
(1)7,000 47,000
15,000 (2)3,000 13,000
50,000 3,000 53,000
(1) (60,000-50,000) X 35,000
50,000
10,000 X 7/10 - 7,000 = minimum basis adjustment
15,000
(2) (60,000-50,000) X 5,00050,000
10,000 X 3/10 = 3,000 = minimum basis adjustment
(4) Adjustment for State Succession Taxes:
The fourth and final adjustment to basis of carryover basis property
is for state estate inheritance, legacy and succession taxes attribu-
table to the appreciation paid by the distributee of the property for which
the estate is not responsible. This adjustment applies only to property which
is subject to the tax. If inheritances by a minor are exempt from the estate
tax, no adjustment is permitted for assets passing to the minor. The formula
for the adjustment is:
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State Succession Taxes Paid X Appreciation of each asset received
Total Appreciation of all assets received
Adjustment Summary:
All adjustments are required to be made in the order as set forth here.
There is an overall limitation on the amount of adjustments, in that
the adjusted basis cannot exceed the fair market value of the property. Fair
market value is deemed to be the value as reported on the federal estate
tax return, whether this value is at date of death, the alternate valuation date
six months later, or the special value of a farm or closely held business.
Note: If the property passing from the estate to the beneficiary would
have been subject to the recapture provisions of Section 1245
and Section 1250 had the decedent sold the property prior to
the death, the recapture potential will pass to the beneficiary and
upon sale by the beneficiary will convert what would have been
capital gain into ordinary income.
The preceding rules are applicable to property given by decedent within
three years of death per Section 2035 provided the donee has not disposed
of the gift property prior to decedent's death.
Property Acquired by Gift:
Section 1015 provides that the donee's basis of property received by
gift is the same basis as it was in the hands of the donor, increased by the
amount of gift tax paid on the net appreciation in value from date acquired
by donor to date of gift. This is the rule if gain is to be calculated. If a
loss is incurred by the donee upon sale, the rule is that the donee's basis
is the same as in the hands of the donor or the last preceding donor by whom
it was acquired by gift, or the fair market value at the time of gift, whichever
is lower. Also, we shall see that it is possible to have neither a gain nor loss
on the sale by a donee.
For the purpose of determining gain, the following formula applies:
Basis to Donee __ Donors Basis + Gift Tax X Fair Market Value at
Date of Gift - Basis
Fair Market Value of Gift
Illustration:
Cost 20,000
FMV at Date of Gift 100,000
Unified (Gift) Transfer Tax 23,800
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100,000 - 20,000
= 20,000 + 23,000 X 100,000100,000
-20,000 + 23,800>X 80,000
100,000
= 20,000 + 23,800 X 80%
= 20,000 + 19,040
= 39,040
Illustration:
Assume that Albert purchased bonds for $2,000 five years before
making a gift to Bob. At the time of the gift, the bonds had a fair market
value of $1,600. Also assume for this illustration that no gift tax was paid
by the donor.
For determining gain, the donee's basis is $2,000.
For determining loss, the fair market value at the date of gift was less
than the basis in the hands of the donor, $1,600.
If the donee sells the bonds for $2,400, his gain is $400 ($2,400 -
$2,000).
If the donee sells the bonds for $1,400 his loss is $200 ($1,600 -
$1,400).
If the donee sells the bonds for any amount between $1,600 and
$2,000 there is neither gain nor loss.
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